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“Occupational licensure as an interference in free markets gets less attention
than its importance for both good and ill warrants. Morris Kleiner is our foremost expert on this important topic, and this book shares what he has learned.
Whatever your policy instincts, this book provides important new insights. It
is a great and valuable accomplishment.”
—Lawrence Summers, Charles W. Eliot University Professor at Harvard
University
“Morris Kleiner is the leading expert in the nation, and perhaps the world, on
the causes and effects of occupational licensing. His book Stages of Occupational Regulation presents five case studies of occupations—interior designers,
mortgage brokers, preschool teachers, electricians and plumbers, and dentists
and hygienists—that are at different stages of government regulation, and then
uses these case studies to provide new insights as to how regulation affects
practitioners, consumers, and the public at large. His focus throughout is on the
efficiency and equity impacts of regulation, and this very interesting, carefully
researched, and well-written book will provide readers with a new appreciation
of the importance of occupational regulation in American society.”
—Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Irving M. Ives Professor of Industrial and Labor
Relations and Economics, Cornell University
“Stages of Occupational Regulation: Analysis of Case Studies makes a great
companion to Kleiner's previous book, Licensing Occupations: Ensuring
Quality or Restricting Competition? In addition to providing an excellent summary of the literature, the book presents original research examining a broad
range of effects of occupational licensing regulations—effects on wages, entry
into the occupation, and adverse outcomes both for consumers and for licensed
professionals. The book delves into how these effects differ among occupations that are licensed in only a handful of states, those that are universally
licensed, and those with licensing regimes lying somewhere in between, describing the details of the economics and public policy issues at play. Stages of
Occupational Regulation also contains a wealth of ideas for future research.”
—Bradley Larsen, Department of Economics, Stanford University
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“Stages of Occupational Regulation blends detailed institutional knowledge,
historical perspective, and economic analysis to present the costs and benefits
of the growing rate of occupational licensing in the U.S. economy. Kleiner is
a clear and engaging narrator, using occupations at various stages of licensing requirements, from mortgage brokers to dental hygienists, to illustrate the
political economy of heightened regulation and to clarify who wins and who
loses from the process. This book, with its wealth of real-world detail, is a
welcome companion to Kleiner’s earlier statistical studies on occupational licensing and cements his place as the foremost expert on this important labor
market institution.”
—Leah Boustan, Department of Economics, University of California at Los
Angeles
“Stages of Occupational Regulation asks searching questions concerning the
use of occupational regulation as a policy lever. Where it is necessary, we are
invited to consider the appropriate form that should be employed, and Professor Kleiner helpfully continues an important conversation about this oftneglected topic.”
—Adam Parfitt, Executive Director, Council on Licensure, Enforcement, and
Regulation (CLEAR)
“Supported by cogent and persuasive historical, institutional, and quantitative
analyses, Stages of Occupational Regulation: Analysis of Case Studies provides new insights into the evolution and impacts of occupational regulation
on the U.S. economy.”
—Adriana D. Kugler, Vice-Provost for Faculty and Professor of Public Policy,
Georgetown University
“To paraphrase Tolstoy, all unlicensed professions are alike; each licensed profession is licensed in its own way. Morris Kleiner has shined a light on this
increasingly pervasive labor market regulation with a variety of informative
case studies, each of which helps us understand why professions are licensed,
who is affected, and why it matters.”
—Charles Wheelan, Harris School of Public Policy, University of Chicago
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Preface
I was left wanting more . . . I liken it to the cliffhanger in a work of
fiction; it has made me eager for the next installment.
—Alice Ramey (2010), Bureau of Labor Statistics economist, in her
review of Licensing Occupations: Ensuring Quality or Restricting
Competition?
As this epigraph attests, I am reasonably certain that at least one reader
was on the edge of her seat while turning the pages of my last book, Licensing
Occupations: Ensuring Quality or Restricting Competition?, published by the
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research in 2006. Occupational licensing is not a topic that often gets mentioned with the same sense of anticipation
as a Robert Ludlum spellbinder or a Sherlock Holmes mystery, but I will take
modest praise wherever I can find it. Therefore, to satisfy the wishes of Alice
Ramey and any other readers for a follow-up work, I have written this current
book.
The goal of this book is to provide new insights into how occupational regulation influences practitioners, consumers, and the public. To accomplish this
goal, I provide detailed case studies of occupations at various stages of governmental regulation. The occupations selected are those of interior designers,
mortgage brokers, preschool teachers, electricians and plumbers, and dentists
and hygienists. Although the groups examined were not randomly selected,
they reflect large occupational groups that have important economic and labor
market effects.
Each chapter presents the evolution and anatomy of each profession. It
asks why the occupation sought licensing or other forms of governmental regulation. Furthermore, it seeks to explain to what extent regulation has changed
over time and whether there is a convergence of state regulations to a national
standard. What qualitative changes have occurred within the occupation? Have
individuals that have attained an occupational license gained higher wages as
a consequence? Have other nonmonetary outcomes within the occupation
been influenced by regulation? Have consumers been affected by regulations
through changes in prices and the quality of the service? To what extent do the
duration and intensity of governmental regulations influence the members of
the profession?
By analyzing these questions, I have attempted to focus on the relevance
of each issue with as much economic and statistical rigor as possible. Furthermore, I have attempted to examine the equity and efficiency trade-offs as these
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occupations become more highly regulated over time. Specifically, to what
extent is access to the regulated service reduced for those whose incomes are
low? In contrast, do higher-income individuals gain by having more goodquality service providers with higher levels of training and experience? George
Shultz, the astute academic and later premier statesman, opined that lags occur
with general public policy issues, but that politicians are impatient (Shultz
1995). Occupational licensing generally fits this model, since it is an institution whose effects are not immediately apparent, but rather reveal their efficacy
over some time. Specifically, occupational licensing usually does not regulate
current practitioners, implements new exams, and develops educational and
location-specific requirements so that implementing these policies takes many
years. Consequently, the labor market or consumer outcomes are not immediately apparent. Understanding this institution requires a longer-run perspective
before wage, price, quality, and distributional effects can be fully realized. An
approach that evaluates the various stages of occupational regulation can help
capture and illuminate the role that this institution has in labor and service
markets.
To correspond with my initial lengthy examination of the topic, readers
should bring some knowledge of economics and statistics to this work in order
to fully understand the material. General readers without this background,
however, should have little difficulty comprehending the major portions of the
book and will be able to understand its key elements. Even when the material
becomes more specialized, readers without a technical background may judiciously push on, since the essential arguments and evidence explained in the
book are easily understood.
—Morris M. Kleiner
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1
Introduction and Overview
A dominant perspective on the development of policies for the
regulation of occupational labor markets is that these workers should
be regulated to ensure quality providers and high levels of service. In
only some narrow areas should competitive labor markets alone be
dominant. Others argue that occupational labor markets should be free
of government regulation because they have little need for licensing
through government rules, except in those cases where the health and
safety of society are seriously threatened. Since World War II, the market for occupational oversight by government has grown to such an
extent that by 2008 almost 40 percent of the U.S. labor market had,
or was required to eventually obtain, either a license or certification
from some form of local, state, or federal government (Kleiner and
Krueger 2013).1 Since governmental occupational regulation varies
greatly depending on the occupation that is licensed, the purpose of this
book is to examine a variety of occupations that are at different stages
of regulation and determine to what extent regulation has influenced
the individuals in the occupation, consumers, or other closely related
occupational practitioners. Since governments at the local, state, and
national levels are confronted with the interests of the members of the
occupations—and in rare cases with the interests of consumers of the
services seeking more regulation—the goal of this book is to provide
new analysis and evidence on how these labor markets work in the face
of new and continuing government regulations.
The book adds further background and new analysis to the issue
in the law-versus-economics debate, which asks whether litigation or
regulation is better for society (Kessler 2011). If regulation is efficient,
then ubiquitous regulation, which is found in most advanced nations,
adds greater impetus for economic development (Shleifer 2011). On
the other hand, the general theme of law-and-economics research suggests that contracts and the courts are a substitute for regulation (Coase
1960). They argue that if potential externalities can be contracted

1
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2 Kleiner

around, no regulation is necessary. However, the growth of regulation
through occupational licensing suggests that some manner of efficient
regulation may be gaining as the dominant form of public policy. An
additional issue that emerges with more regulation is that as occupational licensing becomes more prevalent, there is more room for litigation. This is because licensing develops more rules, which require legal
interpretation. That results in further complaints adjudicated through
the courts. The implications for economic growth are therefore unclear.
The common threads throughout the book include showing the
growth of regulation and its variations over time. Each subsequent
chapter shows an occupation that has a higher level of regulation. In
this way, the successive chapters demonstrate the influence of increased
regulation on the wages of the occupations and, where data were available, its effects on employment. A unique aspect of the book is that
it portrays outcomes both for consumers in the case of regulation of
mortgage brokers and for young children’s educational attainment in
the case of licensing of preschool teachers and their assistants. Another
unique aspect of the analysis is the examination of occupations such as
those of dentists and hygienists, who battle with regulators over who is
permitted to do what type of work in dental offices. A further innovation is the examination of how regulations may influence the number of
workplace injuries and deaths suffered by plumbers and electricians in
the construction industry, which is the most hazardous industry, based
on total numbers of workplace accidents in the United States. Overall,
there are common aspects of the volume, yet each chapter delves into
the unique historical or institutional aspects of a particular occupation
and how it is regulated by government using data and analysis.
The evolution of occupational regulation has a long and distinguished intellectual history. Adam Smith, in his 1776 work The Wealth
of Nations, notes that trades conspired to reduce the availability of
“skilled craftsmen” in order to raise wages. Smith goes on to say that
“to hinder him from employing this strength and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper without injury to his neighbor, is a plain violation
of this most sacred property. It is a manifest encroachment upon the
just liberty both of the workman, and of those who might be imposed to
employ him” (Smith 1937).
In the United States, a structural shift in the economy has developed.
The country has moved from a manufacturing-based economy, where
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Introduction and Overview 3

unions and collective bargaining contracts previously were prominent,
toward a service-oriented economy; the transformation has created a
demand for a “web of rules” governing the workplace that has made
licensing part of this evolution (Dunlop 1958). Although the number of
union members has declined, occupational licensing has grown over the
past 50 years (Kleiner 2006).
Occupational regulation in the United States generally takes three
forms. The least restrictive form is registration, in which individuals file
their names, addresses, and qualifications with a government agency
before practicing their occupation. The registration process may include
posting the equivalent of a surety bond or filing a fee. In contrast, certification permits any person to perform the relevant tasks, but the government—or sometimes a private, nonprofit agency—administers an
examination and certifies those who have achieved the level of skill and
knowledge for certification. For example, chartered financial analysts
and car mechanics are generally certified but not licensed. The toughest
form of regulation is licensure; this form of regulation is often referred
to as “the right to practice.” Under licensure laws, working in an occupation for compensation without first meeting government standards is
illegal. In 2003, the Council of State Governments estimated that more
than 800 occupations were licensed in at least one state, and more than
1,100 occupations were licensed, certified, or registered (Council on
Licensure, Enforcement, and Regulation [CLEAR] 2004).
A simple view, or the perspective of a bureaucratic functionary,
on occupational licensing by government suggests that administrative
procedures regulate the supply of labor in the market. The regulators
screen entrants to the profession and bar those whose skills or character traits suggest a tendency toward low-quality output. The regulators
further monitor incumbents and discipline those whose performance is
below the standards, with punishments that may include revocation of
the license needed to practice. Assuming that entry and ongoing performance are controlled in these ways, one would expect the quality of
service in the profession to be raised by occupational licensing but the
supply to diminish.
In contrast, Milton Friedman questioned the assumption of unbiased gatekeepers and enforcers. Instead, he viewed licensing’s entry
restrictions as creating undesirable monopoly rents or incomes. Members of the occupation worked in their own self-interest to restrict sup-
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ply, increase demand, and maximize “profits” for the members of the
occupation. Friedman (1962) gives an example of doctors who expect
to make a certain income or they will diagnose bogus ailments for
which they will prescribe unnecessary treatments in order to achieve
their expected income.
An expanded and segmented way of thinking about the issue of who
gains from regulation was suggested by Carl Shapiro, who stated that
both the average quality and the average prices or earnings from the
services within the regulated occupation will rise as licensing requirements are implemented or tightened. The consequences are benefits for
those who want higher quality, but at a cost to those who are in lowerquality service markets. Demand for the services of licensed workers
could increase because of higher perceived quality and lower risk, but
demand might also decrease for some segments of the occupation if
some consumers demand lower-quality services that are precluded by
the licensing procedures. An outward shift in demand could accentuate
the increase in the price of services resulting from diminished supply
and further boost provider incomes. Models of licensing assume that
consumers can choose among three markets: 1) a market for mature
producers known to sell high-quality services, 2) a market for mature
producers known to produce low-quality services, and 3) a market for
young producers whose quality of service (low or high) is not known
by the consumer at the time of purchase (Shapiro 1986). The result
is that seekers of high-quality services gain by regulation, and those
who seek low-quality services are worse off because prices are higher
and choices more limited. There is somewhat of a reverse Robin Hood
effect, with the lower-income individuals losing and those with higher
incomes gaining from occupational regulation.
Consumers and citizens often value the reduction in downside risk
more than they value the benefits of a positive outcome. This preference by consumers for the status quo or for reducing the risk of a highly
negative outcome has been called “loss aversion” by Kahneman and
Tversky (1979). If the perception of licensing is that it leads to a reduction in the most serious losses, such as the spread of disease or the
lack of structural integrity of a building, then this form of regulation
can have public backing and support. These are the potential benefits
against which the costs—which are most often the subject of analysis—
are measured.
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Unlike unions, which can engage in concerted activities such as
strikes or work slowdowns, licensed workers neither sign collective
agreements with their employers nor engage in strikes against employers to raise wages. Nonunion workers, who are covered by collective bargaining agreements but are not dues-paying members, usually
receive most of the benefits of workers who are in the union. Occupational licensing can affect pay and employment through three main
channels. First, licensing may increase perceived quality by imposing
initial education, testing, continuing training requirements, internship
requirements, or fees. These requirements are likely to diminish the
number of less qualified or unmotivated individuals who could enter
the occupation, and thereby they serve to drive up the average quality
of human capital in workers in an occupation, as typically measured.
A consequence is higher-quality outcomes for those who are able to
obtain the service, but fewer practitioners and less access to the service.
Second, by using the state to monitor and prevent the potential work
effort of unlicensed workers, competition by unlicensed individuals is
virtually eliminated through the use of the state’s enforcement powers.
For example, the work of hair braiders, which is unlicensed, could be
brought under the control of the cosmetology board and limited to only
licensed cosmetologists or barbers (Anderson v. Minnesota Board of
Barber and Cosmetology Examiners 2005). Furthermore, when demand
fluctuates for traditional tasks, the board has the ability to expand the
regulated work through establishing administrative rules and limiting
the work of unregulated workers.
Third, the regulatory board, through its administrative procedures
of establishing large entry barriers and moral suasion, can reduce the
number of openings in schools that prepare individuals for licensed
positions. In addition, by adjusting the pass rate on the licensing exam,
the board can change the number of new entrants from in-state or the
number of migrants from other states or nations (Tenn 2001; Pagliero
2010).
Some evidence suggests that licensing does restrict the supply of
workers in regulated occupations. One application focuses on the comparison of occupations that are licensed in some states and not in others.
The occupations examined were librarians (licensed in 19 states), respiratory therapists (licensed in 35 states), and dietitians and nutritionists
(licensed in 36 states) from 1990 to 2000 using census data (Kleiner
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2006). Using controls for state characteristics, the multivariate estimates show that in the states where the occupations were unlicensed,
the growth rate in employment was 20 percent faster than in states that
did license these occupations. Another study finds that the imposition of
greater licensing requirements by a state, such as requiring all students
studying to become funeral directors to take embalming classes, is associated with fewer women holding jobs as funeral directors relative to
men, by a range of between 18 and 24 percent (Cathles, Harrington, and
Krynski 2010).2
Studies of the effects of licensing on wages have, in many ways,
paralleled the research methods used to study the effects of unions on
wages (Lewis 1986). These approaches include cross-section estimates,
switchers from regulated to unregulated and vice versa over time, and
cross-sectional results from within-occupation comparisons (Gittleman
and Kleiner 2013). The general estimates of cross-sectional studies
using census data of state licensing’s influence on wages with standard
labor market controls show a range from 10 to 18 percent for wage
increase associated with being covered or attaining an occupational
license. However, within-occupation wage variations, both for service
occupations and for individuals in jobs that repair things, suggest a wide
range of wage changes, from 0 to 40 percent, associated with regulation
within an occupation.
Although these results suggest that licensing—the toughest form
of regulation—matters for wage determination, the results do not use
national estimates, do not examine the levels of government that may
matter, and do not consider the influence of the requirements to become
licensed, such as education, testing, or internships, which may further
enhance wages. When these national estimates are developed, they
show that occupational licensing can raise earnings of individuals in
the occupations between 15 and 18 percent (Kleiner and Krueger 2010,
2013). I plan to examine in detail several occupations to learn when
these national trends apply to specific cases as occupations achieve
varying levels of regulation over time.
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FURTHER COMPARISONS OF UNIONS AND
OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING
As I point out in an ealier volume (Licensing Occupations: Ensuring Quality or Restricting Competition?, Kleiner 2006), unions and
licensing membership are moving in different directions (Kleiner and
Krueger 2013). To update my earlier results to 2008, Figure 1.1 shows
the trends in unionization and licensing over time from 1950 to 2008
(Council of State Governments 1952).3 Licensing data for earlier periods are available only at the state/occupational level; the data gathered
through the Gallup and Westat surveys for 2006 and 2008 are denoted
with a dashed line in the figure. Despite possible problems in both
data series, occupational licensing clearly is rising and unionization
is declining. By 2008, approximately 29 percent of workers polled in
the Westat survey said they were required to have a government-issued
license to do their job, compared with about 12.4 percent who said they
were union members in the Current Population Survey (CPS) for the
same year. An overview of the data used in this volume is presented in
Appendix E.
An interesting anomaly involves the potential substitution between
occupational licensing and unionization. For example, in the United
Kingdom about 13.5 percent of the workforce must have a license
to work, but about 22 percent of the workforce belongs to a union
(Humphris, Kleiner, and Koumenta 2011). In contrast, in the United
States about 29 percent of the workforce must have a license to work,
but only 12.4 percent belongs to a union. In the United States, 41 percent of the workforce either is in a union or is licensed, and in the
United Kingdom about 35.5 percent of the workforce is in a union or
is licensed. Other nations, such as China, have found the general wage
gaps for licensing relative to unregulated workers to be about 13 percent (Chi, Kleiner, and Qian 2013).
For these two countries, the United States and the United Kingdom, there may be substitution of some form of a “web of rules” at the
workplace through the institution of either unionization or governmental licensure. However, there may also be complements, since in the
United States, as Table 1.1 shows, 45 percent of union members are also
licensed, but only about 26 percent of nonunion members are licensed.
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Figure 1.1 Percentage of Union and Licensed Workers, 1950–2008,
Trends in Two Labor Market Institutions
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NOTE: Dashed line shows the value of estimates from state-level data of licensing from
the Gallup and Westat survey results, including licensing by local, state, or federal
governments. More than 800 occupations are licensed on at least one level, according
to the Council of State Governments.
SOURCE: Licensing data are estimated from the author’s surveys, Department of
Labor estimates, a Gallup survey, and a Westat survey; union data are from the Current Population Survey (CPS).

Table 1.1 Percentage of Union and Nonunion Workers Who Are
Licensed and Certified
Licensed
Certified
Union status
No
Yes
No
Yes
Union
55.4
44.6
95.0
5.0
Nonunion
74.3
25.7
94.0
6.0
Total
71.4
28.6
94.2
5.8
SOURCE: Princeton Data Improvement Initiative (2008).
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DEVELOPING STAGES OF OCCUPATIONAL REGULATION
Business enterprises are rarely formed as unionized firms. Similarly, even though occupations develop similar tasks and common procedures for doing a job, they are not begun as licensed occupations.
Occupations evolve, organize, and often select licensing as a method to
obtain professionalism, quality, and status, as well as to limit the supply of practitioners. They tax their members through dues and engage
in political activities that lead to registration, certification, and eventually licensing. The process of regulation across political jurisdictions
often takes years or decades to achieve full licensure. Consequently,
new occupations are often in varying stages of the regulatory process as
they seek to become regulated by units of government. Since regulation
mainly influences new entrants, it would take some time before the full
effect of licensing would influence either the wages and employment of
the individuals in the occupation or the consumers of their services. It
usually takes some time for individuals who are grandfathered into the
occupation, and have less measured human capital than newly regulated
practitioners, to retire or leave the job. Occupations at a more mature
stage of regulation would be more likely to have the benefits or advantages of the various stages of licensing than those that have recently
sought or obtained regulation at different levels of government.4
The occupations that I plan to examine have been selected because
they are at varying stages of regulation across states. In addition, they
were chosen because they have unique characteristics, such as a potential conflict with another occupation, an example being dentists and
hygienists. In other cases, I used an outcome factor, such as health and
safety, to evaluate the influence of licensing within the construction
industry.
Consequently, the overarching framework used to examine each
of the occupations is adapted from the models of economic growth in
Walter Rostow’s The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist
Manifesto (1960). Rostow’s model illustrates five stages of growth,
from traditional to highly developed, and places nations within these
groups. Usually there are events or institutional changes in nations that
trigger movement to higher stages of economic growth and development. The stages of occupational regulation are an arbitrary and in
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many ways a limited way of looking at the sequence of regulation. The
stages approach utilizes not merely the uniformities in the sequence of
regulation but also—and equally—the uniqueness of each occupation’s
experience. The trigger to starkly influence the impact of regulation
within an occupation is occupational licensing. There is an important
time-series element to the stages of occupational regulation. Furthermore, there is the importance of the restrictiveness of entry and the
significance of occupation members remaining in good standing, both
of which influence the ability of the members of the occupation to
influence wages, employment, and other outcomes that are affected by
regulation. Occupational licensing, like the economic growth models
described by Rostow, does not operate in a linear manner. Rather, time
and stages of regulation are key elements in the issues faced by the
members of the occupation, consumers, and society.
In this book, I modify the Rostow model to show that the various
stages of occupational regulation can be represented by several occupations that are at various levels of regulation by different jurisdictions of
government. I also examine the tension that exists between the occupations over the “span of control” of job tasks that are regulated by the
state. Each stage of the influence of occupational regulation has its own
set of outcome criteria such as wages, housing foreclosures, or health
and safety levels. Policies may differ based on the stage of occupational
regulation and the tasks that the occupation performs. Furthermore, the
length of time an occupation has been licensed matters for labor market
outcomes. Generally, the longer an occupation is licensed, the larger
the economic gain for being a member of the licensed occupation. I
will analyze these occupations to establish whether there is a consistent model of stages of growth or whether there are local occupationspecific conditions for each occupation—in which case the model
would not apply to those circumstances or for that time period. The
model development, the gathering of new data on regulatory institutions, and the empirical testing all have a common goal: to inform the
public and policymakers of the costs and benefits of being at each stage
of occupational regulation.
Figure 1.2 shows the seven occupations that I plan to examine in the
book, ordered by the number of states requiring practitioners to have a
license in 2007. Practitioners of these seven occupations include, on
one end of the spectrum, interior designers, who are fully licensed in
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Figure 1.2 Number of States Requiring Licensing for Seven
Occupations, 2007
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only three states, and, on the other end, dental hygienists and dentists,
for whom licensing is mandatory in all states. To the extent that there
is much variation in the number of states that require full licensing, the
examination of these occupations is likely to show how different stages
of regulation may influence workers in these fields and consumers of
their services.

FOCUS OF THE BOOK
A goal of this book is to examine a broad variety of occupations that
includes blue- and white-collar occupations at different stages of occupational regulation by government. In subsequent chapters, I examine
occupations that include ones that are regulated in only a few states
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(e.g., interior designers), moderately regulated ones where from onethird to one-half of the states license the members of the occupation but
entry is relatively easy (mortgage brokers and preschool teachers, for
example, are at this stage of regulation), highly regulated workers (e.g.,
plumbers and electricians in the construction trades), and universally
regulated occupations (e.g., dentists and dental hygienists). One unifying theme of the book is an exploration of the evolution of licensing for
each occupation at the state level. For this, I utilize a box-and-whisker
plot that shows the average level of regulation for certain key factors
in the regulatory process, as well as the variation across states and over
time, to give the reader a broad picture of the evolution and anatomy of
regulation. I also present estimates of the influence of licensing or other
forms of regulation on wages for each occupation.
Since occupations differ widely in what they do, I will examine a
variety of criteria in order to evaluate whether regulation is achieving
its publicly stated goals. For example, for the newly emerging occupation of mortgage brokers, does more intense regulation result in fewer
home foreclosures or lower-priced home loans? Does requiring preschool teachers to have a baccalaureate degree raise their wages, and
does it assist in the educational attainment of their students? Has more
stringent licensing of plumbers and electricians reduced the number
of severe injuries and deaths for workers in the construction industry,
where such casualties have a higher occurrence than in other industries? When two universally licensed occupations such as dentists and
hygienists perform several similar tasks for the patient, how do the
regulations determine who gets to do the work, and what are the labor
market outcomes for practitioners in both occupations? Should national
standards be used in order to reduce any barriers to employment that
may be imposed at the local or state level? These are some of the questions the rest of this book addresses. In the final chapter, I summarize
the major findings on occupational mobility and examine the role that
different stages of occupational regulation over time play in the lives
of licensed workers and other constituents. I also examine the implications of occupational regulation for federal, state, and local government
in making policies that regulate occupational tasks and entry barriers.
Overall, the volume’s chapters have commonalities, yet each chapter
delves into the unique aspects of a particular occupation and how it is
regulated, then looks at the economic consequences.
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Notes
1. Unfortunately, no more recent national data are available than the data from 2008,
since the federal government does not keep regular data on the number or percentage of workers that are licensed. In contrast, annual data from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics tabulate the number and the percentage of union workers and union coverage. Unions form a much smaller percentage of the workforce than licensed
occupations (Kleiner 2006).
2. In March 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eastern District of Louisiana, in
St. Joseph Abbey et al. v. Paul Wess Castille et al., Case No. 11-30756, ruled that
the occupational licensing laws issued by the Louisiana Board of Funeral Directors granting funeral homes an exclusive right to sell caskets was unconstitutional
because it stifled competition.
3. The method used to calculate the percentage of workers licensed prior to 2006
first involved gathering the listing of licensed occupations in each state by Labor
Market Information Units under a grant from the U.S. Department of Labor—
see America’s Career InfoNet, http://www.acinet.org/acinet/licensedoccupations/
lois_occ.aspx?stfips=27&by=occ&keyword=&searchType=&. This was matched
with occupations in the 2000 census. If no match was obtained, the occupation
was dropped. From the census, the number of people working in the licensed
occupation in each state was estimated and used to calculate a weighted average
of the percentage of the workforce in the United States that works in a licensed
occupation. For 2008 we deleted individuals who were certified from our tally of
licensed individuals who were either licensed or certified in our survey conducted
by Westat.
4. Modern econometric techniques such as regression discontinuity, field experiments, or difference-in-difference approaches may have difficulty detecting the
full influence of licensing on wage determination unless they have long timeseries databases.
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An Initial Stage of Regulation:
Interior Designers
A practice act allows individuals to become licensed with a state
board in order to practice a scope of work previously not allowed
to non-licensed individuals. These design services vary by state
but typically include code affecting work. Most architecture and
engineering laws have been written without regard to the capabilities and training of interior designers. This is where legal recognition becomes necessary.
—American Society of Interior Designers (2005)

An overarching goal of many occupations at an initial stage of regulation is to obtain licensing by a governmental entity (Kleiner 2006).
The goal of this chapter is to present and evaluate an occupation at
an initial stage of regulation. The case study presented in this chapter
looks at interior designers, whose profession will serve as a baseline for
the other occupations that will be examined and evaluated later in the
book.1
According to this chapter’s epigraph, which comes from the American Society of Interior Designers (ASID), a goal of interior designers
is to become regulated by the government. The rationale is that their
occupation must become regulated in order to maintain its legitimacy
relative to complementary and competitive occupations such as those
of engineers and architects. Given the institutional environment of interior designers, where practitioners work with members of other regulated occupations, regulation has become necessary in order to maintain
job tasks. The goal of the major association of interior designers is to
obtain occupational licensing status across states in order to secure the
legitimacy and power to do work under the law—similar to other major
occupations that are complementary to interior designers.
Much growth in the regulation of interior designers has taken place
during the recent past. In 1993 only 36 percent of interior designers were

15
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subject to any type of state regulation, whereas in 2007 over 60 percent
of interior designers were subject to occupational regulation.2 However,
interior designers are fully licensed in only three states—Florida, Louisiana, and Nevada—plus the District of Columbia, the fewest number
of states for any licensed occupation examined in this book. Alabama
was the first state to regulate interior designers, having done so in 1982.
The so-called title act gave interior designers the exclusive right to use
the term “interior designer” in advertising. Alabama’s former practice
act resulted in full licensing in 2001, but the act was declared unconstitutional in 2007 by the state supreme court. The court stated that the
act “imposes restrictions that are unnecessary and unreasonable upon
the pursuit of useful activities” and that those restrictions “do not bear
some substantial relation to the public health, safety, or morals, or to the
general welfare, the public convenience, or to the general prosperity.”3
By 2009, 22 states and the District of Columbia imposed some level of
regulation on interior designers. Two states have registration laws, the
most basic type of regulation. States such as Minnesota, however, regulate the use of “certified interior designer” as a title but allow anyone
to do interior design work without certification. The District of Columbia and the three states that have full licensing regulations, however,
restrict the ability to work in the profession by prohibiting practitioners
from doing certain types of interior design work without a license from
the government.
This chapter provides an overview of the occupation of interior
designers, including regulatory requirements for entry and tasks relative to complementary occupations such as engineers and architects.
The analysis then documents the various stages of regulation and shows
the growth of the regulation of interior designers over time. Since relatively few states license interior designers, the chapter documents other
forms of regulation, such as certification and registration, for workers
in the occupation. The chapter also explores the rationale for why the
occupation seeks to become fully licensed. Since there is a battle for
work tasks in the construction and remodeling industries among civil
engineers, architects, and interior designers, not having an equal voice
within state licensing boards likely limits the ability of interior designers to legally do certain tasks or take ownership of large projects, which
may be the purview only of engineers and architects. Since the construction industry is highly volatile, having experienced large growth
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in the early 2000s and contraction following 2007, the ability to control supply is important. Furthermore, the ability to regulate specific
tasks—either those legally assigned to the occupation or those permissible—is an essential element of the “web of rules” for an occupation’s
members. The chapter provides a state-specific example of the push to
have interior designers fully licensed—in this case, in the state of Minnesota. Finally, it also supplies an empirical analysis of the labor market
implications of various forms of regulation on the wage determination
of interior designers.

WHY LICENSE INTERIOR DESIGNERS?
The Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Occupational Outlook Handbook
provides a definition of the occupation of interior designers:
Interior designers draw upon many disciplines to enhance the function, safety, and aesthetics of interior spaces. Their main concerns
are with how different colors, textures, furniture, lighting, and
space work together to meet the needs of a building’s occupants.
Designers plan interior spaces of almost every type of building,
including offices, airport terminals, theaters, shopping malls, restaurants, hotels, schools, hospitals, and private residences. (BLS
2012d)

In many respects, the work of interior designers overlaps and competes with that of engineers, architects, and other construction workers.
The fear that interior designers have of remaining unregulated among
these other occupations which are governmentally regulated in all states
is captured in the following statement by the ASID: “It is no secret that
some other professional groups would like to limit, control, or even
eliminate the practice of interior design as a unique profession. It would
be naive to believe that they are not making their cases” (ASID 2005).
Given that many unregulated occupations, such as perfusionists in health
care or the current case of interior designers in construction, view their
position as being precarious, the fear that other, similar occupations
will achieve through regulatory boards the ability to limit or eliminate
their jobs is a driving force behind much of the push toward additional
government regulation. The argument has been made that the true mea-
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sure of a profession lies in the number of educational requirements and
sophisticated tasks that determine whether the occupation is licensed
(Martin 2008). Thus far, no detailed analytical studies show that licensing significantly reduces dangers to the health and safety of the public
as a result of the work of interior designers, which is a major concern of
public policymakers. These public health and safety concerns dominate
the public debate regarding whether an occupation should be licensed.
Recent analysis shows that giving interior designers the ability to provide a “sign and seal” service for drafting documents for final approval
of building architecture increases their earnings, and that higher earnings are associated with more individuals entering the occupation. No
such labor market effects are observed with regard to the earnings and
employment of architects (Kleiner and Vorotnikov 2012).

HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE OCCUPATION OF
INTERIOR DESIGN
The occupation of interior design is a relatively recent addition to
the purview of governmental oversight. The professional association
for the occupation, the American Institute of Interior Designers (AID),
was founded in 1931, but it was not until the postwar boom of the 1950s
that the organization had grown large enough that it sought to become
regulated. In 1968, voluntary certification began through AID, which
was designed to pave the way for licensing. The professional organization also began to work with interior design programs to strengthen curriculums and develop continuing education programs for the members
of the occupation. In the following decade, AID and another interior
design organization merged to form the American Society of Interior
Designers (ASID) and were immediately assigned the task of collecting information on state regulations for the profession (ASID 2005).
In the 1980s the association began encouraging state-by-state registration regulations, and it signed an accord with the architects’ professional association to support only certification and not full licensing, or
what became known within the occupation as title acts. The agreement
allowed architects to register interior designers in states with these acts
and establish joint regulatory boards. Within this context, the agreement
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gave interior designers with expertise in the field the ability to use this
title, and those persons who did not fulfill the qualifications were forbidden from using the term “registered” or “certified interior designer.”
In 1999, however, the ASID board voted to withdraw from the accord
and aggressively pursue full occupational licensing by the states. Such
state licenses became known as practice acts.
When government regulation of engineers evolved to include civil,
electrical, mechanical, and industrial engineering by the 1960s, the law
stated that only engineers can sign off on initial and final construction
design and implementation of final construction. As a result, interior
designers were relegated to an inferior position within the construction
industry. Moreover, architects were held responsible for the development of the initial design of structures, which further diminished the
role of interior designers in the eyes of the law. More generally, state
and local governments have gradually assumed a more important role
in determining how work is to be done in construction. The appropriate types of labor inputs in construction are largely determined through
governmental statutes or administrative procedures. Working within
the constraints of this institutional environment, interior designers concluded that the only way to obtain access to certain types of work in
this growing field was to take steps to become a regulated occupation.
With this in mind, they proceeded to push for licensing in a number of
states. Here, a case study is instructive. The state of Minnesota is used
to illustrate the process of how interior design has evolved over time.
This state was chosen because it has regulated the interior design occupation since 1992 and full occupational licensing regulations have been
proposed to the legislature in every biennium since 2003.

REGULATION OF INTERIOR DESIGNERS IN MINNESOTA:
A CASE STUDY
A law to change interior designers from a certified profession to
a licensed one was first introduced in the Minnesota Legislature in
2003. As of 2011, the current law governing interior designers in Minnesota is a titling act that regulates the use of the title “registered interior designer.”4 The stated purpose of this statute is to “safeguard life,
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health, and property, and to promote the public welfare.”5 Regulations
restricting the work to persons meeting certain statutory requirements
now affect professions such as architects, engineers, land surveyors,
and landscape architects.6 The statutory amendments proposed in prior
sessions of the Minnesota legislature have called for a requirement
that interior designers be licensed (Alexander et al. 2009). The current
definition of an interior designer under Minnesota law is the following: “One who uses the title, and who designs public interior spaces,
including preparation of documents relative to non-load-bearing interior construction, space planning, finish materials, and furnishings.”7
Those without certification cannot use the title in the preparation of
plans, specifications, reports, plats, or other interior design projects.8
They are also precluded from holding themselves up to the public as
“certified interior designers.”
The proposed law has been introduced in every biennium since
2003. No major changes have been made to the content of the bill since
it was originally introduced as a proposed licensing law in 2003. Table
2.1 shows a brief history of the various attempts to obtain full licensing
for interior designers in Minnesota.
The key provisions of the proposed legislation would limit the
extent of the licensing provisions to larger buildings and construction
sites. Specifically, exemptions to the proposed law read as follows:
Nothing contained in sections . . . shall prevent persons from
advertising and performing services such as consultation, investigation, or evaluation in connection with, or from making plans and
specifications for, or from supervising, the erection, enlargement,
or alteration of any of the following buildings:
(a) dwellings for single families, and outbuildings in connection
therewith, such as barns and private garages;
(b) two-family dwellings;
(c) any farm building or accessory thereto; or
(d) temporary buildings or sheds used exclusively for construction
purposes, not exceeding two stories in height, and not used for living quarters. (Minn. Stat. § 326.03, subd. 1)

The proposed bill would thus exempt single-family dwellings
(which is intended to include homeowners) and farm buildings from
being covered by the act, in spite of the general proposition that home-
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Table 2.1 Attempts to Pass Licensing Regulations for Interior Designers
in Minnesota, 2003–2009
Year
2003
2005
2007
2009

Proposed legislation
SF 2868 / HF 3066
SF 263 / HF 1277
SF 788 / HF 991
SF 349 / HF 416

Sponsoring legislators
Sen. Higgins / Rep. Osterman
Sen. Higgins / Rep. Thissen
Sen. Higgins / Rep. Thissen
Sen. Higgins / Rep. Thissen

Result
Never heard
Never heard
Never heard
Hearing in Senate
Committee on
Commerce and
Consumer Protection,
2/17/09, failed on a
voice vote

SOURCE: Alexander et al. (2009).

owners are the least likely to have detailed information about the safety
of materials or the proper design of space for best use. A listing of the
proposed exemptions to the proposed Minnesota statute is presented in
Table 2.2. For example, the flammability of various building materials or the appropriate distances for wheelchair accessibility or handrail height may be unknown to a homeowner. For a large construction
company, however, this information would be a routine part of the bidding process. Large private-sector building contractors and governmental builders are more likely to be aware of current building codes and
guidelines and be knowledgeable about the qualifications for skilled
architects, engineers, and interior designers. Consequently, these occupations would not need the protection of a licensing law. Much of the
rhetoric during the discussion of licensing has focused on the comparability of laws covering licensing provisions for other occupations
that come under the auspices of the Minnesota Board of Architecture,
Engineering, Land Surveying, Landscape Architecture, Geoscience,
and Interior Design (AELSLAGID). The argument is that all the other
occupations are fully licensed and able to capture work, especially for
large buildings. The provisions and administrative procedures established by the AELSLAGID board govern the allocation of work that
can legally be done by each of the occupations within its jurisdiction.
Therefore, architects, engineers, and land surveyors are able to serve as
large-scale project contractors who can legally sign off on the quality of
a building, factory, or hospital. In contrast, since interior designers are
not licensed, they would not have such authority. This restriction dimin-
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Assembly (as defined by the Minnesota State Building
Code [MSBC] under Occupancy Group A2: dining and
drinking, fewer than 50 persons)
Business (as defined by the MSBC under Occupancy
Group B)
Factory (as defined by the MSBC under Occupancy
Group F2)
Mercantile (as defined by the MSBC under Occupancy
Group M)
Residential (as defined by the MSBC under Occupancy
Group R)
Storage (as defined by the MSBC under Occupancy
Group S1: aircraft hangars and helistops)

9/18/2013 10:10:25 AM

Storage (as defined by the MSBC under Occupancy
Group S2 except for parking garages, open or
enclosed)
Utility (as defined by the MSBC under Occupancy
Group U except for fences higher than 8 feet, tanks
and towers, and retaining walls with over 4 feet of
vertical exposed face)
SOURCE: Alexander et al. (2009).

Not greater than one story with no basement, seating for not more
than 20 persons, and not greater than 1,000 gross square footage
(GSF)
Not greater than two stories with a basement, and not greater than
2,250 GSF
Not greater than one story with no basement, and not greater than
3,000 GSF
Not greater than two stories with a basement, and not greater than
1,500 GSF
Apartment houses/condominiums (three units or less), dwellings,
lodging houses, attached single-family dwellings/townhomes, and
congregate residences (each accommodating 10 persons or fewer)
Not greater than one story with no basement, and not greater than
3,000 GSF
Not greater than one story with no basement, and not greater than
5,000 GSF
Not greater than one story with no basement, and not greater than
1,000 GSF
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Table 2.2 Exemptions to Proposed Minnesota Statute to License Interior Designers
Classifications
Elements that must be met to be exempt
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ishes their responsibility for risk and perhaps their rate of pay within the
construction industry. Therefore, it is in their best interest to tax their
members for political contributions and lobby appropriate legislators
and the governor for passage of legislation that would enhance their
position within occupations that are governed by the board.
Unlike the case with many of the other occupations that are discussed in this book, opposition to the licensing of interior designers
is organized. For example, AIA Minnesota, a Society of the American
Institute of Architects, and the National Kitchen and Bath Association
have both opposed the licensing of interior designers. The arguments
put forth state that licensing is not necessary to protect the health, safety,
and welfare of the public. Opponents have also argued that licensing
is a danger to job growth in Minnesota because it limits the number
of interior designers who could practice in the state. Furthermore, the
argument goes, licensing would be detrimental to consumers because
the limited supply of interior designers would both increase the prices
charged for services and limit access to services. And, in testimony provided to the state legislature, witnesses made statements that licensing
proponents had not provided any studies to back up their claim that
unqualified interior designers are a threat to health and safety. The
groups opposing licensing argue that the exemptions in the bill prove
that licensing is not about protecting public health and safety, because if
unqualified interior designers were a danger to the public in commercial
spaces, they would also be a danger in residential spaces, and therefore no exemptions should exist. If any group needs protection from
incompetent or unscrupulous vendors, they contend, it is homeowners.
They also argue that additional exemptions are allowed for licensed
interior designers under the proposed bill that are not allowed for other
occupations.
As mentioned earlier, architects also argue that the building code
requires that interior designers work under the direction of an architect
in most commercial projects. Problems with compliance would arise if
some projects were required to be supervised by an architect and others
required only a licensed interior designer.9 Architects have opposed the
licensure of interior designers mainly in anticipation of potential battles
among the occupations covered by the AELSLAGID for work tasks
such as certifying drafts of final drawings in the construction industry (Kleiner and Vorotnikov 2012). This issue is more likely to occur
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in industries such as architectural, engineering, and related services
(NAICS 5413) and specialized design services (NAICS 5414).

ISSUES OF HEALTH AND SAFETY
A central argument for the proposed Minnesota statute has been
the importance of licensing for the health and safety of the citizens of
the state. The anecdotes that have been presented focus on legal cases
involving interior designers, which are detailed in this section. In 1996,
a restaurant employee in the title-act state of New York sued an interior
designer for injuries related to a fall.10 The court stated that the interior designer’s services were completed prior to the plaintiff’s fall, so
the court rejected the plaintiff’s claim.11 This determination was based
neither on the existence of titling nor on any of the benefits of the act
(Alexander et al. 2009).12 One important aspect of this case is the court’s
finding that, because the plaintiff was not a party to a contract with the
defendant—rather, she was an employee who worked in the facility—
the interior designer owed no duty of care to her after the completion of
the discrete project for which he had been hired.13 The court stated that
the interior designer was not at fault in the incident.
In another case study involving the state of New York, a building
tenant brought an action against an interior designer, among others,
for injuries sustained in a fall.14 The New York State Supreme Court
dismissed this action against the interior designer because there was
no evidence that the interior designer’s specifications were faulty.15 An
additional anecdotal case related to interior design comes from the state
of Mississippi, which has no interior design regulation. In Simoneaux
v. BSL Inc., a plaintiff slipped and fell while attempting to exit a hotel
Jacuzzi tub.16 The plaintiff in the case sued several parties, including
the interior designer.17 The court in this case ruled that the issue should
be decided by a jury and that interior designers were not necessarily
responsible for the fall.
This case law suggests that not many legal cases offer clear evidence that the actions of interior designers have caused substantial
harm to the public. Even if these cases of injury had been attributed
to interior designers, there is no evidence that having licensed interior
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designers would have avoided the injuries. Moreover, the issues of the
role of prices in seeking nonlicensed substitutes, the scrapping of marginal projects because of labor cost concerns, and the reduction in the
ability to make private contractual arrangements are costs that should
be weighed against the potential benefits of moving interior designers
in Minnesota to a more rigorous regime of regulation.
Next I examine whether regulations for interior designers have
affected either the wages or employment growth of the occupation.

ANALYZING INTERIOR DESIGNERS
A key element in the examination of interior designers is whether
regulations at this stage of licensing have significant labor market
effects with respect to the wages or employment growth of the occupation. In order to present evidence on the influence of regulations, I
examine the American Community Survey (ACS) from 2007 through
2009. The ACS does not include a specific category for interior designers. However, an earlier analysis of the occupation by Harrington and
Treber (2009) developed a template for examining the occupation.
They created an interior design classification from occupational and
industry codes and used the following occupational codes to identify
“designers”:
260—Artists and related workers
263—Designers
775—Miscellaneous assemblers and fabricators
I begin with Harrington and Treber’s definition and expand it slightly
to include individuals with the occupational codes working in architectural services (the industry code for architectural services is NAICS
5413 and for specialized design services is NAICS 5414). In my conversations with both architects and design professionals, I learned that
many interior designers work in architecture firms. It is appropriate,
then, to assume that individuals coded as “designers” working in the
architecture industry are, in fact, interior designers.
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DEVELOPING ESTIMATES ON THE INFLUENCE OF THE
REGULATION OF INTERIOR DESIGNERS
In order to examine the influence of regulation for interior designers, I initially develop an index of regulation for the occupation. The
index includes the following three characteristics of the type of regulation for the occupation: 1) whether the state had any form of regulation;
2) whether it had a full licensing law or a practice act; and 3) whether
it had certification of the occupation, known as a title act. Forming the
basis of our analysis of the role of regulation in the labor market for
interior designers, Table 2.3 shows which states have passed these types
of laws, the kind of regulation by state, and the year in which the law
was passed.
As the previous comments and examination of the evolution of regulation for this occupation have shown, growth in the regulation of interior designers has evolved over time. Figure 2.1 is a box-and-whisker
plot that shows the growth of the mean and variance of the regulation
of interior designers for all states from 1990 to 2009. Prior to 1980, no
states regulated interior designers, but starting in the early 1990s the
number of states regulating interior designers through either a practice
act or a title act increased. The figure shows that growth has occurred
over time in both the level and the variance of the regulations governing the occupation. Although the figure shows the statutory coverage
of the occupation, it does not provide the level of enforcement of the
provisions.
Detailed data are available for interior designers from two major
data sources: the American Community Survey (ACS) of the U.S. Census Bureau and the Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) survey
from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The ACS is based on interviews with individuals, whereas the OES is based on a survey of employers. Both databases allow for an examination of wage and employment
data by state. A major difference in the ACS is that it allows for many
covariates (such as human capital and other types of characteristics of
the individual) to be controlled for in estimation procedures. It also has
information on income from nonlabor funds, and many of the interior
designers were self-employed and reported profits on their enterprises.
The OES, however, is a state-based program with few of the covari-
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Table 2.3 State Regulations for Interior Designers
State
Type of statute
Alabama
Title act
Alaska
None
Arizona
None
Arkansas
Title act
California
Title act
Colorado
Permitting statute
Connecticut
Title act
Delaware
None
District of Columbia
Practice act
Florida
Practice act
Georgia
Title act
Hawaii
None
Idaho
None
Illinois
Title act
Indiana
Title act
Iowa
Title act
Kansas
None
Kentucky
Title act
Louisiana
Practice act
Maine
Title act
Maryland
Title act
Massachusetts
None
Michigan
None
Minnesota
Title act
Mississippi
None
Missouri
Title act
Montana
None
Nebraska
None
Nevada
Practice act
New Hampshire
None
New Jersey
Title act
New Mexico
Title act
New York
Title act
North Carolina
None
North Dakota
None
Ohio
None

Year passed
1982

1993
1990
2001
1983
1999
1994
1992

1990
1990
2005
2002
1999
1993
1991

1992
1998

1995
2002
1989
1990

(continued)
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Table 2.3 (continued)
State
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Type of statute
Title act
None
None
None
None
None
Title act
Title act
None
None
Title act
None
None
Title act
None

Year passed
2006

1991
1991

1990

1996

SOURCE: Author’s compilation; American Society of Interior Designers (ASID).

ates that are needed to fully examine the occupation, but it does allow
the use of state-level covariates. Together, these data sources provide
confirmation or evidence of the role of statutory requirements in the
regulation of interior designers.
Other Data
In order to take into account other characteristics of the economic
environment that may influence the labor market for interior designers,
the empirical models control for state per capita income and the growth
in state employment. Since other factors may influence the wages and
employment growth of interior designers beyond those captured by the
statutory factors, additional controls are included for the state and year
characteristics of the observations; these additional controls are called
state and year fixed effects. This approach provides estimates that are
equivalent to difference-in-differences estimators for those states that
changed their policies. This technique is useful because it avoids bias
due to omitted variables that do not change over time in the use of a
panel data set like the ones used in the analysis.

Kleiner2013.indb 28

9/18/2013 10:10:27 AM

An Initial Stage of Regulation: Interior Designers 29
Figure 2.1 Evolution of State Regulations for Interior Designers,
1990–2009

6

Index

4

2

0
1990

1995

2000

2005

2009

NOTE: This figure shows the growth of the mean and the variance for the regulation
requirement index of interior designers from 1990 to 2009. The requirement indexes
for each state, which measure the restriction level of regulation, are produced based
on a series of requirements to obtain a license or certificate, including minimum education and experience, examination requirement, continuing education requirement,
age requirement, and so on.
SOURCE: Author’s compilation.

ESTIMATES OF THE INFLUENCE OF REGULATION ON
WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT
In order to analyze the influence of state regulation on the labor
market of interior designers, the analysis uses the data on the labor market combined with the information on the regulatory regimes of each of
the states. The ACS contains detailed economic data for an analysis of
the economic characteristics of interior designers. In combination with
the trends in the regulation of the occupation over time, the estimates
should show to what extent the movement toward more regulation may
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have influenced the wages and employment of the individuals in the
occupation.
Table 2.4 shows the basic mean wage data on interior designers
in the ACS, as well as the data broken down by whether they were
licensed. The data show that interior designers earned an average of
$41,412 annually in 2009; those individuals who were covered by
licensing laws earned $38,324, whereas designers in unlicensed states
earned $41,750. These values, however, fail to take into account other
factors that may influence the earnings of interior designers. The rest
of this section documents the wage and employment effects of various
forms of occupational regulation of interior designers.
The model used in the analysis is a basic fixed-effects approach
that can also be viewed as a generalization of the conventional twogroup, two-period difference-in-differences model. Table 2.5 shows the
results for both a traditional panel estimate of the role of regulation in
wage determination and a two-stage estimation procedure. For the twostage procedure, the first stage is developed by estimating a model of
individual-level outcomes on covariates and a full set of state × time
fixed effects. The coefficients on the state × time fixed effects represent
state × time mean outcomes that have been “purged” of the variation
Table 2.4 Basic Data on Interior Designers from the American
Community Survey (ACS), 2009
Nonlicensed states
mean
sd
Income ($)
41,750 29,890
Hourly wage ($)
26.26
167.76
Annual hours
1,872
747
Age
39.54
12.24
Female
0.54
0.50
Hispanic
0.08
0.27
Black
0.04
0.19
Asian
0.09
0.28
Bachelor
0.50
0.50
Master
0.09
0.28
No. of observations
10,889

Licensed states
mean
sd
38,324 26,501
22.64
33.49
1,912
743
41.30
12.47
0.55
0.50
0.15
0.36
0.05
0.22
0.03
0.16
0.44
0.50
0.08
0.27
1,287

All states
mean
sd
41,412 29,590
25.91
159.6
1,876
746
39.72
12.27
0.54
0.50
0.08
0.28
0.04
0.19
0.08
0.27
0.49
0.50
0.09
0.28
12,176

NOTE: sd = standard deviation.
SOURCE: ACS.
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associated with the within-cell variation in the covariates. In the second stage, these “adjusted cell-level means” are estimates on the policy
variables and fixed effects. The two-step approach is a way of performing aggregation while still allowing for adjustment of individual-level
covariates, which is a limitation of pure aggregation. The basic panel
estimates, which are also shown in the table, include individual covariates as well as state and year fixed effects.18
Using data from the ACS, Table 2.5 shows the influence of economic variables on the logarithm of hourly earnings. The key variables
from the ACS are as hypothesized, with key human capital factors such
as education and age having a major influence on wage determination.
In order to show the influence of regulation on wage determination,
the model includes measures of regulation in the estimation equations.
The basic economic variables such as age and gender show consistent
results, and there seems to be little influence of the individual regulation
variables on measures of hourly wage determination. However, using
an F-test of the joint significance of the variables on wage determination finds that they are positive and significant using either the one- or
the two-stage specification of the earnings model. Perhaps at very low
levels of state regulation, which is the case for the occupation, the influence of regulation on earnings appears to have a small magnitude.
Licensing may behave in a manner similar to unionization, where
initially the influence of regulation on wages may be small, but the
influence is likely to grow over time (Freeman and Kleiner 1990). Analysis for interior designers and architects shows that this is the case for
provisions such as sign-and-seal for these occupations as well (Kleiner
and Vorotnikov 2012). Furthermore, since only three states and the District of Columbia have a practice act, which is the most restrictive form
of occupational regulation and the type of regulation that is most likely
to limit competition, the result may be that neighboring or nearby states
are able to provide these services. As with any form of regulation, a
key issue is enforcement, and in building, remodeling, and construction, where architects, engineers, and interior designers work closely
together, the issue of licensing may have a smaller role and less enforcement than in occupations where the work tends to stand alone, as in the
case of dentistry, detailed in a later chapter.
Although these estimates on wage determination provide some evidence of the overall effects of regulation on wage determination, a case
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Interior designer–logged hourly wages
Variables

One-stage model
B
SE
t

Two-stage model
B
SE
t

Regulation

0.100 0.081 1.24 −0.189 0.203 −0.93

One-stage model
B
SE
t

Two-stage model
B
SE
t

One-stage model Two-stage model
B
SE
t
B
SE
t

Practice act

0.311 0.083 3.74 0.176 0.210 0.84 0.212 0.017 12.57 0.359 0.121 2.97

Title act

0.100 0.081 1.24 −0.192 0.204 −0.95

State fixed effects
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Year fixed effects
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Covariates
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
78.91***
4.53**
F statistic for joint
significance
First stage N
12,176
12,176
12,176
12,176
12,176
12,176
Second stage N
n/a
454
n/a
454
n/a
454
NOTE: The covariates included in all models are indicators for gender, race, education, and a quadratic function in age. The one-stage
models are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) with state and year fixed effects. The two-stage models adjust for covariates in
a first-stage regression of individual logged wages on covariates and a full set of state × year fixed effects. In the second stage, the state ×
year fixed effects (covariate-adjusted mean wages) are regressed on the regulation variables and state and year fixed effects. The secondstage regressions are weighted by the inverse of the state × year cell sample sizes. In all models, the standard errors are robust and allow
for clustering at the state level. *significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level. Y = yes;
blank = not applicable; SE = standard error; t = t-score; B = coefficient.
SOURCE: ACS.
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study is particularly instructive, and the state of Alabama provides an
interesting one. The state implemented a practice act in 2001, which
was then ruled unconstitutional in 2007 by the state supreme court. If a
practice act had increased wages for interior designers, we would then
have expected to see a substantial increase in wages between 2002 and
2007 in Alabama. For example, interior designers in Alabama saw a
wage increase of 46 percent under a practice act (see Figure 2.2), along
with wage changes in the occupation nationally. By comparison, the
national mean wage increased by 17 percent over the same period of
time (Alexander et al. 2009). This case study demonstrates the influence of licensing on wage determination for the occupation in Alabama
in comparison with other states.
The BLS data provide the impetus for further analysis of wages in
the interior design industry. Although these differences in means certainly provide substantial evidence in support of the hypothesis, they
are not conclusive. Many possible explanations can account for wage
Figure 2.2 Annual Interior Designer Wages, Alabama vs. National
Average, 1999–2009
55

Alabama—mean annual
National—mean annual

50

2009 $ (000s)

45

40

35

30

25
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2000
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2008

2009

SOURCE: Occupational employment and wage estimates for various years, www.bls
.gov/oes/oes_data.htm, from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
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differences between designers in one state and another. For example, a
reasonable assumption is that interior designers in regulated states have
attained a higher level of education, on average, than those in unregulated states because of the presence of educational requirements for
licensure. In the subsequent section, statistical analysis is used with the
data from the ACS in an attempt to isolate the effects of regulation on
wages and explain the gap in earnings between regulated and unregulated designers.
One additional factor is the influence of regulation on the employment of interior designers. In order to determine this, the analysis provides two different data sets. In Table 2.6, the model is estimated using
the ACS for the influence of regulation on annual hours of labor supplied. The estimates in Table 2.6 show that having a practice act reduces
annual hours worked by approximately 16 percent based on the significant estimates in column three of the table. (This is the −330.3 coefficient value divided by the standard number of hours worked of 2,080
per year.) More rigorous regulation may drive up earnings enough for
practitioners to take some of those earnings in the form of leisure. Moreover, occupational regulation may restrict the supply of labor available
within the occupation.
In order to provide additional sensitivity estimates for the analysis,
the OES is used because it provides more detailed and potentially reliable employment data by state for the occupation. The estimates from
the statistical model are presented in Table 2.7. The basic model examines the influence of the three types of regulation of interior designers
on employment and employment growth, controlling for the per capita
income in the state. Similar to the wage estimates, none of the measures of regulation were statistically significant in influencing either the
level of or the growth in employment of interior designers. Independent
examination of the influence of regulation on employment by Alexander
and colleagues using the ACS found similar results (Alexander et al.
2009). Based on these estimates, regulation at this stage of development produces small employment effects as well as small wage effects.
Occupational regulation seems to have minimal effects on labor market
outcomes at the earliest stages of regulation.
Next we examine whether certain economic factors could affect
whether regulations for interior designers are enacted into law.
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Table 2.6 Effects of Interior Designer Regulation on Annual Hours of Labor Supplied by Interior Designers Using
ACS, 2001–2009
Interior designer annual hours of labor supply
Variables
Regulation

One-stage model Two-stage model
B
SE
t
B
SE
t
−138.3 227.5 −0.61 190.3 156.3 1.22

One-stage model
B
SE
t

Two-stage model
B
SE
t

One-stage model
B
SE
t

Two-stage model
B
SE
t

Practice act

−330.3 231.1 −1.43 −228.3 174.2 −1.31 −193.2 20.63 −9.36 −413.9 146.9 −2.82

Title act

−138.1 227.6 −0.61 194.5 157.1 1.24

State fixed
effects
Year fixed
effects
Covariates
F statistic for
joint significance
First stage N
Second stage
N

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y
44.61***

Y
4.08**

Y

Y

12,176
n/a

12,176
454

12,176
n/a

12,176
454

12,176
n/a

12,176
454
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NOTE: The covariates included in all models are indicators for gender, race, education, and a quadratic function in age. The one-stage
models are estimated using OLS with state and year fixed effects. The two-stage models adjust for covariates in a first-stage regression of
labor supply on covariates and a full set of state × year fixed effects. In the second stage, the state × year fixed effects (covariate-adjusted
mean hours of labor supply) are regressed on the regulation variables and state and year fixed effects. The second-stage regressions are
weighted by the inverse of the state × year cell sample sizes. In all models, the standard errors are robust and allow for clustering at the
state level. *significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level. Y = yes; blank = not applicable;
SE = standard error; t = t-score; B = coefficient.
SOURCE: ACS.

Variables
regulation

(1)
lnemp
0.163
0.128

practice
title
lnpcinc
State fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Observations
R-squared

−2.769***
0.768
Y
Y
369
0.747

(2)
lnemp

0.427
0.278
0.160
0.128
−2.738***
0.768
Y
Y
369
0.748

(3)
lnemp

(4)
empgr
−0.0003
0.273

0.274
0.250

−2.648***
0.766
Y
Y
369
0.747

1.291
1.450
Y
Y
328
0.440

(5)
empgr

(6)
empgr

0.352
0.505
−0.005
0.273
1.323
1.452
Y
Y
328
0.441

0.357
0.430

NOTE: * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level. Y = yes.
SOURCE: Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) survey, from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).

1.320
1.437
Y
Y
328
0.441
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DETERMINANTS OF THE PASSAGE OF LAWS
REGULATING INTERIOR DESIGNERS
Could some economic factors affect whether regulations for interior designers are enacted into law? In order to determine whether the
economic climate in a state matters, in Table 2.8 a hazard model is estimated for the period 2001 through 2009 to examine whether a titling
law was enacted during this period. This approach examines the time
to the passage of a titling law based on the characteristics of the state.
The results show that none of the three factors—1) the annual wage,
2) the state per capita income, and 3) the employment growth rate—was
statistically significant in determining the passage of a titling law. In
a similar manner, Panel A of the table provides estimates of a hazard
model for the period 2001 through 2009 for the passage of a titling act,
and Panel B shows the passage of a practice act, or a full licensing of
interior designers. No additional licensing laws granting full licensing
to the occupation have been passed since 2000. Again, the economic
factors in the state are not related to the eventual passage of a licensing
law. Perhaps political issues or a major event in a state may have led to
the passage of a law either giving interior designers the right to exclusive title and use of the term “interior designer” within the law or granting them the right to perform certain tasks. The results of the analysis in
this area, however, were inconclusive.
Next I examine whether unlicensed interior designers pose any serious risks to public health and safety.

PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE ON THE HEALTH
AND SAFETY OF CONSUMERS
If the licensing of interior designers does indeed protect public
safety, then licensing would reduce the probability of negative outcomes for consumers. In the case of interior designers, such negative
outcomes could include whether a building collapses, the impact of injuries caused by slippage on improperly coated floors, and the destruction
of buildings by fire. Alexander et al. (2009) examine results from insur-
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Table 2.8 Possible Economic Factors Leading to Passage of Legislation
Regulating Interior Designers
Panel A: Hazard model estimates of time to adoption of titling law
for interior designers’ regulation, 2001–2009
Variable
Average annual wage, 1999–2001
Average state per capita income, 1999–2001
Average state employment growth rate,
1999–2001
Observations

Hazard ratio
2.400
(9.786)
16.780
(89.803)
0.356
(0.410)

Coefficient
0.876
(4.077)
2.820
(5.352)
−1.032
(1.152)
28

NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.

Panel B: Hazard model estimates of time to pass practice act
for interior designers, 1990–2000
Variable
Average annual wage, 1990
Average state per capita income, 1989–1992
Average state employment growth rate,
1989–1992
Observations

Hazard ratio
42264.3
(291206.5)
4.867
(22.395)
3.124**
(1.828)

Coefficient
10.652
(6.890)
1.583
(4.601)
1.139**
(0.585)
45

NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. The wage is calculated from the 1990 census Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS). The five states (Alaska, Montana, North
Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming) with the fewest interior designers in the microsample are excluded from the estimation. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant
at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations using PUMS.
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ance brokers who cover interior designers and the structures they normally work on. In addition, they performed an empirical analysis across
states where firings might have been the result of shoddy work. Their
analysis, in which they considered together insurance premiums and
fire death rates, indicated no clear effect of the quality of interior design
licensing. They did not find conclusive evidence to support the claim
that interior design licensing will provide greater protection of public
health and safety. Furthermore, Richard Carpenter of the Institute for
Justice, using data on complaints to the Better Business Bureau in his
research, found no difference in the number of consumer complaints
filed against interior designers in states that had just certification (title
acts) and those that had full licensing (Carpenter 2008). Carpenter cites
testimony in Wisconsin that showed that officials in that state could not
find health and safety reasons for regulating interior designers (Callender 1995).
Thus far, the ASID has not demonstrated that unlicensed interior
designers have generated significant harm or loss to society relative
to those that are regulated (Harrington and Treber 2009). Proponents
of interior design licensing have asserted that the interior finish and
content of building materials are contributing factors to fires and thus
responsible for deaths, injuries, and costly property damage (Martin
2008). But building occupants themselves may have been responsible
for creating interior environments more conducive to the ignition and
lethality of fires. Thus far, no rigorous empirical evidence supports the
assertion that failure to regulate interior designers would result in more
fires, deaths, or injuries to the consumers of interior design services.
Overall, the preliminary empirical evidence contained in the current
research does not support the public safety rationale for the licensing of
interior designers (Harrington and Treber 2009).

CONCLUSIONS
One could summarize the role that licensing plays in regulating interior designers in this statement by Glenn Wilson, former commissioner
of the Minnesota Department of Commerce, regarding occupational
licensing within his department: “What you think we do, we don’t do.”
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Wilson explains that the ability to monitor or enforce regulatory provisions on individuals who are licensed by his department is minimal.
Consequently, he says, the general enforcement ability of government
on licensing regulations is minimal.19
For occupations at this initial stage of regulation, where certification rather than licensing dominates, evidence that regulation raises
wages or does much to improve quality is conflicting. The estimates
by Harrington and Treber (2009) show some influence of regulation
on wage determination. Similarly, Alabama interior designers’ wages
grew much faster than the national growth rate after implementation of
full-scale licensing in the state. More recent national data from the ACS
analysis through 2009, however, show that the regulation and licensing
of interior designers has a small and insignificant influence on wage
determination.
An examination of the employment growth of interior designers
during the period 2000–2009 shows that regulation has a small influence on employment growth once state economic characteristics are
taken into account. Furthermore, the economic factors available for the
analysis were not important in determining whether a law was passed.
Perhaps the organizational or political skills of the leaders of the profession were the more important factors in determining whether interior
designers were licensed. Another event in the state, such as a building
collapse or other catastrophic event, may have galvanized support for
the regulation of the occupation. However, in my research I was unable
to find such events that might have triggered the eventual licensing of
interior designers.
An examination of the evidence shows that interior designers are
seeking regulation in order to maintain the status of the organization
in comparison to both engineers and architects. From their perspective,
this goal is reasonable because these other licensed occupations have the
ability to legislate work for their members, which comes at the expense
of interior designers—especially when construction jobs decline, as
they did from 2007 through 2010. Although this goal is an important
one for the more than 72,000 interior designers in the United States and
their families, it may not warrant additional regulation based on the criteria of health and safety that are established in most states (BLS 2011).
Moreover, the dominant criterion for regulation in state government is
the quality of the practitioner; it does not take into account that limit-
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ing members of the occupation might affect consumers. Consequently,
what may be good for the members of the interior design occupation
relative to other competing occupations may drive up prices without
any clear evidence of higher-quality buildings or improved consumer
health and safety.
An examination of the regulation of interior designers serves as a
foundation from which to compare more intensely regulated occupations. The next several chapters examine occupations with longer and
more intense experiences with licensing. These chapters evaluate the
performance of the members as well as the influence of these regulations on consumers.

Notes
1. I would like to thank Jing Cai for her extraordinary assistance with the chapter.
2. See Harrington and Treber (2009) for a detailed listing of the issues involved with
this increase.
3. Alabama v. Lupo, 984 So. 2d 395 (Ala. Sup. 2007).
4. Minn. Stat. § 326.02. (“No person may use the title certified interior designer
unless that person has been certified as an interior designer or has been exempted
by the board.”) Registered architects can seek certification as interior designers
without meeting any additional requirements, and the act does not preclude an
individual from saying he or she can do interior design work.
5. Minn. Stat. § 326.02, subd. 1.
6. Minn. Stat. § 326.02, subd. 2.
7. Minn. Stat. § 326.02, subd. 4b.
8. Minn. Stat. § 326.03, subd. 1.
9. Minnesota Senate, Hearing on S.F. 349 before the Senate Committee on Commerce
and Consumer Protection, 86th Minn. Leg., Reg. Sess. (Feb. 17, 2009), available at http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/media/media_list.php?ls=86&archive
_year=2009&archive_month=02&category=committee&type=audio#monthnav
(audio).
10. Neil v. City of New York, 642 N.Y.S. 2d 661 (1996).
11. Ibid, 662.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Rubin v. First Avenue Owners Inc., 618 N.Y.S. 2d 793 (1994).
15. Ibid.
16. Simoneaux v. BSL Inc. WL 2165208 S.D. Miss. (2008).
17. Ibid.
18. The approach taken in Tables 2.5 and 2.6 produces results that are consistent with
the more commonly used panel estimation approach. Given the type of data gath-
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ered in the book on the influence of regulation on the labor market, we present the
panel estimation approach for the other occupations that are analyzed in detail.
19. Glenn Wilson, personal communication with the author, December 22, 2010.
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3
The Rise, Fall, and
Regulation of Mortgage Brokers
People think they can make a quick buck, but they’re not in it for
the long haul. We’ll see every shoe salesman and photocopier
salesman will all of a sudden be a mortgage broker, but come next
year they’ll all be gone.
—Mary McGarity (2001, p. 41)

Mortgage brokers are intermediaries who both match potential
mortgage borrowers with lenders and assist them in completing the
loan origination process for the purpose of purchasing property.1 Brokers have typically operated as independent service providers, not as
agents or employees of either borrowers or lenders, and they are compensated by fees paid by the borrower and sometimes the lender as
well.2 They are generally small businesses. Approximately 83 percent
of companies are licensed in only one state and employ from one to five
mortgage loan originators. Additionally, 87 percent of these companies
have only a single location. Data for individual mortgage loan originators reflect similar trends (Nationwide Mortgage Licensing System
and Registry 2012). Their role in the U.S. mortgage market skyrocketed from an insignificant few in 1980 to a predominant position in
the home purchasing market in 2007, just before the collapse of the
housing market in the United States. In 2004, about 53,000 mortgage
brokerage firms were operating in the United States and were directly
or indirectly involved in the origination of as many as 68 percent of
all mortgages that year (Wholesale Access 2005).3 As the mortgage
broker business grew, so did questions about the industry’s role and
its effects on consumer welfare. However, with the financial crisis of
2008 and the decline in the housing market, mortgage brokers declined
dramatically, so that by 2009 there had been a 72 percent decline in the
number of mortgage brokerage firms from its peak (Olson 2007). By
2010, there were only half as many mortgage brokers, about 246,000,

43
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as had been working in the occupation in 2006. In addition, by 2010 all
states required state licensure of loan officers, except for those who had
the title of independent brokers (Berry 2010). This decline and move
to more regulations reflects the opening quotation of this chapter. The
goal of the chapter is to examine the role of the governmental regulation of mortgage brokers on wage determination and on outcomes for
consumers for this highly volatile occupation. Within this context, this
occupation is one that has moderate levels of occupational regulation,
judged by the fact that it takes relatively little specific education and
few other job-specific requirements to become licensed. Nevertheless,
the governmental requirements that practitioners must meet in order
to do the work have been increasing over time, with clear implications
for the members of the occupation and the consumers of their services.
Workers in financial services are much more regulated than interior
designers, the focus of the previous chapter, but they still represent an
occupation at an initial stage of occupational regulation in comparison
with those that will be examined later in this volume.
This chapter examines the relationships between mortgage broker
licensing and labor market and consumer outcomes, focusing on the
period of growth of the services provided and the occupation. The chapter gives some background on the occupation and reviews the rationale for how licensing can affect outcomes in both the labor market for
mortgage brokers and the consumer product market for mortgages. The
examination of the occupation then introduces and summarizes a compilation of mortgage broker licensing requirements from the 50 states
and the District of Columbia for the period 1996–2006, initially developed by Pahl (2007). The data are used to analyze whether mortgage
broker licensing or any of its components have significant relationships
with labor or service market outcomes. Estimates are presented from
an index of regulation that attempts to construct overall indices of the
difficulty of mortgage broker regulation, but the analysis finds that they
are not significantly related to labor market or consumer market outcomes. The index examines many of the separate components of state
mortgage broker regulation and finds that one component—the requirement in many states that mortgage brokers maintain a surety bond or
maintain a minimum net worth—has a significant and fairly consistent
statistical association with fewer brokers, fewer subprime mortgages,
higher foreclosure rates on subprime mortgages, and a higher percent-
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age of mortgages carrying high interest rates.4 These results are often
viewed as a counterintuitive finding by those who suggest that occupational regulation either does not matter or can have positive influences on labor markets and consumer financial well-being. The results
developed in this chapter provide more evidence of the influence of
regulation on the quality and prices of the services in this financial sector (Ambrose and Conklin 2012; Shi 2012).

UNDERSTANDING THE INDUSTRY AND OCCUPATION
The number of mortgage broker firms nationwide is expected to
fall a staggering 72 percent from its peak back in 2005, according
to Wholesale Access chief David Olson, who spoke with National
Mortgage News. —Colin Robertson (2009)

From one perspective, the rise of mortgage brokering was just one
part of a broader vertical disintegration of the lending business which is
thought to have made mortgage credit more widely and cheaply available to many households following the savings and loan crisis of the
1980s. Mortgage brokers have played a role in the evolution of the
highly specialized and efficient mortgage market. In particular, brokers
can make the complicated task of shopping and applying for the increasingly wide array of mortgage products more manageable and efficient
for borrowers and lenders alike. Millions of households, including
many affluent and sophisticated consumers, have frequently arranged
mortgages through brokers. The brokers’ services seem to be operating
in reasonably competitive markets, as evidenced by the repeat business
and the recommendations of their services to others.
Critics of the members of the occupation have argued that too many
mortgage brokers are not honest or, more broadly, that market failures
prevent competition from effectively disciplining brokers’ profits and
quality of service. These market failures, mainly through information
asymmetries, allow mortgage brokers to profit at the expense of mortgage borrowers as well as lenders. These issues are said to be especially
problematic in the subprime mortgage market, where mortgage brokers dominated originations from the late 1990s through the middle of
the next decade (Schloemer et al. 2006). For example, data from New
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Century Financial Corporation show that brokers earned an average of
$5,300 per funded loan for all loans in New Century’s sample of the
loans made through mortgage brokers (Berndt, Hollifield, and Sandås
2010).
In response to these concerns, a variety of policy measures have
been discussed. One of the most common responses of policymakers
has been to increase the regulatory practices to include occupational
licensing standards for mortgage brokers. In a study for the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Pahl (2007) documents how state licensing of mortgage brokers increased both in the number of states and
the intensity of the statutes, as measured by more restrictions per state
between 1996 and 2006. Since then, a surge in mortgage foreclosures
has provided even greater political momentum for the enactment of
further regulation. Policymakers seem to have concluded that a lack
of market discipline and regulatory oversight allowed many mortgage
brokers to originate expensive and risky mortgages. They tend to view
a more comprehensive system of mortgage broker licensing as part of
the solution in order to reduce consumer problems in these financial
markets. Yet little is known about how or even whether licensing influences the labor market for brokers or their customers.
The evolution of mortgage brokering in the United States and
the policy issues that arose with it have been well described in other
sources; this chapter summarizes them to motivate and provide background for the analysis of mortgage broker occupational licensing.5 In
particular, mortgage brokering has become an economically significant
industry surrounded by controversy about the extent of benefits it provides to consumers and lenders. This section describes some of the key
pricing and quality issues that policymakers try to address with licensing programs.
The National Association of Mortgage Brokers (NAMB) delineates
the roles of the mortgage lender and the mortgage broker as follows:6
The wholesale lender underwrites and funds the home loan, may
service the loan payments, and ensures the loan’s compliance with
underwriting guidelines. The broker, on the other hand, originates
the loan. A detailed application process, financial and credit worthiness investigation, and extensive disclosure requirements must
be completed in order for a wholesale lender to evaluate a consumer’s home loan request. The broker simplifies this process for the
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borrower and the wholesale lender, by conducting this research,
counseling consumers on their loan package choices, and enabling
them to select the right loan for their home buying needs.
The mortgage loan process can be arduous, costly, and seemingly impossible to the consumer. The broker works as the liaison
between the borrower and the lender to create a cost effective and
efficient loan process.
As an independent contractor, the broker allows wholesaler lenders to cut origination costs by providing such services as preparing
the borrower’s loan package, loan application, funding process,
and counseling the borrower. (NAMB 2013)

The services of mortgage brokers were virtually nonexistent 30
years ago. At that time, the mortgage industry was made up almost
entirely of banks and savings and loans that managed the entire process
of bringing borrowers and investors together. They located depositors
and borrowers and recommended from a small subset the appropriate
type of mortgage, analyzed borrowers’ creditworthiness and the value
of their collateral, closed the loans, serviced the loans, and made payments to the investors. The banks used simple criteria of 20 percent
down payment—or higher fees for those with lower down payments—
and a fixed-rate mortgage over the life of the mortgage.
By 2000, the mortgage market had changed radically (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] 2002; Jacobides
2005). Technological change (fax machines, the Internet, and other technologies), financial innovation (credit scoring, automated underwriting,
securitization of mortgages, and so forth), and deregulation (e.g., repeal
of state usury limits) abetted extensive specialization and vertical disintegration in the industry, so that separate firms could focus on particular
steps in the process, such as loan marketing and closing, underwriting, initial funding, servicing, pooling, and long-term funding. At the
same time, the range of potential participants within each such niche
broadened; for example, nondepository mortgage banks competed with
depository institutions to originate and sometimes service, pool, or fund
mortgages. In addition, new types of mortgages (e.g., adjustable rate
mortgages [ARMs]) and differentiated products aimed at a wider array
of consumers, and these new products captured significant shares of the
market.
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These developments both affected and were affected by the rapid
growth of mortgage brokering. As the decision to grant credit became
less based on subjective assessments of the loan applicant and more
based on credit scores and other objective underwriting standards,
underwriting moved to the back office, and loan officers employed by
depository institutions focused increasingly on sales and loan closing
services. Improved communications technology—fax machines and
later the Internet and PDF documents—fostered the physical separation
of the sales function from the underwriting function, and this in turn
made it possible to outsource either or both.
Mortgage brokers take outsourcing one step further, in that they
work for themselves, as independent contractors dealing with multiple
lenders. As such, brokers allowed both established mortgage lenders
(the depository institutions) and new competitors (nondepository mortgage banks) to specialize and to rapidly scale up or down their sales
efforts and loan origination volumes in response to market cycles and
competitive opportunities (HUD 2002; Apgar, Bendimerad, and Essene
2007).
Low overheads and the resulting ability to efficiently market themselves within residential neighborhoods helped brokers in the early
2000s penetrate the emerging subprime market, which included many
households that were somewhat unfamiliar with traditional mortgage
lending institutions. Much of the growth of the mortgage broker industry took place through the addition of new firms, as the average size of
firms remained small, about 10 individuals, during most of the period
of the analysis (Sichelman 2003).
Mortgage brokers, by consolidating information on multiple products from multiple lenders, offered consumers a convenient way to
examine a variety of home loans for which they were financially qualified. The result was the creation of a viable intermediary role and rapid
growth in the mortgage broker industry from the late 1990s to 2008.
The transformation of the U.S. mortgage market after 1980 created
significant benefits for U.S. consumers by increasing home ownership
and improving the efficiency of mortgage processing, and mortgage
brokers claimed a share of the credit. Brokers served millions of customers from all parts of society; their repeat business and the multiyear
growth in their market share until the financial crisis in 2008 suggest
that many of their customers had been pleased with their services. Bro-
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kers helped to shorten the loan closing process and made it cheaper,
and they enabled the mortgage industry to meet enormous variations in
demand. However, the transformation of the mortgage industry created
new problems, and mortgage brokers were blamed for many of these.
Critics of mortgage brokers generally focus on incentive problems
stemming from the fact that the broker is an intermediary whose pay
depends directly on the size and number of loans he or she originates
and only indirectly on whether the borrower received appropriate representation on the deal and whether the borrower makes payments as
expected (Schloemer et al. 2006). The incentive issues arise because of
informational asymmetries among the borrower, lender, and broker. It
has been well documented that borrowers are confused by the language
and terms of mortgage contracts and related documentation (Guttentag
2000; Woodward 2003; Pappalardo and Lacko 2007). Borrowers frequently fail to understand basic facts about the mortgages they signed
and are even more confused about the other mortgage options available to them. Many have argued that the complexity created by having so many legal documents to sign in a short period of time makes
the financial part of home purchases nearly impossible to understand.
Many borrowers are willing to follow the advice of a professional, such
as a mortgage broker, even though they may be unable to verify the
quality of the advice even after the fact. This creates an opportunity for
professionals, including mortgage brokers, to abuse that trust by, for
example, recommending a mortgage that has a higher interest rate than
the customer qualifies for, in order to obtain a higher fee.7 The following three points, taken from Guttentag, are among the most frequently
cited consumer issues regarding mortgage brokers and other financial
intermediaries with similar incentives:
1) Brokers steer borrowers “to mortgages that provide higher
compensation to the broker but are not necessarily the lowest
cost or most advantageous to the consumer,” and they do so
deliberately and disproportionately with subprime, minority,
elderly, or poorly informed customers.
2) They market aggressively to maximize origination fees, in particular by persuading borrowers to take out loans they cannot
afford or to refinance too frequently based on their income and
financial status.
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3) They receive fees from borrowers and lenders that are more
than commensurate with services rendered, especially from
minority or unsophisticated borrowers.
Asymmetrical information, or information that one side possesses
but the other does not, also makes lenders concerned about the quality of mortgage brokers’ services. Brokers’ fees typically are paid only
when loans are closed. Consequently, brokers’ immediate incentive is
to earn their fees by getting lenders to approve and close loans, and
they do not have a direct stake in subsequent loan performance. This
incentive has been seen as raising the following major issues for lenders
regarding brokers:
1) Brokers may corrupt the information about the borrower that
is submitted for underwriting in order to increase the chances
that the lender will approve the loan, with the result that loans
handled by brokers are more likely to default than loans processed by the lender’s own loan officers (Alexander et al.
2002). The incomplete or inaccurate information can arise
from either carelessness or deliberate misrepresentation or
fraud (Schloemer et al. 2006). For mortgage brokers there are,
potentially, clear elements of either incompetence or unscrupulous behavior.
2) Contrary to contractual agreements with their lender clients,
brokers encourage the clients’ existing borrowers to refinance,
so that prepayment rates on the lenders’ broker-originated
mortgages are higher than on mortgages originated by the
lenders’ own loan officers (LaCour-Little and Chun 1999).
One view is that the marketplace can mitigate these consumer and
lender information and incentive problems and correct or alleviate the
market failures that have been alleged in housing finance. For example,
over time lenders can monitor the quality of the loans submitted by a
given broker and either stop dealing with or pay lower fees to inferior
brokers. Although some lenders began monitoring in this way, industry
experts assert that, at least until recently, these efforts have not been
sufficiently strict or widespread to significantly change aggregate outcomes (Alexander et al. 2002; Apgar, Bendimerad, and Essene 2007).
Some lenders mitigated losses by pricing broker-originated loans differently, using higher interest rates on these loans to offset default risk
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or imposing prepayment penalties to offset higher prepayment risk. On
the consumer side, confusion about mortgages contributed to enhanced
efforts at home buyer financial education, but with only limited results.
Guttentag (2000) suggests a new contractual arrangement, the Upfront
Mortgage Broker certification, under which mortgage brokers would
serve as the borrower’s agent in return for fixed, fully disclosed fees.
However, only a small fraction of brokers work under this arrangement.
As of 2007 the market responses have not eliminated concerns about
bad outcomes caused by asymmetric information and incentive conflicts in the mortgage broker market. Partly as a result, many mortgage
lenders have cut back on or ceased accepting broker-originated loans,
exacerbating the steep decline in mortgage brokering since 2006. More
importantly, the recession that was triggered by the financial collapse
in 2008 saw financial institutions dramatically reduce their reliance on
brokers because of the drop in demand for housing and because of the
actual and potential abuses that were associated with brokers.

RATIONALE FOR THE REGULATION OF
MORTGAGE BROKERS
With mainly market-based responses to financial crises not eliminating concerns about mortgage broker incentives and actions, public
policymakers have entered the fray. The federal financial regulatory
agencies have promulgated new guidelines and requirements regarding
mortgage information disclosures and subprime loan underwriting and
pricing. Many states and local governments have enacted antipredatory lending laws that restrict mortgage interest rates, fees, and contract
terms. In addition, state legislators and regulators, often with the support
and help of mortgage broker trade associations, have broadened and
tightened the requirements for mortgage broker firms and individual
loan officers to obtain the licenses that they need to operate legally. In
the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Congress established
new minimum requirements for state mortgage broker registration and
regulation. This section reviews the rationale for and previous empirical studies of occupational licensing. The following sections summarize the specifics of mortgage broker licensing in the United States and
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assess how state differences in mortgage broker licensing are associated
with outcomes in the labor and mortgage markets.
Licensing requirements generally take the form of unspecified fixed
costs controlled by the licensing authority, broadly similar to typical
licensing requirements such as payment of an annual licensing fee or
maintenance of a surety bond, which would be the case for mortgage
brokers. Utilizing a commonly used perspective on the rationale for
governmental regulation, skill affects the relative cost of producing
high-quality services, and licensing takes the more specific form of
a minimal human capital requirement, similar to actual requirements
that entrants and sometimes incumbents take certain training programs
or pass an exam (Shapiro 1986). Apart from these special fixed costs,
entry into and exit out of the occupation are unrestricted, which ensures
that providers earn zero economic profits in equilibrium—or, in other
words, no excess profits.
In applying any of this rationale to mortgage broker licensing, a
worthwhile consideration is what would be observed in the credit market if mortgage brokers provided higher-quality services. The nature of
the service is to match a borrower and lender efficiently, so that loans
are made with a favorable combination of lower search-plus-processing
costs than if a broker had not been involved. However, because credit
markets are also subject to information asymmetries, the credit market
results of high-quality brokering are potentially counterintuitive. For
example, higher quality might include the consideration that the broker
provides the lender with more complete and accurate information about
the borrower, so that loans are underwritten and priced more accurately.
If so, it is conceivable that better brokers could be associated with a
greater proportion of high-priced loans in the credit market, because
lenders would be more willing to price risk rather than ration credit
if they had more trust in the information brokers were submitting. In
other words, the quality of mortgage brokering can affect the breadth
of the credit market and thus the range of creditworthiness among loan
applicants and recipients, and this can complicate the impact of higherquality brokering on some credit market outcomes.
However, if we control for the creditworthiness of loan applicants,
better brokering services would be associated with lower search- and
processing-related costs, such as a lower percentage of loan applica-
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tions being denied, a lower rate of bad matches that lead to delinquency
or foreclosure, and a shorter time between loan application and loan
closing or denial. The effects of better services provided by the occupation on interest rates, controlling for creditworthiness, are less clear.
Borrowers might be willing to accept higher interest rates in a brokered
transaction, compared with a nonbrokered transaction, if there were
more-than-offsetting reductions in search costs, just as lenders might be
willing to accept lower interest rates if there were more-than-offsetting
reductions in marketing and processing costs. The role for public policy
presumably is to ensure that borrowers obtain a higher-quality service
by the members of the profession, and that outcomes such as foreclosures are diminished by having brokers oversee the process.
Table 3.1 shows the extent to which the individuals surveyed who
were interested in these financial services checked with the government to see if the person who was providing the service was licensed.
The results from the survey show that only 14 percent checked to learn
whether the individual was licensed; 84 percent did not check on the
licensing status of the individual, and 2 percent didn’t know whether
they had checked. One conclusion from the survey is that licensing is
not a major factor in the perceived quality of the service. On the other
hand, the survey results could show that consumers assume that these
services are already of high quality or that regulation is not essential for
the service provider.
Table 3.1 Financial Consumer Monitoring of Licensing
Survey question
Eligible respondents
Answers
Percentage
Have you ever checked Respondents who
Yes
14
with a state or federal
have used a financial No
84
regulator regarding the
professional (“Yes” Don’t know
2
background, registration, to any of k_1 to k_5) Prefer not to say
0
or license of a financial
professional?
14,918
N
SOURCE: FINRA Investor Education Foundation (2013).
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MEASURING THE INFLUENCE OF OCCUPATIONAL
REGULATION ON MORTGAGE BROKERS
In order to examine and analyze the role of the regulation of mortgage brokers both for the members of the occupation and for consumers
of their services, a method needs to be devised to determine the level
of regulation over time for each state. To associate mortgage broker
licensing with market outcomes, a method was developed for the measurement of the extent of mortgage broker licensing. Cindy Pahl, as part
of her work at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, implemented
a compilation of these regulations in the 50 states and the District of
Columbia for the period 1996–2006, just prior to the dramatic decline
in housing prices and the recession (Pahl 2007). Pahl shows that a wide
variety of licensing provisions may apply specifically to mortgage brokerage firms. The following are examples of such provisions:
• The entity’s controlling individual(s) may be required to be of
minimum age; maintain in-state residency; meet minimums for
professional prelicensing education, experience, or examination
results; provide evidence of ethical fitness and absence of criminal background; and complete required continuing education.
• The entity may be required to name an individual as managing principal, and the managing principal may be subject to requirements similar to those for controlling individuals as well as
requirements to maintain a minimum net worth or surety bond
or to obtain a license as an individual mortgage broker or loan
officer.
• The entity itself may be required to maintain a minimum net
worth or a surety bond. Entities, sole proprietors, controlling individuals, and managing principals may be required to pay fees
for licensing, application processing, application investigation,
or license renewal.
• Entities and sole proprietors may be required to meet minimum
physical office requirements, such as maintaining a physical office in states where they operate. To open a branch office, entities and sole proprietors may be required to provide notifica-
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tion, obtain a license or certificate, pay various fees, maintain
branch-specific amounts of net worth or surety bonds, or name a
branch manager who may be required to meet provisions similar
to those listed above for managing principals. In some states, the
loan officers who work for mortgage brokerage firms may also
be required to meet standards of the same type as those listed
above for managing principals, but often at a lower level. Additional provisions may specify that a loan officer can work for
only one firm at a time. However, some states allow certain other
professionals, such as real estate agents or attorneys, to engage
in some aspects of mortgage brokering without obtaining a specific mortgage broker license; these exemptions may be subject
to limits on the maximum number or volume of loans brokered.
For each state and the District of Columbia for each year from 1996
through 2006, the index assigns an integer value for the intensity of
each of 24 regulatory components. Most of the components deal with
the regulation of human capital requirements. For example, regarding
the controlling of individuals in mortgage brokerage firms, the codes
separate intensities for prelicensing education, prelicensing experience,
prelicensing examinations, and continuing education requirements.
Pahl codes the same four variables for managing principals, branch
managers, and the firms’ employees, for a total of 16 human capital
components. Three components reflect, respectively, the degree of individual licensing required of managing principals, branch managers, and
employees. At the firm level, the index is coded by intensity; in other
words, entry requirements are more difficult for both net worth and
surety bonding requirements, so the intensity of surety bonding required
for branches is separately coded. Finally, the codes show whether an instate office is required and the extent of exemptions that allow other
professions to engage in mortgage brokering activities.
The analysis uses two overall indices of the intensity of mortgage
broker regulation in a state: a simple sum of all 24 of Pahl’s individual
intensity values (the summated rating scale) and a statistically weighted
nonlinear index (the Rasch index).8 This combined index can capture
the major regulatory provisions affecting the occupation using both linear (summated rating scale) and nonlinear (Rasch index) measures of
the level of regulation.
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In addition to these composite indices, the analysis also examines
subsets of the 24 regulatory components that were collected.9 Much of
the analysis includes a dollar-valued measure of the bonding and net
worth regulations, which were created by examining the details of each
state’s requirements and selecting what was judged to be the smallest
dollar option by which new entrants could meet either the bonding or
the net worth requirement. These values were also examined by subtracting the bonding and net worth indices from the composite indices.
There was an examination of other subindices and individual components, such as those for the provisions regarding training and examinations, provisions that apply only to the management of brokerage firms,
provisions that limit brokerage firm branches, and provisions that apply
only to employees of brokerage firms. Some of these regulatory variables were significant in regressions with one or more of our labor and
mortgage market–dependent variables, and in a few cases their presence materially weakened the significance of the bonding and net worth
variable. The major focus was on the bonding and net worth provisions
in order to show the broadest and most consistent pattern of significant
relationships with market outcomes.
Using the measures of regulatory restrictiveness, Table 3.2 shows
the top seven and bottom five states ranked by the restrictiveness of
their summated scale of mortgage broker licensing. Florida has the
most statutory provisions regulating mortgage brokers. The five states
with the least restrictive statutes in 2004, such as Alaska and Wyoming,
are less populous. Montana and Texas had the greatest increase in the
regulation of mortgage brokers during the period 1999–2004. In general, larger industrial and urbanized states were more likely to impose
broader and deeper regulatory provisions on mortgage brokers, Montana being an exception.
Figure 3.1 shows the more general growth and variation of regulation over time from 1996 to 2006, using a box-and-whisker plot. The
mean value of the summated rating scale for all states was 3.2 in 1996
and increased to almost 8.0 by 2005, using the index developed by Pahl
(2007). The variations in state practices also rose. As the membership
in the occupation expanded in response to growth in the demand for
broker services, more states began regulating the members of the occupation. This may have occurred because members in the occupation
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Table 3.2 Regulation in the Most, Least, and Greatest Changer States
Rankings
Regulation value
Top seven regulated states, 2004
Florida
16
Montana
14
New Jersey
13
Ohio
12
Texas
12
North Carolina
12
Nevada
12
Bottom five regulated states, 2004
Colorado
0
Wyoming
0
Alaska
0
South Dakota
1
Maine
2
Top seven states by change in regulation, 1999–2004
Montana
14
Texas
12
North Carolina
11
Oklahoma
8
Connecticut
7
Nevada
7
Utah
7
SOURCE: Developed from Pahl (2007).

sought regulation or because of public concern about brokers allegedly
charging excessive fees or leading customers into overly risky loans.
Because of their significance for the subsequent analysis, it is
important to understand the nature of bonding requirements.10 When
brokers are required to have a bond of $50,000, for example, this typically means that they pay an annual premium, ranging from several
hundred to a few thousand dollars, to a surety bond company. It does
not mean that the broker must own and place in trust a fixed-income
security with a market value of $50,000. Under specified conditions of
broker nonperformance of duties spelled out in the governing laws and
regulations, third parties, such as the broker’s customers, may collect
up to the amount of the bond from the surety company. The role of the
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Figure 3.1 Growth and Variation of Occupational Regulation over Time
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NOTE: This box-and-whisker plot shows annual values of the median, interquartile
range, and outliers of the summated rating scale derived from the catalogue of state
(and District of Columbia) mortgage broker regulations. The line in the middle of
the box represents the median. The bottom and top edges of the box are the first and
third quartiles, respectively. The whiskers extending from the box represent the most
extreme point within the range of one and a half times the interquartile range (the difference between the third and first quartiles). The remaining points represent outliers
that do not fall within the range of the whiskers.
SOURCE: Pahl (2007).

surety company is to ensure that a valid claim will be promptly paid.11
If this occurs, the surety company will seek full compensation from
the broker for the amount it paid out to the third party, plus expenses.
The broker’s annual premium or the basis of his or her salary is thus a
fee paid to guarantee a line of contingent credit up to a legally required
amount. In setting the annual premium it charges a broker, a surety
company considers both the expected value of claims against the broker
and the probability of collecting from the broker for any amounts paid
out. Consequently, the bond company may conduct detailed screening
of applicants, similar to credit underwriting, before issuing the bond.
The basic hypothesis is that this type of screening could make bonding one of the most significant barriers to entry in states requiring bonds
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of $50,000 or more, especially given that the educational requirements
for mortgage brokers do not usually require more than one year of
classes or other tasks. Some support for this view comes from Barker’s
(2008) finding that state bonding requirements mattered in a related
occupation—real estate brokerage—where they were associated with
higher-quality service, as measured by a lower rate of consumer complaints. An industry expert, David Olson (2007), provides additional
support. He notes that one factor that kept mortgage brokers from originating many Federal Housing Administration (FHA) mortgages was
the FHA’s requirement that originators provide a formal audit, costing
about $5,000 each year. He suggests that more mortgage brokers would
originate FHA loans if this audit requirement were dropped in favor of
having brokers maintain a $75,000 surety bond. For established mortgage brokers with good credit, the cost of this bond would be about
$750, but Olson notes that “brokers with low net worth and fewer years
in the business will have a more difficult time getting a bond at all.”
In such cases, the broker could seek a more costly bond from a surety
company that specializes in serving higher-risk clients, but premiums
from this type of company often reach 10 to 15 percent of the amount
of the bond, compared with 1 to 2 percent for low-risk mortgage brokers. Thus, on just a $50,000 bond, a high-risk premium could match
or exceed the $5,000 audit cost that Olson judged to be prohibitive for
most brokers. This requirement may serve to increase the quality of
brokers but reduce their quantity. For some who need the services of a
broker for negotiating price, picking an appropriately structured mortgage, or maintaining payments on an existing mortgage, having the
financial advice of a competent and honest broker may enhance their
economic welfare.

ESTIMATING RELATIONSHIPS
In order to calculate the influence of regulation of mortgage brokers
and their labor market and consumer market outcomes, multivariate statistical models were developed of these relationships. These two types
of relationships—1) labor markets and 2) consumer markets—are the
key ones for evaluating the social costs and benefits of the institution
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of licensing for this occupation. The model controls for other factors
affecting these markets. The analysis takes two main forms: 1) panel
data analyses using repeated annual cross sections of labor and mortgage
market data, and 2) cross-sectional analyses of hundreds to thousands of
individual mortgages issued in 2005. Most of the panel data regressions
utilize state-level average data, but for mortgage broker earnings the
observations are combined on individual mortgage professionals with
state-averaged data. The panel data regressions allow for fixed effects
in each state as well as time trends. As a check on the results, a reestimation was developed of the cross-sectional regressions on a sample restricted to mortgages just in metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs)
that cross state boundaries, so that MSA fixed effects for the prices of
mortgages could be included.

ESTIMATES FOR LABOR MARKET VARIABLES
Table 3.3 provides descriptive statistics for key labor market variables as well as other mortgage market and regulatory variables used
in the analysis. The table shows the growth in occupational regulation
and a measure of hourly wages and earnings from the annual American Community Survey (ACS) of mortgage brokers and related lending
professionals.12 The ACS is conducted annually by the Census Bureau
and replicates the formerly used long form on the decennial census. It
provides large samples of individuals even for relatively detailed occupational classifications such as loan officers and brokers.
To take advantage of the variation across both space and time to
analyze relationships between the intensity of licensing and key labor
market variables such as mortgage brokers’ employment (relative to
that of the population) and earnings, a panel data set is created. These
relationships could be either positive or negative, based on the hypotheses discussed above. An additional complication, not reflected in the
theoretical models, is that brokers may accelerate entry into the occupation before the standards become fully effective, leading to a spurious
positive relationship between subsequent regulation and the number of
practitioners in the short run. This was the case in accounting, where
anticipated new regulations resulted in a surge of applications just
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Table 3.3 Summary Statistics for the Labor Market, Service Market,
and Legal and Bonding Provisions
2000
mean
State-level and individual variables
(sd)
Broker/loan officer hourly wage ($)
20.12
(12.74)
Annual broker/loan officer earnings ($)
40,973.43
(26,177.80)
Employment (loan officers and
0.15
brokers/population, %)
(0.06)
Years of experience
18.49
(10.54)
Years of schooling
14.54
(1.79)
Mean number of loans
537,109.57
(679,999.52)
Mean number of subprime loans
13,995.13
(15,213.93)
Mean number of loans in foreclosure
6,214.27
(8,883.82)
Mean state population
5,471,375.84
(6,101,905.36)
Median household income ($)
58,574.57
(7,641.51)
Licensing index (1996)
2.33
(1.96)
Licensing index (2005)
6.84
(3.68)
Bonding/net worth index (2000)
1.7
(1.37)
Bonding/net worth index (2005)
1.88
(1.35)
Real bonding/net worth requirement ($)
15,825.12
1996a
(18,963.83)
Real bonding/net worth requirement ($)
27,479.08
2005a
(25,928.68)

2005
mean
(sd)
25.15
(16.87)
52,748.68
(41,526.24)
0.17
(0.17)
19.51
(11.51)
14.69
(1.80)
736,032.00
(880,192.82)
95,726.69
(129,101.6)
8,580.52
(9,444.91)
5,757,977.29
(6,498,035.30)
63,504.76
(10,326.91)

NOTE: Standard deviations in parentheses.
a
Base year 2000.
SOURCE: American Community Survey (ACS) of the U.S. Census Bureau; Occupational Employment Statistics wage survey.
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before more stringent educational requirements took effect (Cumming
and Rankin 1999).
The analysis begins by relating regulation to the employment of
brokers and associated lending professionals. Initially, the results find
that neither the linear-summated rating scale nor the Rasch index is
significantly related to mortgage broker employment at the state level.
The basic findings hold, whether the specification and estimation are
done with the more rigorous fixed effects or with random effects. The
estimation strategy chosen uses the fixed effects approach since it helps
avoid omitted variable bias due to unobserved heterogeneity.
Table 3.4 shows the relationship between bonding and net worth
requirements and state-level employment relative to population from
2000 to 2005. The measure of employment is based on the ACS data
and represents the number of mortgage brokers and related lending professionals per capita by state. The use of the ACS is in many ways preferable to the OES because the OES does not cover self-employed individuals, and, as was noted earlier, up to 80 percent of licensed mortgage
brokers are either self-employed or work in small group practices that
may not be covered in the OES (BLS 2013b). The model uses pooled
time series and cross-section data that allow an estimate with year fixedeffects models and a set of human capital, labor market, and service
market state controls. The results show that the bonding and net worth
requirement is significant and negatively associated with employment.
Using the values at the mean of the distribution, the estimates show that
doubling the bonding requirement is associated with an approximately
8 to 10 percent decrease in the number of brokers and related lending professionals in the state relative to the population. The bonding
requirement may have a stronger relationship to employment than the
other licensing components for several reasons: it may be both relatively onerous and easily enforced up front and thus may reduce entry
into the occupation. One would expect that states with older mortgage
brokers and related lending professionals were the ones with lower per
capita levels of employment within the occupation. This may simply
reflect the fact that most new entrants are younger, so that impeding
entry tends to both age the profession and reduce employment. It could
also be that, as the occupation matures and public policies on regulation
evolve, the political clout of mortgage brokers will grow, possibly leading to adoption of more rigorous educational and experience requirements that will complement those on bonding.
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Table 3.4 Fixed-Effects Models of Loan Officer Employment/Population
by State
Summated regulation index, lagged once
(no net worth/bonding)/100
Real net worth/bonding requirement, lagged once
/1,000,000
Summated regulation index, lagged twice
(no net worth/bonding)/100
Real net worth/bonding requirement, lagged twice
/1,000,000
Mean experience by state
Mean experience by state squared/10,000
Mean years of school by state
Lag median state household income/100,000
Lag state unemployment rate
Lag state home ownership percentage
Constant
Year dummy controls (2001–2005), base 2000
Observations
Number of states
R-squared
F-test for one- and two-period lags of summated
index
F-test for one- and two-period lags of bonding/net
worth

(1)
0.068

(2)
0.058

(0.206)
−0.545

(0.173)
−0.795

(0.431)
−0.026

(0.350)**

(0.235)
−0.418
(0.403)
−0.004
(0.003)
0.993
(0.659)
−0.001
(0.005)
0.218
(0.162)
0.010
(0.006)*
−0.001
(0.002)
0.172
(0.176)
Y
300
50
0.12
0.06

−0.004
(0.003)
0.994
(0.658)
−0.001
(0.005)
0.211
(0.161)
0.010
(0.006)*
−0.002
(0.002)
0.187
(0.175)
Y
300
50
0.11
—

3.16**

—

NOTE: The two columns contain two different estimates for the influence of those
factors on employment of loan officer population to employment. The second column shows a sensitivity analysis of using a different statistical specification. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05
level; *** significant at the 0.01 level. Y = yes. — means no estimates were developed
for these cells. Blank means the variable was not used in the second specification.
SOURCE: ACS data.
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Restricting entry could have a direct effect on earnings. To examine
this relationship, a model is estimated showing the association between
the bonding requirements and annual earnings, using individuallevel data in the ACS. Table 3.5 presents estimates of the relationship
between regulation and annual earnings from 2000 to 2005 using the
individual practitioner data for each year. The basic earnings equation
can be stated as follows:
(3.1)

ln(Earningsit) = a + b1Rit + b2 Xit + uit ,

where Earningsit stands for the annual earnings of person i in time
period t; Rit is the tightness of mortgage broker licensing through bonding and net worth requirements in person i’s state in time period t; the
vector Xit includes covariates measuring characteristics of each person
and state, along with year time trends; uit is the error term; and a, b1,
and b2 are the coefficients we estimate. Since regulation generally influences only new entrants, it would take some time before the full effect
of regulation would influence wages and employment of the individuals in the occupation. We find a positive relationship between mortgage
broker licensing and mortgage broker earnings, ranging from an imprecisely estimated 7 percent to a marginally significant 6 percent.13,14 As
shown in Table 3.5, the coefficients on the nonregulatory explanatory
variables were consistent with the labor economics and human capital
literature. Using an F-test in column 1, the joint regulation variables are
statistically significant.
The findings show that tighter requirements for bonding and for net
worth are also associated with lower volumes of loans processed and
a higher percentage of high-priced loans originated. One interpretation
of this set of results is that the demand for mortgage broker services
is approximately of unit elasticity, so that as the numbers of brokers
and loans processed contract, brokers’ fees per loan processed rise by
enough to just offset the lower loan volume and higher operating costs
that result from tighter licensing, leaving the average broker’s net earnings only slightly higher.
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Table 3.5 Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Models of Log Annual
Earnings, 2000–2005
(1)
(2)
Summated regulation index, lagged once
0.290
−0.485
(no net worth/bonding)/100
(0.520)
(0.204)**
Real bonding/net worth requirement, lagged
0.076
0.060
once/100,000
(0.099)
(0.033)*
Summated regulation index, lagged twice
−0.009
(no net worth/bonding)
(0.006)
Real bonding/net worth requirement, lagged
0.148
twice/100,000
(0.113)
Experience
0.057
0.057
(0.004)***
(0.004)***
Experience squared/1,000
−1.018
−1.020
(0.089)***
(0.090)***
Log years of school
1.262
1.263
(0.059)***
(0.059)***
Lag median household income/1,000,000
10.823
10.786
(1.677)***
(1.668)***
Lag state population/1,000,000
4.950
4.653
(1.721)***
(1.702)***
Lag state unemployment rate/100
−0.231
−0.046
(1.465)
(1.453)
State homeownership percentage/100
−0.088
−0.070
(0.226)
(0.222)
Constant
6.430
6.407
(0.262)***
(0.262)***
Year dummy controls (2001–2004), base 2000
Y
Y
Observations
6,699
6,699
0.13
0.13
R-squared
3.54**
—
F-test for one- and two-period lags of
summated index
1.97
—
F-test for one- and two-period lags of bonding/
net worth
NOTE: Columns (1) and (2) show sensitivity analyses using different statistical specifications to see if the results are stable. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level.
Y = yes. — means no estimates were developed for these cells.
SOURCE: ACS data.
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DOES BROKER REGULATION INFLUENCE FINANCIAL
OUTCOMES FOR CONSUMERS?
A key part of the investigation shows the relationship between
mortgage broker licensing, the volume of subprime lending, and the
rate of mortgage foreclosures. As discussed above, stricter licensing
could reduce the number of subprime loans, for example, by restricting
the number or work effort of mortgage brokers. Alternatively, stricter
licensing could boost effective loan demand by enhancing the quality
of broker services, thereby increasing the willingness both of marginal
borrowers to step forward to use their services and of lenders to also
see these services as being of high quality. To probe these potential
outcomes, the following model is estimated:
(3.2)

ln(sp − loans originatedit ) = α + β1Rit + β2 Xit + μit ,

where sp − loans originatedit is the number of new subprime mortgages
in state i over period t; Rit represents the state-level mortgage broker
licensing indices in time period t; the vector Xit includes covariates measuring the characteristics of each state, along with year time trends;
μit is the error term; and α, β1, and β2 are the coefficients we estimate.
Subprime loans originated were measured as the number of all originations in a state for a given year that were made by lenders on the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development’s list for that year (or
for the most recent year available) of institutions whose mortgage activity is primarily in the subprime market.
The state fixed-effects results estimated over 2001–2005 with the
bonding/net worth requirements are presented in Table 3.6. The results
show that the two-lag specification of bonding requirements is associated with fewer loans originated. These estimates are consistent with
those on employment. The results show that imposing bonding requirements correlates with fewer brokers and fewer subprime loans originated in the state. Quantitatively, the coefficients imply that a doubling
of the mean bonding requirement to approximately $54,000 would be
associated with a cut in the number of subprime loans originated by
about 220,000 per year in 2004, or approximately 9 percent.
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Table 3.6 Fixed-Effects Estimates of the Log of State Subprime Loan
Originations
Constant
(1)
(2)
Summated regulatory index, lagged once
−0.023
−0.020
(no net worth/bonding)
(0.011)**
(0.010)*
Real net worth/bonding requirement, lagged
0.104
−0.321
once/100,000
(0.253)
(0.223)
Summated regulatory index, lagged twice
−0.002
(no net worth/bonding)
(0.012)
Real net worth/bonding requirement, lagged
−0.741
twice/100,000
(0.219)***
Lag state unemployment rate
−0.017
−0.014
(0.034)
(0.035)
Lag state population/100,000
0.024
0.022
(0.010)**
(0.010)**
Lag median state household income/100,000
0.622
0.511
(0.938)
(0.965)
State homeownership percentage
0.050
0.049
(0.012)***
(0.012)***
Constant
4.661
4.823
(1.048)***
(1.076)***
Year dummy controls (2002–2005), base 2001
Y
Y
Observations
254
254
Number of states (including DC)
51
51
0.76
0.74
R-squared
2.78*
—
F-test for one- and two-period lags of
summated index
6.91***
—
F-test for one- and two-period lags of bonding/
net worth
NOTE: Columns (1) and (2) show sensitivity analyses using different statistical specifications to see if the results are stable. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant
at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level. Y =
yes. — means no estimates were developed for these cells.
SOURCE: ACS data.
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If there are fewer loans with stricter licensing, does the quality of
those loans, as measured by fewer negative outcomes such as foreclosures, also vary with licensing requirements? If state licensing improves
the quality of broker services, the effects might include more appropriate loan selection and more accurate loan underwriting, resulting in
fewer foreclosures. Alternatively, foreclosures could be positively correlated with tighter licensing, perhaps because a reduced availability of
brokers leads to less accurate underwriting or because states that have
higher foreclosure rates for other reasons (e.g., low or volatile incomes)
are more likely to enact tighter restrictions. To assess these possibilities,
we estimate two versions of the following model with regard to owneroccupied properties, one for only subprime mortgages and one for all
mortgages:
(3.3)

Home Foreclosuresit = α + β1Rit + β2Xit + μit ,

where Home Foreclosuresit is the percentage of mortgages (on owneroccupied properties) in foreclosure for state i over period t (as measured
in the National Delinquency Survey of the Mortgage Bankers Association, 1979–2005); Rit represents the state-level measures of mortgage
broker bonding/net worth requirements in time period t; the vector Xit
includes covariates measuring characteristics of each state, along with
year time trends; μit is the error term; and α, β1, and β2 are the coefficients we estimate.
As shown in Table 3.7 for the estimation period 1999 through 2004,
there is a significant positive relationship between bonding/net worth
requirements and foreclosure rates for both subprime and all mortgages
when state-level labor market and service market factors are also controlled for. The estimates are consistent with the view, discussed above,
that occupational regulation reduces the quality of an occupation’s
output. However, the results do not clarify the mechanism by which
mortgage broker bonding would lead to higher foreclosures. One could
speculate that fewer brokers, which is the outcome of tougher regulation, may reduce the “nudging” to maintain the serviceability of loans
that brokers may have consummated (Thaler and Sunstein 2008).
Given the positive relationship between bonding and foreclosures
that could arise because states enact bonding or net worth requirements
in response to previous periods of high foreclosure, additional quality
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safeguards are provided. As a check on this possibility, an estimated
subsequent passage of a bonding or net worth requirement is developed.
Table 3.8, which uses a Weibull hazard model with covariates similar
to those in Tables 3.6 and 3.7, shows that the relationship is not statistically significant, indicating an absence of this form of simultaneity bias.
This statistical approach is used to measure the time to the adoption of
the licensing bill based on the major socioeconomic characteristics in
the state.
One final issue we address in this section is presented in Table 3.9,
which shows the relationship of bonding/net worth requirements to
homeownership. Using the same type of model as Table 3.7, we show
estimates of the relationship of mortgage broker bonding/net worth
requirements and homeownership. The findings show that income is
positively related to homeownership, but there is no statistically significant relationship between the measures of regulation and homeownership. Although bonding may matter for the quantity and quality of subprime mortgages, it does not seem to vary with the overall rate of state
homeownership. It might reflect the fact that mortgage originations are
flow variables and hence can change more from year to year than a
stock variable like homeownership.

FURTHER PROBING OF REGULATION AND FINANCIAL
OUTCOMES FOR CONSUMERS
Brokers have short-term incentives to sell high-priced loans to
consumers. The federal banking regulators track high-priced loans
through the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data collection,
which records most home mortgage applications and originations in the
United States. The focus is on first-lien mortgages in our analysis. A
high-priced first-lien mortgage is defined as one whose annual percentage rate (APR) is 3 or more percentage points above the contemporaneous 30-year Treasury bond yield. APR is defined essentially as an internal rate of return, taking into account initial fees and introductory rates
and setting any index variables in the contract at current market values,
assuming they remain constant for the scheduled maturity of the loan.
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Table 3.7 Fixed-Effects Models of the Percentage of Loans (subprime and all loans) in Foreclosure
(1)
(2)
(3)
subinfclose
subinfclose
allinfclose
Summated reg. index, lagged once (no net worth/bonding)
0.022
0.004
0.016
(0.093)
(0.078)
(0.016)
Real net worth/bonding requirement, lagged once/100,000
1.357
3.186
0.217
(1.585)
(1.245)**
(0.280)
Summated reg. index, lagged twice (no net worth/bonding)
−0.100
0.013
(0.104)
(0.018)
Real net worth/bonding requirement, lagged twice/100,000
3.659
0.476
(1.598)**
(0.283)*
Lag state unemployment rate
0.873
0.970
0.222
(0.224)***
(0.196)***
(0.040)***
Lag state population/100,000
−0.005
−0.059
−0.032
(0.069)
(0.055)
(0.012)***
Lag median state household income/100,000
−5.080
−7.396
−1.560
(6.709)
(6.059)
(1.187)
State homeownership percentage
−0.292
−0.319
−0.057
(0.087)***
(0.080)***
(0.015)***
Constant
27.444
28.629
6.617
(7.197)***
(6.168)***
(1.273)***
Year dummy controls (2000–2004), base 1999
Y
Y
Y
Observations
255
306
255
Number of states (including DC)
51
51
51

(4)
allinfclose
0.021
(0.014)
0.540
(0.226)**

0.251
(0.036)***
−0.033
(0.010)***
−3.003
(1.100)***
−0.057
(0.014)***
6.673
(1.120)***
Y
306
51
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R-squared
F-test for one- and two-period lags of summated index
F-test for one- and two-period lags of bonding/net worth

0.66
0.50
5.51***

0.63
−
−

0.42
1.46
3.29**

0.43
−
−

NOTE: Columns (1) and (2) and columns (3) and (4) show sensitivity analyses using different statistical specifications to see if the results
are stable. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level.
Y = yes. — means no estimates were developed for these cells.
SOURCE: Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data from FFIEC (2007); U.S. Census Bureau, Census of Population and Housing,
various years.
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NOTE: Columns (1) and (2) and columns (3) and (4) show sensitivity analyses using different statistical specifications to see if the results
are stable. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level.
SOURCE: HMDA data from FFIEC (2007); U.S. Census Bureau, Census of Population and Housing, various years.
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Table 3.8 Hazard Model Estimates of Time to Adoption of a Net Worth or Bonding Bill, 1998–2005 (using a Weibull
distribution of duration)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Avg. percentage of subprime loans in foreclosure, ’98–’00
0.17
0.15
(0.19)
(0.26)
Avg. percentage of all loans in foreclosure, ’98–’00
0.53
0.98
(0.75)
(1.25)
Avg. state unemployment rate, ’98–’00
0.186
0.185
(0.386)
(0.390)
Avg. state population, ’98–’00/1,000,000
−0.030
−0.050
(0.062)
(0.072)
Avg. state median household income, ’98–’00/1,000
−0.047
−0.042
(0.062)
(0.064)
Avg. state homeownership percentage, ’98–’00
−0.005
0.003
(0.085)
(0.089)
Constant
−3.742
−2.029
−3.422
−2.858
(1.274)***
(7.921)
(1.113)***
(8.308)
Observations
17
17
17
17
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If mortgage broker licensing succeeds in protecting consumers,
high-priced loans may be reduced.15 There is a further assessment of
the empirical relationship between mortgage broker regulation and the
probability that a mortgage will be high-priced. For broker-originated
loans the model assesses how broker regulation affects the chance that
any mortgage, brokered or not, is high-priced. This also would be plausible, since mortgage brokers compete strongly with other mortgage
origination providers. However, looking at the entire mortgage market
could weaken the model’s ability to detect the direct effects of mortgage
broker regulation, so there is a preference to focus as closely as possible
on broker-originated mortgages.
Focusing on brokered mortgages, however, presents a problem
because the HMDA data do not indicate whether a mortgage was
brokered. A couple of strategies can deal with the issue of this missing information. For federally regulated banks and thrifts, there is the
potential to use the borrowers’ location (available at the census tract
level from the HMDA data) to condition on whether the loan was made
outside the lender’s Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) assessment
area. Under the CRA, federally regulated banks and thrifts must declare
an assessment area where the degree of services they provide will be
evaluated for compliance with the CRA. Typically these areas include
the lender’s principal retail offices, and lenders generally have fewer
offices outside their assessment area. Federally regulated lenders are
presumed to rely on their retail offices to originate the majority of their
mortgages within their assessment areas but are presumed to rely much
more on brokers to reach mortgage customers outside their assessment
areas. Accordingly, for federally regulated banks and thrifts, the focus
is on mortgages originated outside each reporting lender’s CRA assessment area.16
For mortgage banks not subject to the CRA, there is a reliance on
reports from industry publications and industry experts to identify a set
of lenders known to rely almost exclusively on mortgage brokers for
loan applications. For one lending company, Option One, in 2005, the
year examined in this study, the firm obtained almost all of its mortgage applications through brokers. Thomas LaMalfa, formerly managing director of Wholesale Access (2005), helped identify nine other
“broker-dependent” mortgage originators in 2005: 1) Taylor, Bean, and
Whitaker Mortgage Company; 2) First Magnus Financial Corporation;
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Table 3.9 Fixed-Effects Models of State Homeownership Percentage
(1)
(2)
Real bonding/net worth requirement, lagged
0.881
1.206
once/100,000
(1.154)
(0.943)
Real bonding/net worth requirement, lagged
0.582
twice/100,000
(1.188)
Lag state unemployment rate
−0.194
−0.191
(0.155)
(0.155)
Lag state population/100,000
0.066
0.066
(0.043)
(0.043)
Lag median state household income/100,000
10.896
11.029
(4.778)**
(4.763)**
Constant
61.428
61.415
(3.004)***
(2.999)***
Year dummy controls (2000–2004), base 1999
Y
Y
Observations
306
306
Number of states (including DC)
51
51
0.26
0.26
R2
0.94
—
F-test for one- and two-period lags of net
worth/bonding requirements
NOTE: Columns (1) and (2) show sensitivity analyses using different statistical specifications to see if the results are stable. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant
at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level. Y =
yes. — means no estimates were developed for this cell.
SOURCE: HMDA data from FFIEC (2007); Census of Population, various years.

3) American Mortgage Network; 4) Loan City; 5) Green Point Mortgage Funding; 6) Argent Mortgage Company; 7) New Century Mortgage Corporation; 8) Nova Star Home Mortgage; and 9) Résumé.17
In Table 3.10, an estimated linear probability model for whether
a loan is high-priced, using four different data sets, is developed.18
Observations are clustered by state to compute robust standard errors
that allow for less than full independence among the observations in
each state. This controls for the state regulatory environment, the borrower’s income and racial/ethnic identity, the loan amount, and several economic and demographic properties of the census tract where
the property is located (the distribution of credit scores, unemployment
rate, median age of applicants, median age of housing stock, percentage
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of minority population, median income, and the percentage of owneroccupied and vacant housing units).
For mortgage refinancing, the results are fairly consistent. There is
a clear difference in the size of the constant term, which is low for the
CRA lenders outside their assessment areas (0.10) and higher for the 10
broker-dependent lenders (0.38). The 2005 national average was 0.26
for first-lien refinance mortgages. Although this gives a very different
starting point to the two refinancing regressions, the marginal effects
of many of the explanatory variables are similar. The coefficients on
the mortgage broker regulatory variables for 2004, which was the only
year there were data for, are of primary interest here. In Table 3.10
the coefficient on the bonding/net worth requirement is positive and
significant, indicating that a $100,000 increase in this requirement is
associated with, respectively, a 5.4 or a 3.5 percentage-point increase in
the probability that a refinancing is high-priced in these two columns.
The coefficient on the index of other mortgage broker regulations is not
significant in Table 3.10.
The results for two other regulatory variables—an index of state
antipredatory-lending laws and an indicator of states that prohibit deficiency judgments—are also consistent across the refinancing regressions in Table 3.10. The coefficient on the index of antipredatorylending laws is negative but not significant at the 0.10 percent level. The
coefficient on the indicator of no deficiency judgments is significant but
with an unexpected negative sign, suggesting that high-priced loans are
less likely in states that do not allow creditors to pursue deficiency judgments. A possible explanation is that lenders ration credit more strictly
in states that rule out deficiency judgments but use risk-based pricing
to lend to a wider selection of applicants where they have the right to
pursue a deficiency judgment.19
The coefficient on the percentage of adults in the census tract of
the mortgaged property who have very low credit scores is consistently
positive and significant in Table 3.10. A 10-percentage-point increase in
the percentage of adults in the tract with a very low score is associated
with about a 5- to 6-percentage-point increase in the probability that a
mortgage refinance loan in that tract will be high-priced.20
African American, Hispanic, and female borrowers are significantly
more likely to get a high-priced mortgage refinancing than are non-
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Table 3.10 Logarithmic Probability of a High-Priced Loan in a Cross
Section of 10 Broker-Dependent Lenders’ Mortgages
Mortgage Home-purchase
refinance
mortgage
State broker bonding/net worth requirement
0.054
0.050
($100,000)
(0.021)**
(0.028)*
Index of other state broker licensing
0.002
0.002
requirements
(0.003)
(0.003)
Index of state antipredatory-lending laws
−0.012
0.004
(0.008)
(0.009)
State prohibition of deficiency judgments
−0.130
−0.098
(dummy variable)
(0.029)***
(0.027)***
Borrower's income ($1,000)
−0.505
−0.280
(0.077)***
(0.068)***
Borrower's income squared ($1,000,000)
0.093
0.035
(0.020)***
(0.011)***
Adults in census tract with very low credit
0.005
0.006
score (%)
(0.001)***
(0.001)***
African American borrower (dummy
0.146
0.173
variable)
(0.018)***
(0.011)***
Asian American borrower (dummy variable)
−0.060
−0.032
(0.019)***
(0.023)
Hispanic borrower (dummy variable)
0.074
0.119
(0.013)***
(0.019) ***
Female borrower (dummy variable)
0.039
0.163
(0.006)***
(0.006)***
Constant
0.382
0.537
(0.073)***
(0.069)***
Number of state clusters for standard errors
51
51
(DC included)
0.095
0.107
R2
273,365
185,773
N
NOTE: * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at
the 0.01 level.
SOURCE: HMDA data from FFIEC (2007); U.S. Census Bureau, Census of Population
and Housing, various years.
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Hispanic white male borrowers. The largest effect is for African American borrowers. For example, for mortgage refinance loans by federally
regulated banks and thrifts lending outside their CRA assessment areas,
the probability of getting a high-priced loan increases by 21 percentage
points for an African American borrower, compared with increases of
9 percentage points for Hispanics and 4 percentage points for women.
For other racial groups, we find no significant effects, except that Asian
Americans refinancing with the 10 broker-dependent lenders are about
6 percentage points less likely to get a high-priced loan.
The results for the regulatory variables are not as strong or as consistent with home-purchase mortgages as with mortgage refinance
loans. The bonding/net worth variable is positive and significant at a
0.10 level for the 10 broker-dependent lenders but has an insignificant
and small negative coefficient for the CRA-regulated lenders on loans
outside their assessment areas. The index of the remaining mortgage
broker regulations is insignificant in the home-purchase regressions,
as is the index of antipredatory-lending laws. The indicator of nodeficiency judgments is again negative and significant for the brokerdependent lenders, but it is now insignificant for the CRA-regulated
lenders’ loans outside their assessment areas. Apparently, the process
for making home-purchase loans differs in important ways from the
process for making mortgage refinance loans, at least at the CRAregulated institutions.21
As Avery, Brevoort, and Canner (2006) note, CRA-regulated lenders’ mortgage underwriting appears to be quite different inside, compared with outside, their assessment areas. The authors speculate that
one explanation may be the use of differing marketing channels, including greater use of brokers outside assessment areas.
To limit the potential influence of unmeasured location-specific
effects, a reestimation is developed with a sample restricted to only
observations in MSAs that straddle state borders, similar to the methods
in Holmes (1998) and Bostic et al. (2007). The data used were on 51
MSAs that cross state boundaries, touching parts of 39 states.22 They
estimate the same equations in Table 3.10 but with fixed effects for each
MSA, which has the advantage of controlling for location-specific factors not measured by the other variables, such as the percentage of loans
with adjustable rates or the level or rate of change in housing prices
(LaCour-Little 2007c). This is useful, in that the nature of interest-rate
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data (a single cross section) precludes controlling for these factors by
means of state fixed effects, because they would be collinear with the
state-level policy variables.
For the data from the broker-dependent lenders, the results on the
sample from multistate MSAs for the bonding variable (and most of the
other variables) are similar to those in Table 3.10.23 In particular, for
mortgage refinancing loans by the broker-dependent lenders, the coefficient on the state broker bonding variable has a t-statistic of 2.05 and
a coefficient of 0.048, compared with 0.054 in Table 3.10. For homepurchase mortgages from the same lenders, the coefficient on the bonding variable has a 1.96 t-statistic and a coefficient of 0.041, compared
with 0.050 in Table 3.10. For home-purchase loans by CRA lenders
outside their assessment areas, the coefficient on the bonding variable
is −0.004 and insignificant for the multistate MSA sample with fixed
effects, very similar to the results in Table 3.10.
Thus the results for Table 3.10, which uses data almost exclusively
on broker-originated loans, are reasonably robust to location-specific
effects not explicitly controlled for in the model. These results are
also robust to the omission of data from the 12 states without multistate MSAs, including California. However, the same is not true of
the results for mortgage refinance loans by CRA lenders outside their
assessment areas, which probably consist of a mixture of brokeroriginated and other loans. The coefficient on the bonding variable for
those loans becomes marginally insignificant when observations from
the 12 states without border-crossing MSAs are dropped from the full
sample or when they are estimated on the multistate MSA sample without fixed effects. With fixed effects on the multistate MSA sample, the
coefficient becomes clearly insignificant.

ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE POLITICS OF ENHANCING
HIGHER BONDING REQUIREMENTS
To examine the potential endogeneity or lack of a causal relationship
of mortgage broker regulations, information was gathered on the legislative history information from industry sources and regulators in eight
states that have raised their bonding requirements at least once. Overall,
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these conversations suggest a somewhat long and complicated chain of
legislative causality. Successful efforts to raise bonding requirements
tend to originate from the mortgage broker industry or from state regulators, rather than directly from consumer groups. However, consumer
advocacy and issues still can motivate the industry or give rise to regulatory proposals, and there are also some signs of grassroots industry
opposition to proposals made by state mortgage broker associations. In
addition, the gestation time between an initial legislative proposal and
final passage and implementation may go several years, so any market
outcomes that initiated the legislative process may have changed by the
time of implementation. Consumer issues seem to serve as the background from which industry and regulatory agency–initiated bonding
requirements emerge, often during a multiyear process.
Of the nine increases we discussed, five were described as first proposed or drafted by the state’s mortgage broker association (Ohio 1999,
Texas 1999, North Carolina 2002, Idaho 2004, and Montana 2004), and
four were described as initiated by the state regulatory authority (New
Jersey 2001, Tennessee 2001, Ohio 2002, and Minnesota 2007). The
distinction is somewhat blurred by the industry’s frequent practice of
vetting its proposals with state regulators, which often yields at least
technical drafting suggestions but sometimes yields more affirmative
legislative support from the regulator. No successful bonding proposal
was said to have been opposed by state regulators. Sometimes earlier
proposals that had not been vetted with the regulator had failed. As a
result, regulators have been involved, actively or passively, in most of
the successful bonding bills we examined.
The stated motivations of the industry and the regulators differed.
Industry proposals were described as attempts to make the occupation
more professional and to provide a degree of consumer protection by
inhibiting some forms of fraud, thereby enhancing the occupation’s
reputation. However, industry-supported increases to bonding requirements were sometimes motivated on narrow grounds (e.g., North Carolina 2002), such as to ensure that consumers could be compensated if
a broker absconded with the relatively small amount of cash the customer had entrusted to the broker, but not to help the consumer collect on larger judgments for less narrow forms of fraud or negligence.
By contrast, proposals initiated by the regulatory authorities tended to
have bonding requirements that were higher and broader in scope, with
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the apparent intention of providing both more resources to compensate
consumers and more incentives for appropriate broker behavior.
None of the sources (which did not include consumer groups) suggested that the bonding requirement that passed had been either first
proposed or subsequently opposed by consumer advocates. However,
the industry’s proposal in Texas was in part a response to a much higher
bonding proposal previously introduced by a legislator on the grounds
of consumer protection, and in at least two other cases (Ohio 1999,
North Carolina 2002) the industry’s proposal was said to be motivated
in part by competing regulatory proposals (not including bonding) from
consumer groups. Opposition to the bonding bills that passed was said
to be limited and mainly from legislators who were concerned that it
might be onerous enough to hurt their constituents who were in the
business. In some cases, this was thought to reflect, in part, grassroots
lobbying by mortgage brokers at odds with their own industry association’s position.

CONCLUSIONS
Mortgage brokers make up a relatively new occupation that has
recently been regulated in the United States. About 40 years ago, there
were almost no mortgage brokers, because individuals who wanted a
loan to buy or refinance a house went to a bank or savings and loan.
With deregulation of financial services and technology improvements
that allow easy development and dissemination of credit scores, this
picture began to change, and in 2004 as much as two-thirds of all housing finance was initiated through a mortgage broker. However, by 2009
there had been a dramatic drop in the number of brokerage companies
and brokers.
This chapter examines the relationships between state regulation
of mortgage brokers, outcomes in the labor market, and outcomes for
consumers of these services during the period of growth. The occupation, although at an early stage of regulation, is much more regulated than that of interior designers, the focus of Chapter 2. The findings show that the relationship between mortgage broker licensing and
market outcomes differs among the types of licensing requirements; in
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particular, financial bonding or net worth requirements are associated
with somewhat higher earnings, with modest reductions in the number of mortgage brokers and the number of subprime loans originated,
and with somewhat higher foreclosure rates and higher interest rates on
brokered loans.
Much of the empirical analysis for this chapter ends in 2006, just
as U.S. foreclosure rates on nonprime adjustable-rate mortgages began
to surge. Financial markets reacted to the raft of foreclosures by raising
the cost and cutting the availability of funding for both subprime and
mortgage-broker-originated mortgages. State regulators have tightened
regulations on mortgage contracts, mortgage origination, and mortgage
broker licensing as well, and the Housing and Economic Recovery Act
of 2008 brings federal oversight to mortgage broker licensing. Such a
result would be consistent with the findings of Law and Kim (2005),
which show that during the early periods of occupational regulation
in the United States, the monopoly impacts were modest. As in other
occupations that have evolved with near-universal licensing in the
states, mortgage brokers, having survived the Great Recession and the
bust of the housing market, could also eventually benefit through higher
earnings and the ability to control both entry and quality. At this early
stage of regulation, it is not surprising to find only modest effects. This
is perhaps similar to the case of unions, which have only modest effects
on wages when they first organize a firm, but in subsequent stages of
negotiations may have larger effects on wage determination (Freeman
and Kleiner 1990). In the case of occupational regulation, the initial
stages of regulation may have modest effects, but over time may reach
long-run estimates of about 15 percent (Kleiner and Krueger 2010).
The next chapter examines the regulation of an occupation that is in the
takeoff stage of regulation—the low-paying occupation and industry of
early childhood education.
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Notes
1. I thank Richard Todd, vice president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis,
for his work on and assistance with this chapter. This chapter is based on and uses
material from Kleiner and Todd (2007).
2. Some states have recently moved to enact or more strictly enforce laws that make
the broker an agent of the borrower, but this was not a factor during much of the
period of the empirical part of the study.
3. By 2006, the number of firms had changed little, but their share of originations
was estimated to have declined to about 58 percent (Wholesale Access 2007).
With the volume of subprime lending apparently having fallen significantly in
2007, mortgage broker numbers may decline further, as brokers had originated the
majority of subprime mortgages and these types of loans have all but disappeared
in the post-2008 crash period (Olson 2007).
4. Some of the other components of mortgage broker regulation also are significant
in some of the specifications and may deserve further research, but here the focus
is on the bonding and net worth requirements because they were more broadly and
consistently significant.
5. For example, see Guttentag (2000); Engel and McCoy (2002); U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) (2002); Woodward (2003); El Anshasy,
Elliehausen, and Shimazaki (2005); Apgar, Bendimerad, and Essene (2007);
Essene and Apgar (2007); Jackson and Burlingame (2007); and LaCour-Little
(2007b).
6. The term “broker” is generally used to refer to a firm offering mortgage brokerage
services, whereas the term “loan officer” is commonly used to refer to an employee
of a mortgage broker who actually performs these services. We adopt this common
usage, with certain exceptions, as for instance in note 7, where “broker” means
the individual. Indeed, terminology in the industry is not uniform (HUD 2002)
and can be confusing, not least because the actual roles of brokers, loan officers,
lenders, and others are not rigidly bounded and distinctions often blur. For a wry
but useful summary of the overlapping roles and confusing jargon in the mortgage
origination business, see Tanta (2007).
7. This potential is not limited to mortgage brokers, however. It extends to loan officers at mortgage lending banks when they are paid incentives based on the size
and interest rate of the loans they originate.
8. This index is from a Rasch-type model (Andrich 1988) that places each of the
variables within a logical structure based on frequency of outcome and an integer
scale. The empirical measure of the Rasch model we use is known as a partial
credit model—a nonlinear model that assigns weights that are consistent with an
implicit structure to the regulatory system. This approach assumes that the distance between parameters is equal and that the categories are equal integers. The
development of the Rasch scale uses maximum likelihood estimation to calculate
a unique index for each state. The estimates derived from using the Rasch index
did not differ qualitatively from those of the nonlinear approach.
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9. The anatomy of the regulatory system for brokers by state is generally consistent.
Simple correlations among the individual items in our index were mostly positive,
and a large number were statistically significant. None of the negative correlations
among the components of the index were statistically significant.
10. For background on the market for surety bonds in general and mortgage broker
surety bonds in particular, see www.jwsuretybonds.com.
11. Surety companies investigate the validity of claims before paying out. We are
referring here to claims they consider valid.
12. As a check on the results using the ACS, I also use the Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) wage survey, which has produced employment and wage
estimates for over 800 occupations by state on a biennial basis from 1999 on.
The OES also includes a category for loan officers and brokers. In both the ACS
and OES, the data we use include mortgage loan officers and agents, collection
analysts, loan servicing officers, and loan underwriters. These state OES figures
are highly correlated (r = 0.81) with the National Mortgage Broker Association’s
count of membership by state. Similar high correlations were found between
National Mortgage Broker Association memberships and the ACS figures. The
ACS figures are presented because of their ability to show additional individualand state-level covariates to reduce omitted variable bias in the estimates.
13. Estimates for hourly earnings showed generally similar results. We use total
earnings in our estimates because of the variable nature of compensation for
brokers that are commission-based. In addition, since many brokers are in small
offices where profits are shared, the earnings variable will capture this form of
compensation.
14. Estimates for changes in licensing and changes in wages also showed no statistically significant impact. In none of the earnings or wage estimates were the
licensing index variables significant when we used state-level controls. We also
estimated nonlinear models of the licensing variables, and they were also not significant. Furthermore, tests using the OES found significance for the licensing
variables only when the Xit controls were omitted. The estimates are also available
from the authors.
15. Two separate studies, based on proprietary data from selected major lenders’ mortgages that originated in 2002, suggest that, on average, consumers using brokers
did get lower-priced loans than other borrowers, when other factors were controlled for. See El Anshasy, Elliehausen, and Shimazaki (2005) and LaCour-Little
(2007a). Results to the contrary were found by LaCour-Little (2007b).
16. HMDA data from CRA-regulated mortgage originators was used.
17. Their respective HMDA respondent ID numbers are 7499100008, 7979400002,
1788100000, 7428900001, 13-3210378, 1917700009, 7900200006, both
1512400000 and 1707500002 for Nova Star, and 1991500005. To make the data
more manageable, an estimated 50 percent random sample was developed.
18. An estimated probit model for each of these regressions obtained very similar
results.
19. Karen Pence, assistant director of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System in Washington, D.C., raised this issue.
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20. In the full regression results underlying Tables 3.9 and 3.10, the coefficient on
another credit score variable—the percentage of adults with a credit file who lack
a credit score—is significantly positive but smaller for the CRA-regulated lenders
but not significant for the 10 broker-dependent lenders.
21. For the home-purchase mortgages examined in Table 3.10, the coefficients on the
credit score and racial/ethnic variables have a pattern of statistical significance not
too different from that of the mortgage refinance loans in Table 3.9, although the
size of the coefficients often differs substantially. In results not shown but available from the author, we repeated the estimates in Table 3.10 for mortgages made
within the CRA assessment areas of CRA-regulated lenders. None of the regulatory variables were statistically significant except the coefficient on the indicator
of no-deficiency judgments, which was significant and positive for home-purchase
mortgages. The insignificance of the mortgage broker regulation variables in these
regressions is consistent with our presumption that loans within a CRA assessment
area are much less likely to involve a mortgage broker. We have no clear explanation yet for why the results for the indicator of no-deficiency judgments change.
22. These states are Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
23. The parallels are even closer if we estimate on just the split MSAs without fixed
effects.
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4
Occupational Regulation
of Child Care Services
with Matthew Hendricks
University of Tulsa

Empirical research cannot tell us for sure how zealously the government should promote quality in child care or Head Start or
pre-K programs, but it can draw our attention to quality variables
that really matter. Strong empirical research, combined with clear
values, can promote a more enlightened public debate on early
child care and education. Already, it has helped us to distinguish
between good and bad arguments and good and bad policies.
—William Gormley (2007)

INTRODUCTION
The regulation of child care services presents a unique opportunity to examine occupational regulation for a service that is provided
in both the public and private sectors.1 Given the growing policy issue
of the funding and effects of early childhood education on economic
development, an empirical examination of the issue of government and
regulation, as Gormley suggests in the chapter’s opening quotation,
is an important way to enhance the ability of policymakers to judge
the efficacy of various policies (Grunewald and Rolnick 2006; Bartik
2011). Furthermore, the way that child care centers have evolved in
the United States has resulted in their serving both as small schools
and as babysitting services for young children. The chapter presents
an analysis of occupational regulation in a unique and growing sector
of the U.S. economy, where licensing is fairly new and generally lax
(Hotz and Xiao 2011). As with the other occupations that are examined
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in this book, day care teachers, assistants, and administrators have seen
an increase in state regulation over time. Given this institutional setting,
the regulation of day care labor is at an early stage of regulatory evolution relative to most of the other occupations discussed in the book.
As the rate of mothers’ labor market participation has increased
over time, so has the number of children in regular nonparental care
(Smolensky and Gootman 2003). Estimates from surveys conducted in
the early 2000s suggest that 43 percent of children under age five and
53 percent of children between the ages of three and four are in some
type of nonparental child care, the majority of which is provided by
professional child-care providers (U.S. Census Bureau 2008). Increasingly, nonparental child care is also recognized as an important context
for children’s development, particularly for promoting school readiness. Although nonparental care has become more popular, the variability in the quality of early education and care has become a concern
to parents and policymakers. Prior analysis of the issue suggests that
the quality of nonparental care is highly variable and that a substantial
portion of children’s experiences is of questionable value to the child’s
educational attainment (Helburn 1995; Kontos et al. 1995; Helburn and
Howes 1996).
In contrast, several analytical research studies have shown that
the skills, habits, and attitudes developed in early childhood can have
important effects as children grow into adults. Parental care giving,
including investments of time and money, has long been recognized as
an important influence on children’s early human capital development
(Becker 1991; Shonkoff and Phillips 2000). The impetus to regulate
child care initially grew out of safety concerns for children and the view
that many children receive poor quality of care, as measured by safety
or the quality of learning (Phillips and Zigler 1987). Proponents argued
that government licensure assures parents of a basic level of quality
in the provision of child care. Moreover, it ensures greater monitoring
and transparency in the provision of care and the quality of services
provided. In addition, through both standards and enforcement actions,
governmental regulation provides a system to enforce penalties in the
event of poor quality care.
For child care providers and other regulated industries and occupations, occupational licensing can reduce competition and thereby
increase revenues for existing providers of the service or product. Qual-
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ity and access to high educational outcomes are of major importance
to policymakers and legislators, as states consider several alternative
initiatives to improve early education outcomes and child care quality
of service. For example, Hotz and Xiao (2011) show that regulatory
provisions for child care and early education facilities by states grew by
more than 39 percent from 1983 to 1997, and the estimates derived for
this chapter show the overall growth of regulation from 1983 to 2007 to
be more than 40 percent. Although the breadth of coverage has grown,
the intensity of coverage is still modest.
Despite this increase in regulation, analysis of relevant data on
how regulation affects children and their families is limited. In order
to examine these issues in more detail, this chapter addresses three
important issues on child care regulation. First, a theory on the evolution of the role of government regulation will show the potential
for an increase in the educational outcomes of the regulated, but the
potential also to possibly increase child care prices, thus pricing some
families out of the formal center-based child care market. That result
causes them to substitute informal care or to reduce maternal labor supply to the labor market. Second, if regulation reduces the number of
individuals who can become workers in early childhood facilities, then
wages will go up. Prior studies have found that stricter regulations both
decrease the availability of center-based care and increase the price of
such care. Third, the analysis in the chapter examines whether state
child care regulations affect children’s school readiness as measured by
preacademic score outcomes. Although prior research has investigated
how child care regulations are related to health outcomes (Currie and
Hotz 2004), the effects of regulation on children’s cognitive and early
academic measures have not been analyzed in such detail.
In order to address the issues specified above, the chapter is organized as follows. Initially, background information is provided on the
regulatory environment for the preschool industry in the United States.
Next, there is an explanation of the theoretical background and prior
literature on the effect that government regulation has on both the quality of child care and the potential consequences for supply and demand.
The section after that gives the empirical models used in the analysis.
Next, an overview of the data and descriptive statistics is provided. The
empirical analysis shows the effects of regulation on the wages of child
care workers, child access to regulated forms of care, and finally the
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influence of these regulations on childrens’ early academic achievement. The summary and conclusions section develops a discussion of
the policy implications of the findings.

GOVERNMENT REGULATION AND THE CHILD
CARE INDUSTRY
As has been discussed earlier in this book, over the past 60 years, the
United States has witnessed a major growth in the number of individuals who require occupational licensing from the government (Kleiner
2006). By 2008, about 29 percent of the members of the U.S. workforce indicated that they worked in an occupation licensed by either
local, state, or federal governments (Kleiner and Krueger 2013). The
three types of occupational regulation used by various levels of government are licensure, certification, or registration. Licensing is the most
restrictive form of occupational regulation and the most frequently
used. State-appointed boards generally have oversight on the licensing
process, including setting entry and continuing practice standards to
include education requirements and testing for entry, creating codes to
govern behavior, and creating penalties for violations of the rules. Procedurally, licensing an occupation means an individual must pass the
board’s requirements before practicing in the profession. Individuals
who fail to meet the licensure requirements face financial or criminal
penalties if they try to practice the profession for pay. More specifically, entry requirements vary across occupations; common licensure
requirements include formal education, experience, an entry test, good
character, and a period of residency.
In general, the jurisdiction that regulates occupations is at the state
level, which is also the case in the child care industry (Mocan 2001;
Kleiner 2006). Every state regulates the child care industry to some
degree, since child care establishments must obtain licensure to enter the
market (Hotz and Xiao 2005). In 2005, nationwide, there were approximately 335,520 licensed child care providers. Of these, one-third were
center-based and two-thirds were family-based providers (National
Association for Regulatory Administration [NARA] and National Child
Care Information and Technical Assistance Center [NCCIC] 2006).
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State rules regarding the licensing of both center-based child care
and family-based child care fall into two main categories: structural and
safety. Structural regulations are those that mandate maximum childto-staff ratios, minimum experience/education requirements, ongoing
education requirements, and maximum classroom size. The child ratios
and classroom sizes vary, depending on the age of the children in the
program. Safety regulations include stipulations regarding staff training in CPR/first aid, immunizations, criminal background checks, and
compliance with the provision of nutritional meals. In addition, some
states have licensing rules and policies about the use of developmentally appropriate activities. States also establish guidelines for monitoring programs to ensure that they are complying with child care licensing requirements.
A common and important distinction among child care providers
is whether the program is center-based or family-based. Center-based
programs are more academically oriented and generally refer to programs offered in a dedicated facility or nonhome environment (church,
synagogue, community center, and so on). “Family-based” refers to
programs offered in a caregiver's private residence for children related
and unrelated to the caregiver (family-based care does not include
informal care provided by a family’s relative). States regulate each of
these types of child care differently. In addition, regulations may differ
by the age of the children. For example, states often set lower child-tocaregiver ratios for infants than for toddlers or for children age three to
kindergarten.

OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF DAY CARE AND
REGULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
The origins of day care are often traced to the welfare and reform
movements of the nineteenth century. “Day care grew out of a welfare
movement to care for immigrant and working class children while their
. . . mothers worked,” write Scarr and Weinberg (1986, p. 1140). The
early nurseries cared for children of working wives and of widows of
merchant seamen. Settlement houses were especially active in promoting day care for immigrant children. Jane Addams, the highly regarded
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Chicago social worker and activist, developed nurseries for poor children who needed supervision and care, note Scarr and Weinberg. During World War II, the federal government sponsored day care for more
than 400,000 preschool children. The focus was the effort to increase
female labor-force participation during the war. Following the war, the
federal government stopped subsidizing preschool child-care facilities and got out of both the regulation and the funding of preschools
(Boschee and Jacobs 1997).
When the federal government reduced its heavy involvement
in day care, a number of firms established their own centers, which
created a substantial benefit for women with children. Firms such as
Kaiser, Stride Rite, and Marriott established day care centers either on
their property or with a subcontractor. In recent years, organizations
such as the National Association of Child Care Resource and Referral
Agencies and the National Association for Regulatory Administration
have argued for more and tougher licensing requirements both for the
facilities and for workers such as teachers and assistants, stating that
licensing is the path toward higher-quality outcomes for children and
toward quality assurance for their parents. The first study that gathered
data on licensing of facilities and their workers was developed by Kay
Hollestelle, former executive director of the Children’s Foundation, in
the early 1980s. The report documented the types of regulations that
each of the states adopted and their coverage (NARA and NCCIC
2010). Many states require child care centers, including those in private
homes, to be licensed if they care for more than a few children (the
number varies by state). In order to obtain their licenses, child care
centers may require child care workers to pass a background check, get
immunizations, and meet a minimum training requirement.

CHILD CARE REGULATION AND CHILD CARE
EDUCATION QUALITY
The stated goal of the regulators is that licensing of the child care
market is an attempt by the state to ensure that the provision of child
care guarantees the safety of children and meets a minimum quality
standard. Analysts of child care outcomes distinguish between two types
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of quality indicators: 1) process measures and 2) structural measures
(Blau and Currie 2006). Process quality refers to children’s experiences
in child care settings, including children's interactions with caregivers
and peers, developmentally appropriate activities, and health and safety
measures. Structural characteristics include the child-to-adult ratio,
the size of each group of children, and the level of caregiver education and training (Vandell and Wolfe 2002). Structural characteristics,
which are most often the target of regulations, are thought to affect
children’s development, primarily by shaping the quality of providers’
caregiving (National Institute of Child Health and Human Development [NICHD] 2002). Developmental analysts found some evidence
of linkages between child outcomes and the quality of care—both process and structural—that children experience. Beginning in the 1960s,
higher quality caregiving is associated with improved school readiness
and better early academic skills (Shonkoff and Phillips 2000; Vandell
and Wolfe 2002; Smolensky and Gootman 2003).
The effect of state-level regulations on the level of quality in the
regulated child care market remains uncertain, primarily because the
few studies that have addressed this question face methodological challenges. Nevertheless, previous theory and evidence suggest that higher
levels of state regulation are linked with higher process measures of quality care in regulated types of care, including family- and center-based
care (see Chipty 1995; Hofferth and Chaplin 1998; Blau 2003; Heeb
and Kilburn 2004; Raikes, Raikes, and Wilcox 2005; Rigby, Ryan, and
Brooks-Gunn 2007). In particular, the work by Hotz and Xiao (2011)
has found that stringent child-staff ratios have the effect of increasing
the probability that providers who stay in the market will seek to obtain
accreditation from the National Association for the Education of Young
Children (NAEYC), since this is one of the requirements of that organization. This suggests that the given amount of regulation may indirectly
cause child care centers to pursue accreditation, which may be one way
in which regulation improves quality and signals to the market that it
provides high-quality child care services.
Although all of these factors may influence the effects of stricter
regulation on child care quality, there remain two potential reasons
why stricter regulation may not lead to improvements in structural or
process quality. First, the link between the health and safety quality
of care, children’s experiences, and measures of academic indicators
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of quality (regulated or otherwise) may be modest. There is some evidence that provider education and training is associated with child care
outcomes (Burchinal, Howes, and Kontos 2002; Clarke-Stewart et al.
2002; NICHD 2002). However, the magnitudes of estimated associations between structural and process measures of quality are small.
Second, child care regulations may not be adequately implemented
or enforced, which implies that the effects of regulation would be
weaker than intended. For example, centers rarely lose their accreditation or are fined, and teachers also infrequently lose their licenses. This
suggests that in order to estimate the effects of stricter regulations, it is
also necessary to examine the enforcement mechanism across states,
which include financial penalties and the number of monitors per state.
Unfortunately, these data are not readily available, either nationally or
on a state-by-state basis.

THE POTENTIAL INFLUENCE OF CHILD CARE
REGULATION ON PRICE, SUPPLY, AND DEMAND
This section develops the rationale for the role of regulation on the
key economic factors in child care. The long-term trend of increasing
participation by women in the labor force has been a key factor in the
increasing number of children who are in nonparental child care or
early education centers. A basic rationale for child care provisions suggests that three factors work in concert to affect parents’ labor market
and child care decisions: 1) availability, 2) price, and 3) quality (as perceived by parents). If regulation is intended, in part, to produce a higher
quality of child care for those who attend, then there is good reason
to suspect that it will also affect the economics of child care, such as
price, supply, and demand for those services. Moreover, within a family
production function, if the inheritance and passing along of skills and
education to a new generation is viewed as positive, then early childhood education and skill development would be perceived as a normal
good that would increase as the income of the household grew.
Stricter regulations might increase the perceived quality of regulated care because the downside risks of care are reduced, and with
this risk reduction, the demand for nonparental care is increased. For
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example, some advocates of regulation suggest that the establishment
of minimum quality standard regulations sends a signal to parents that
providers are guaranteed to meet basic requirements (Akerloff 1970).
This quality signal can, in turn, stimulate demand because it reduces
parents’ uncertainty or unease about their children’s experiences in nonparental child care.
Similarly, increased regulation may reduce the supply of formal
care arrangements. For example, by increasing the minimum education
required for a care provider and decreasing the child-to-staff ratio in
care facilities, the government could decrease the number of eligible
care providers willing to work for a given wage. Hotz and Xiao (2011),
for example, find that regulation of center-based child care reduces
the supply of child care centers, by increasing the costs of providing care and thereby outweighing the demand effects. Their analysis
makes a distinction between regulations related to child-to-staff ratios
and minimum education requirements. The child-to-staff ratio requirements deterred provider entry and reduced supply. Minimum education
requirement regulations did not deter entry, but they did reduce profits
and ultimately the supply of child care providers. Though important,
these economic effects did not address wage effects, access, or the
influence of regulation on child educational outcomes.
In each case, increased demand or decreased supply would suggest
that the price of formal care arrangements will increase. As a result, not
all consumers benefit from any quality-enhancing effects of regulation.
Some consumers will, in the absence of a subsidy, be priced out of
the market for child care and be forced to substitute another arrangement, often choosing either parental care, unregulated informal care,
or family-based monitoring of children. This potential price increase is
likely to have the greatest impact on some of the most at-risk children,
since children from low-income families are most likely to be priced
out of regulated child care markets. This may result in children from
lower-income categories starting school behind other children. In child
care, as in most forms of licensing, there is usually a trade-off between
access and quality.
The empirical analysis of regulation has consistently found a significant relationship between regulations, price, and demand for day
care (Lowenberg and Tinnin 1992; Hotz and Kilburn 1994; Hofferth
and Chaplin 1998; Heeb and Kilburn 2004). These findings show that
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regulation of an input, especially a costly one such as labor in producing child care, will restrict the supply of these services. Combining
this supply restriction with potentially increased demand for regulated
care is associated with an increase in the price of a good or service.
The analysis of the topic suggests that lower-income individuals lose in
quantity but that higher-income consumers gain both in the number of
providers of the service and in the quality of the service (Shapiro 1986;
Hotz and Xiao 2011).
The choice of the type of day care facility that parents select has
been influenced by government regulation. Several studies have focused
on a family’s choice of the mode of child care (Hotz and Kilburn 1994;
Hofferth and Chaplin 1998; Currie and Hotz 2004; Heeb and Kilburn
2004). In particular, Currie and Hotz examine the effect of regulation
on the probability that a child will be enrolled in regulated modes of
child care (center- or family-based care). They find that families are
less likely to enroll their children in center-based care as regulations
and prices rise. Their results suggest that, as regulations increase, families substitute away from formal care arrangements (family- and centerbased) into informal child care arrangements (parental care or relative
monitoring of children). The empirical models of enrollment effects
closely follow those of Currie and Hotz. However, these analysts
employ a relatively small sample in their estimation, which prevents the
inclusion of techniques such as state fixed effects in their specifications.
Several of the approaches presented in this chapter improve on the Currie and Hotz specifications by including state and year fixed effects in
a larger sample. The models also include a rich set of individual-level
controls offered by the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study (ECLS)
and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) surveys.
Prior research on state regulations and the child care and early
education markets has established that stringent child care regulations
affecting labor costs have the effect of restricting the supply of child
care in the regulated sector. In addition, the reduction of supply can
lead to a higher price for child care and early education in the regulated sector as parents and guardians bid for fewer child care slots.
This development would disproportionally disadvantage children from
lower-income households that cannot obtain need-based subsidies.
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EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF EARLY
CHILDHOOD REGULATION
Analytical studies have been slow to consider the associations
between state or local regulation of early child care and education and
children’s early academic skills. If, as suggested by prior research,
stricter regulation improves child care quality, then we would expect
that such regulation will also improve children’s early academic skills,
at least in the short run (Anderson 2008). In particular, intuition suggests that stricter structural quality–related regulations such as those
related to staff training, adult-to-child ratios, and class size would have
a positive influence on academic achievement. Yet there is a possibility
that regulation will increase child care prices, thereby reducing access
to formal care arrangements, particularly for lower-income families
who do not have subsidies for child care such as offered through Head
Start or other government programs. This could potentially lead parents
to choose unregulated child care arrangements (or none at all), which
suggests that any possible benefits accruing to those enrolled in more
highly regulated care may be offset by these unintended negative consequences of regulation. The analysis that follows will measure these
potential effects of regulation for early childhood services. Specifically,
the intent of the remainder of the chapter is to examine the following set
of issues: First, can occupational licensing and other regulations raise
the wages of child care workers? Second, to what extent do regulations
influence the likelihood of children enrolling in a center-based day care
facility? Third, to what extent does more regulation cause an increase in
early child academic achievement for those children attending a formal
day care facility?
Several data sources are used to estimate the influence of regulation
on wages, enrollment, and educational attainment. These data sources
include the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study’s kindergarten and
birth cohorts (ECLS-K and ECLS-B), the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), the American Community Survey (ACS), and a
detailed database of child care regulations for all 50 states from 1983
to 2007. The following section provides a description of the relevant
variables in each of these data sets.
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CHILD CARE REGULATIONS
The child care regulation database was originally compiled by Hotz
and Kilburn (1994) for the years 1983–2000. The regulation database
provides key information on the nature of the state regulatory environment under which family-based and center-based child care facilities
operated over the period. The database was updated from 2000 to 2007.
It provides a wide variety of information regarding state requirements
for child care facilities. For example, it indicates which states require
child development programs, the training and minimum education level
necessary for directors of child care facilities as well as for instructors
and their assistants, the required child-to-teacher ratio, and the physical requirements of the facilities (e.g., building size and playground
requirements).
The regulation data include state-level child care regulation indices
to quantify the degree and intensity of regulation by state for centerbased and family-based child care. Eight summated indices were created that summarize the strength of a state’s requirements in separate
categories. They include an overall index, as well as indices for development of children, staff requirements, education within the center, the
environment of the facility, the ratio of children to staff, health issues,
and oversight and monitoring of the facility. The components of each
of these indices are listed in Appendix Tables A.1 and A.2. The overall
summated index captures the overall intensity of state regulations by
adding up all of the regulations that apply to child care providers. The
other indices covering various categories include these seven:
1) The development index sums those regulations that are intended to encourage child development. These variables
include measures of experience and training of the staff, the
ratio of children to staff members in the facility, and whether
the state requires a child development program.
2) The staff index sums any regulations that stipulate requirements
of the staff at child care providers. These regulations include
education, experience, age, and training requirements, as well
as criminal background checks and first aid certification.
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3) The education index measures the strength of a state’s regulations related to the minimum education requirements for the
staff, including their assistants.
4) The environment index attempts to capture the strength of a
state’s regulations regarding the physical environment of the
care facility. These regulations include the amount of indoor
and outdoor space required.
5) The ratio index captures the strength of a state’s regulations
related to child-to-staff ratios for a provider.
6) The health and safety index measures the strength of a state’s
regulations related to the health and safety of children. The
components of this index include requirements for immunization, health evaluations, policies regarding sick children,
first aid training requirements for the staff, and criminal background checks.
7) Finally, the oversight index measures a state’s ability to provide oversight or enforce its regulatory provisions. Included in
the index are variables such as whether the state can impose
fines, whether parents have free access to the facility, and
whether the state has the ability to revoke a license. Unfortunately, enforcement data were not available in the data sets that
were used for the analysis.
Measured by the overall summated index, the strength of state regulation of child care facilities has steadily increased over the period
1983–2007. Figure 4.1 displays a box-and-whisker plot for each year of
the summated index for center-based (Panel A) and family-based (Panel
B) care. The figure is a visualization of the mean (over states) and standard deviation of the summated ratings over time. The figure shows an
increase in the mean number of state regulations facing child care providers over the years 1983–2007. The declining range of the whiskers
in the plot also indicates that the variance among states in the strength
of regulation has steadily decreased over time. Figure 4.1 also suggests
that state regulation of child care has become stronger on average and
is becoming less variable across states.
Although there is considerable variation in the level of regulation
across time, as shown in Figure 4.1, there is also variation across states.
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Figure 4.1 Box-and-Whisker Graph Showing the Growth and Variation
of Child Care Regulations by State over Time
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SOURCE: Hotz and Xiao (2011); authors’ compilation of data from 2000 to 2007.
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Table 4.1 shows variation in the overall summated child care regulation
index across all states in 2007. For example, in 2007 the most highly
regulated state for center-based care (Rhode Island) had a score of 40
in the overall summated rating index, whereas the least regulated state
(Idaho) had a score of only 6. Table 4.1 also depicts considerable variation of state regulations within a particular state over time. For instance,
from 1983 to 2007, Mississippi increased its overall regulation score
for center-based care by 24 points and for family-based care by 14
points; these values were among the largest increases in these scores.
The empirical analysis that follows exploits this variation in regulation,
in general and along specific dimensions, within states over time and
across states to estimate the influence of regulation on wage determination, access, and child care outcomes.

LABOR MARKET DATA
This section provides an explanation of the data used to examine
the labor market effects of regulation of child care workers. The American Community Survey (ACS) provides annual information on wage,
education level, race, age, geography, and work experience for a nationally representative sample of child care workers and preschool teachers
from the “child day care services” industry classification for the years
2000–2007. The data are used to estimate the influence of regulation on
the hourly wages of child care workers, while holding constant other
individual characteristics that are related to wages. The ACS provides
a large sample of preschool teachers and day care workers with which
to analyze the wage effects of state child care regulations. In each year,
the ACS has more than 2,000 observations, and in the later years of
the survey there are a minimum of 16,000 observations. The ACS provides the standard control variables found in analyzing census data that
can be used in estimating wage equations such as race, education level,
and years of experience. Table 4.2 shows the summary statistics in the
ACS sample covariates used in the estimation of the models that are
presented later in the chapter. The table provides information for all
preschool workers, child care workers, and preschool teachers.
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Table 4.1 State Levels and Changes in Child Care Regulations,
1983–2007
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina

Kleiner2013.indb 100

Overall center-based
1983
2007
25
10
23
7
16
25
24

Overall family-based
1983
2007
22
11
24
14

31
9
25
39

9
15
3
28
25

9

22
22
6
35
33
23
24
27

17
12
4
17
4

11

35
34
39
16
32
5
21
25
15
25
20
16
28

36
29
25
26
27
26

36
32

23
21
25
21
19
27
16
21
5
18
15
20

24
14
27
10
14
12
14
19
0
13
16
11

24
18
25
20
21
24

37
25
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Table 4.1 (continued)
State
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Overall center-based
1983
2007
10
32
13
27
18
26
21
30
24
34
40
6
17
22
19
16
21
20
35

29
24
32

Overall family-based
1983
2007
8
19
25
24
23
22
12
20
2
12
10
10
9
14

24
23
18
20

17
21

NOTE: Blank = data not available.
SOURCE: Hotz and Xiao (2011); authors’ compilation.

Measures of Child Care Outcomes
The ECLS-K provides information on child outcomes and child
care arrangements and consists of a cross-sectional data set of over
20,000 children and their parents in all 50 states from the kindergarten
class of 1998–1999. This chapter uses the restricted confidential version
of the ECLS-K, which provides information on child care arrangements
and the state in which the children live, as well as individual academic
skill assessments (reading and math skills). It also provides extensive
background information on the children’s parents, including education
level, employment status, income level, marital status, race, and further
details of the socioeconomic characteristics of the children and their
families. Although the data are rich in covariates, they have few observations for many of the smaller states, making the analysis generally
applicable only to larger states.
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Information on child academic achievement is particularly important as an outcome variable of the influence of occupational regulation. The ECLS-K provides general knowledge, math, and reading skill
assessment scores for all children. These scores were collected in the fall
of the children’s kindergarten year and should reflect their experiences
prior to school entry. In mathematics, children are tested on their ability
to identify one-digit numbers, recognize geometric shapes, count, read
two-digit numerals, recognize sequences, solve simple addition and
subtraction problems, and additional questions on cognitive ability. The
reading test consists of measuring the child’s ability to identify upperand lowercase letters, associate letters with sounds, recognize common
words, and read words in context. In each case, the child’s overall skill
in each test is given as an item response theory (IRT) skill score, which
measures their overall aptitude in reading and math skills. These IRT
scores are then standardized across children and are the key dependent
variables in our empirical models measuring the effect of regulation on
academic achievement.
In the analysis, a match was made with children’s type of child care
along with the appropriate level of state regulation. The goal was to
classify children by the type of care they received in the year prior to
entering kindergarten. Information was used from the parent survey to
categorize the type of care a child received in the year prior to kindergarten as follows: center-based care (including preschool, day care,
and prekindergarten, but excluding Head Start), family-based care
(nonrelative care provided outside the child’s home), nonrelative care
(nonrelative care in the child’s home), and relative care. Because information was also collected on how many hours of each type of care
children typically received, the analysis is able to construct variables
that capture whether children receive any of each type of care as well
as designate one type of care as the primary care arrangement (i.e., the
care category in which children spend the largest number of hours). In
order to match our state regulation data with the children included in
the ECLS-K, we match those children that attended center-based care
with the center-based state regulation variables in 1997 (the year before
the children entered kindergarten). Similarly, a match was obtained for
those children that attended family-based care (nonrelative care outside
of the home) with state-level family-based regulation variables in 1997.
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Table 4.2 Summary Statistics: American Community Survey (ACS) for
All Preschool Workers, Child Care Workers, and Teachers
All
Variable
Mean
sd
Min.
Max.
13.05
2.30
0
20
years of education
14.44
0
78
potential experience (age – educ – 6) 19.60
592.78 711.11
0
6,084
potential experience squared
0.97
0.18
0
1
female
0.57
0.49
0
1
married
0.77
0.42
0
1
race—white
0.14
0.35
0
1
race—black
N = 64,914
Child care workers
Variable
Mean
sd
Min.
Max.
12.57
2.29
0
20
years of education
15.15
0
78
potential experience (age − educ − 6) 20.07
632.43 760.46
0
6,084
potential experience squared
0.96
0.19
0
1
female
0.55
0.50
0
1
married
0.76
0.43
0
1
race—white
0.14
0.35
0
1
race—black
N = 45,054
Preschool teachers
Variable
Mean
sd
Min.
Max.
14.14
1.93
0
20
years of education
12.64
0
74
potential experience (age − educ − 6) 18.52
502.81 573.83
0
5,476
potential experience squared
0.98
0.14
0
1
female
0.63
0.48
0
1
married
0.79
0.41
0
1
race—white
0.14
0.34
0
1
race—black
N = 19,860
NOTE: Models include full set of year and state dummies. The value for potential experience is derived from the person’s age minus that person’s years of education minus
six (the age of first enrollment in school).
SOURCE: American Community Survey (ACS).
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An additional source of data for the study is the ECLS-B, a nationally representative birth cohort of 14,000 children born in 2001. This
longitudinal study follows children from birth until kindergarten and
includes both parent interviews and direct child assessments. For the
ECLS-B, information was collected when the children were approximately nine months old (2001–2002), two years old (2003), four years
old (2005–2006), and at kindergarten age (2006–2007 and 2007–2008).
The kindergarten 2006–2007 round of the ECLS-B provides child
achievement assessments that are compatible with the ECLS-K kindergarten test scores. The preschool round of the ECLS-B contains reading
and math test scores for children that are nearly the same age as those
in the ECLS-K. The reading and math assessments are similar in each
data source.
The ECLS-B data also provide detailed information about child care
experiences, information on the child’s state of residence, primary child
care arrangement throughout the child’s first five years, including in the
year before kindergarten, and family background. The observations in
the data include information (up to four years of age) regarding children’s primary child care arrangements in a way similar to the ECLS-K,
distinguishing between center-based care, family-based care, Head
Start, and relative care. Also, similar to the ECLS-K, the ECLS-B has
a large amount of information that measures or proxies for influential
family processes such as income, mother’s education level, poverty status, the number of children in the household, and the family structure.
The empirical analysis combines the ECLS-K and ECLS-B data so
that there is a repeated cross section across states. This allows an estimate of the empirical models using various sensitivity approaches. The
ECLS-K provides a sample of children across all 50 states who attended
child care in the year 1997, and the ECLS-B provides a sample of children attending child care in 2005. Each provides information on the
child’s primary child care arrangement in the year before kindergarten,
the child’s reading and math aptitude measured in kindergarten, and the
child’s individual and family characteristics.
Table 4.3 shows summary statistics of key variables for the analysis
by survey type: the ECLS-K or the ECLS-B. The table suggests that the
individuals, including the children, in the ECLS-K have comparable
average characteristics with the children in the ECLS-B sample. However, a slightly higher proportion of children in the ECLS-B belong to
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Table 4.3 Summary Statistics from the ECLS-K and ECLS-B Surveys
ECLS-K
ECLS-B
Variable
Mean
sd
Mean
sd
0.04
1.01
0.03
1.00
standardized reading score fall of
kindergarten
0.09
1.00
0.03
1.00
standardized math score fall of
kindergarten
0.48
0.50
0.50
0.50
childcare = center care
0.10
0.30
0.05
0.23
childcare = family-based care
0.10
0.30
0.13
0.34
childcare = head start
0.01
0.09
0.02
0.13
childcare = nonrelative care
0.14
0.35
0.12
0.33
childcare = relative care
0.17
0.38
0.17
0.38
childcare = parental care
68.49
4.29
65.13
3.75
child age KF (months old)a
0.41
0.49
0.30
0.46
reside in city
0.37
0.48
0.42
0.49
reside in suburb
0.11
0.32
0.12
0.33
reside in town
0.51
0.50
0.50
0.50
boy
0.61
0.49
0.41
0.49
race is white
0.16
0.36
0.15
0.36
race is black
0.14
0.34
0.21
0.40
race is Hispanic
0.05
0.21
0.13
0.33
race is Asian
0.22
0.42
0.19
0.39
mother works part-time
0.47
0.50
0.42
0.49
mother works full-time
2.44
1.11
2.52
1.17
number of children in household
0.08
0.28
0.05
0.22
family structure: step
0.21
0.40
0.19
0.39
family structure: single parent
0.03
0.17
0.02
0.13
family structure: adoptive or other
0.16
0.36
0.23
0.42
household below poverty threshold
0.92
0.27
0.78
0.42
speak English at home
0.30
0.46
0.25
0.43
mother’s education: high school
diploma
0.34
0.47
0.30
0.46
mother’s education: voc. degree or
some college
0.39
0.20
0.40
mother’s education: bachelor’s degree 0.19
0.07
0.25
0.12
0.32
mother’s education: advanced degree
0.01
0.10
0.09
0.28
very low birth weight (less than 3.125
lb.)
(continued)
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Table 4.3 (continued)
Variable
low birth weight (between 3.125 lb.
and 5.5 lb.)
hhincome = $5,001 to $10,000
hhincome = $10,001 to $15,000
hhincome = $15,001 to $20,000
hhincome = $20,001 to $25,000
hhincome = $25,001 to $30,000
hhincome = $30,001 to $35,000
hhincome = $35,001 to $40,000
hhincome = $40,001 to $50,000
hhincome = $50,001 to $75,000
hhincome = $75,001 to $100,000
hhincome = $100,001 to $200,000
hhincome = $200,001 or more

ECLS-K
Mean
sd
0.06
0.25
0.05
0.06
0.06
0.07
0.07
0.06
0.07
0.11
0.20
0.13
0.07
0.02

0.22
0.24
0.24
0.25
0.26
0.23
0.26
0.32
0.40
0.33
0.26
0.13

ECLS-B
Mean
sd
0.15
0.36
0.04
0.06
0.06
0.08
0.06
0.05
0.05
0.09
0.16
0.13
0.14
0.04

0.20
0.23
0.24
0.27
0.25
0.23
0.23
0.28
0.37
0.34
0.34
0.19

NOTE: Sample sizes limited to complete observations: ECLS-K survey, N = 13,679;
ECLS-B survey, N = 5,534.
a
child age KF (months old) means the child’s age in months at the start of the fall
semester of kindergarten.
SOURCE: Early Childhood Longitudinal Study, Kindergarten Cohort (ECLS-K); Early
Childhood Longitudinal Study, Birth Cohort (ECLS-B).

a racial minority, and children in the ECLS-B are more likely to have
a low birth weight. The age of children (listed as 68.5 in the ECLS-K
and 65.1 in the ECLS-B) is in months. Given the youth of the children
in the samples these differences may matter more than would be caught
with just a listing by their age in round years. Beside those differences,
the children in the ECLS-K and ECLS-B come from families with similar structure and socioeconomic status, are about the same age at the
time of math and reading testing, and have similar levels of child care
arrangements.
A Further Measure of Child Outcomes: National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth (NLSY)
The NLSY 1979 Maternal and Child Supplement is a panel of children born to mothers who were between the ages of 14 and 21 in 1979.
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Starting in 1986 and continuing on a biennial basis, direct child assessments were conducted for all children born to women in the original
NLSY sample. Children born early in the study had comparatively
young and disadvantaged mothers. However, by the 1990s, the data
were far more representative. Although not nationally representative,
the data are national in scope and remain one of few such data sets that
have repeated panel data with school readiness assessments for young
children. For this part of our analysis, a selection was made of all cohorts
of children who were between ages three and four between 1986 and
2004. This is important because it eliminates children born to the youngest mothers from the analysis (these children were older than four when
first observed in 1986). Moreover, because the mother’s age at birth is
known, this variable can be controlled for in the analysis. To further test
the sensitivity of the results, given the large sample size, one can also
remove young mothers or earlier cohorts of children from the analysis.
The analysis indicates the NLSY provides about 5,300 completerecord observations of children at ages three through six. In this data set,
and with the others that focus on educational outcomes, the data that are
available suggest that there are sufficient observations for large states,
but little can be said about educational attainment in smaller states.
Permission was obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics to work
with the restricted-use geocode version of these data. The restricted-use
NLSY provides much of the same information as the ECLS-K: state
residence, information on child-care arrangements, child cognitive
and academic skill assessments (standardized assessment of receptive
vocabulary and academic skills), and parental and household characteristics. Information on care arrangements is available for all children for
the first three years of life (collected prospectively and retrospectively,
depending on the specific year of the survey). Mothers were asked
about up to three arrangements for each child, and the data have been
coded so that one can distinguish between center-based care, familybased care (nonrelative care in others’ homes), and other nonrelative
or relative care. As with the ECLS-K, the data allow a determination
of whether children regularly experienced any of these types of care, as
well as the type of care that was considered the primary care arrangement at age three.
For children’s achievement, the NLSY provides measures of the
Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT), measured at age three or
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four, which assesses children’s receptive vocabulary, and the Peabody Individual Achievement Test (PIAT), a widely used reading recognition and math assessment, measured at age five or six. Although
these are different measures of achievement from the ECLS-K or the
ECLS-B, they provide another outcome variable in order to test the role
that state regulation has in children’s academic achievement. Similar
to the ECLS data, the NLSY has a wide variety of child and family
information that can be employed as covariates. In particular, it has
extensive demographic information as well as measures of the child’s
temperament, the mother’s health behaviors, the quality of the home
environment, and behavioral attitudes.

INFLUENCE OF REGULATION ON
WAGE DETERMINATION
As noted earlier, government regulation of child care may influence
the price of child care both by increasing the demand for the regulated
service and by reducing supply. On the demand side, theory suggests
that certain regulations, given that they increase the quality of care provided, could increase demand for formal care because its quality has
risen. On the supply side, increased regulation may have a direct impact
on the provider’s costs.
Two examples of how regulation can influence provider costs are
by 1) requiring providers to hire more highly educated workers or by
2) requiring providers to maintain a higher staff-to-child ratio. Either
of these regulations may increase the wages of child care workers in
a state. For example, if a state requires providers to hire workers with
a college education, wages will tend to increase if the provider would
have otherwise hired workers with less education. Similarly, if the state
ratio requirement forces providers to hire more staff than they would
have otherwise, assuming workers have limited mobility, the ratio
requirement will tend to raise the wages of child care workers in the
state.
In this section of the chapter, an empirical specification is developed to test for a relationship between state regulation and the wages of
child care providers. If state regulation tends to increase wages, regula-
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tion may have a direct influence on the supply of regulated child care.
If regulation increases wages, then the quantity of child care supplied to
the market will be lower for a given price per child. Consequently, raising wages and prices reduces the number of children in day care, all else
being equal. Without subsidies to low-income families, their children
will be shifted to either parental or other family care.
Analyzing these relationships suggests that we estimate the following log-wage model, which provides an estimate of the determinants of
wages for individual child care workers:
(4.1)

ln(wageist ) = δzst + xit β + ws + vt + εist .

In Equation (4.1), wageist is the wage of child care worker i in state
s at time t, xit is a vector containing observable individual-level variables that influence wages, ws and vt are state and time fixed effects,
respectively, and εist represents individual-level unobservables that
influence the wages of workers. Finally, the key explanatory variable
in this model is zst , which represents the strength of regulation of care
in state s during year t. In the models, zst is restricted to regulations
(either indexed or measured individually) that are related to staff-tochild ratios and education requirements. In this model, δ represents an
estimate of the causal effect of stricter education and ratio requirements
on the wages of child care workers.
The next section examines whether these regulations would provide
benefits to children through enhanced academic performance.

REGULATION AND ENROLLMENT IN
PRESCHOOL PROGRAMS
As noted earlier, more stringent state regulation of formal child care
arrangements may increase the price of care. Moreover, stricter regulation may increase demand for formal care because the perceived and
actual quality may increase, and stricter regulation may decrease supply
because the increased standards would reduce the number of openings
and workers in the industry. More specifically, stricter regulation may
reduce the number of children attending formal care arrangements and
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increase its price if regulation increases provider costs without fueling
greater demand.
In contrast, if greater regulation increases the demand for centerbased care by increasing the quality of preschools, while having a relatively small influence on the cost of providing formal care, then regulation could have a net effect of increasing child enrollment in formal care
arrangements. Regulations that are binding and affect the provider’s
costs of operation are expected to have an influence on enrollment in
formal care arrangements. The expectation is that stricter government
limitations on child-to-staff ratios, higher minimum education requirements, limitations on the size of the establishment, and other government regulations will reduce the supply of formal care. This would be
similar to the results suggested by Blau and Currie (2006) and by Hotz
and Xiao (2011). In turn, assuming that the demand effects of regulation
are negligible, the expectation is that states that have stricter regulations
with respect to formal care will also have lower child enrollment in
formal care providers.
The estimation of the effect of state regulation on the type of child
care chosen by parents employs a multinomial logit model of the individual choice of the type of care a child receives (center-based care,
family-based care, Head Start, or other, informal care arrangements),
conditional on state regulation indices and state fixed effects, year fixed
effects, and family and individual controls. In this framework, the estimations are able to assess the influence of state child care regulations
on the probability that a child will enroll in formal care arrangements
conditional on individual- and state-level characteristics.

ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE OUTCOMES
A basic relationship of the effect of government regulation on academic skills can be modeled using the following specification. The
model of childhood achievement assumes that academic skills are
determined by the following variables, which differ for individuals in
center care (j = c) and family care providers (j = f ):
(4.2)
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The variable ݕ௦௧
is the achievement measure (reading or math test
score measure) for which the data are available for child i at time t in
state s in care type j, xit is a row vector of individual characteristics

affecting a child’s outcome, ݓ௦ is a state fixed effect for care type j, ݖ௦௧
is the state child care regulation index for care type j in state s at time

t, where an increase in ݖ௦௧
represents stricter state regulation of care


type j, ݒ௧ is a time fixed effect for care type j, and ߝ௦௧ is an error term
containing unobserved variables that affect a child’s achievement measure. The vector β j and scalar δ j are other covariates that will be used to
control other factors that may determine test scores. The values for δ j
give the partial effect of government regulation of child care type j on a
child’s achievement measure.

ESTIMATES OF THE INFLUENCE OF REGULATION
The next section of the chapter is divided into three parts. The initial
section presents estimates of the influence of regulation on wage determination of child care workers in the ACS. Next, estimates of child care
enrollment are presented. Finally, results of the effect of regulation on
children’s early academic achievement are shown. At this early stage of
regulation and with the mobile labor market of young, generally lesseducated workers that work in the industry, there is likely little influence of regulation on the labor market, enrollment in types of programs,
or educational outcomes. The remainder of the chapter documents how
the estimates were derived and their implications for child care services
and for the succeeding chapters, which cover more heavily regulated
occupations at more advanced stages of regulation.
The Influence of State Regulation on Wages of Child
Care Providers
Initially, estimates are provided of the potential labor costs of regulation. Since labor costs are the largest single cost item for day care
centers, they would likely contribute a great deal to the overall price of
the service. Given the loose regulatory framework covering preschool
teachers and their aides, it would be surprising to find a strong influ-
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ence of regulation on wage determination. Table 4.4 shows the influence of regulation on wage determination of preschool teachers with
(column 2) and without (column 1) state fixed effects. The key variables
are education requirements, experience, and teacher-to-child ratios. In
a similar manner, using a model consistent with Table 4.4, Table 4.5
gives estimates of the influence of regulation of other kinds of child
care workers who are not teachers, with and without state fixed effects.
In addition, given the low levels of skill requirements and the ability
to replace child care workers, the influence of regulation is expected to
be low. The model uses one-period lags, although estimates using twoand three-period lag variables showed similar results. The estimates in
these two tables demonstrate that the role of education requirements,
experience, and teacher-to-child ratios are small and generally not statistically significant in either Table 4.4 or Table 4.5. On the whole, the
explanatory power of the model is fairly low. Furthermore, since the
estimates on many of the variables have opposing signs, the use of
an F-test for the joint significance of the variables would not provide
additional information about the direction of the regulation effects. In
the case of preschool education, where workers are easy to replace and
where requirements are both new and relaxed, there does not appear to
be much of an influence of regulation on wage determination. Similar
to the findings by Hotz and Xiao (2011), the estimates vary and show
small effects of regulation on wage determination.2 When government
regulation requirements are in an occupation where it is easy to replace
these workers, and where regulations are not onerous, then the economic effects appear to be minimal.
The Influence of State Regulation on Enrollment in Formal
Day Care Facilities
The previous section of the chapter noted the lack of a consistent
result for regulation on wage determination. However, there may be
other regulatory factors beyond wage determination that influence
whether children are enrolled in formal or center-based preschool programs or in family-focused ones. For example, there may be quality
effects of regulation that enhance the enrollment in center-based care,
or the staff-student ratio requirements may drive up the prices of these
services and send children to family-based care. This section empiri-
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Table 4.4 Estimates of the Influence of State Regulation on the Wages of
Preschool Teachers in the Day Care Industry, 2000–2008
(1)
(2)
Variables
lnwage
lnwage
0.00
−0.01**
education required in years, aide, day care center
(0.00)
(0.00)
−0.04*
education required in years, director, day care center −0.01
(0.01)
(0.02)
0.01*** −0.01
education required in years, teacher, day care center
(0.00)
(0.01)
−0.00
−0.00
education required in years, family home provider
(0.00)
(0.00)
−0.02
0.34***
experience required in years, aide in center
(0.02)
(0.07)
−0.00
0.03***
experience required, director of center
(0.01)
(0.01)
0.06**
0.08
experience required, teacher in center
(0.03)
(0.06)
0.02
0.03
experience required, family provider
(0.01)
(0.07)
−0.02*** −0.01***
max. child-to-caregiver ratio for age 48–59 months,
(0.00)
(0.00)
center
−0.00
0.00***
max. child-to-caregiver ratio for age 48–59 months,
(0.00)
(0.00)
family-based
State fixed effects
No
Yes
Observations
16,667
16,667
0.089
0.115
R-squared
13,380
13,380
N
NOTE: Dependent variable is log of wage. Sample restricted to preschool teachers in
the child day-care services industry. All models include full set of year dummies. All
covariates are lagged one year. Standard errors, in parentheses, are robust to clustering
by state. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant
at the 0.01 level. Column 1 shows the influence of regulation on wage determination
of preschool teachers without state fixed effects; column 2 shows it with state fixed
effects.
SOURCE: ACS.
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Table 4.5 Estimates of the Influence of State Regulation on the Wages of
Child Care Workers in the Day Care Industry, 2000–2008
(1)
(2)
Variables
lnwage
lnwage
0.00
−0.01
education required in years, aide, day care center
(0.00)
(0.01)
−0.05
education required in years, director, day care center −0.00
(0.01)
(0.04)
0.01*** −0.00
education required in years, teacher, day care center
(0.00)
(0.00)
−0.00*
−0.00
education required in years, family home provider
(0.00)
(0.00)
0.00
0.06
experience required in years, aide in center
(0.02)
(0.09)
−0.01
−0.00
experience required, director of center
(0.01)
(0.01)
0.03*
0.02
experience required, teacher in center
(0.02)
(0.02)
0.04**
0.03
experience required, family provider
(0.02)
(0.03)
−0.00
0.00
max. child-to-caregiver ratio for age 48–59 months,
center
(0.00)
(0.00)
−0.00**
0.00***
max. child-to-caregiver ratio for age 48–59 months,
(0.00)
(0.00)
family-based
State fixed effects
No
Yes
Observations
39,339
39,339
0.082
0.094
R-squared
NOTE: Dependent variable is log of wage. Sample restricted to child-care workers in
the child day-care services industry. All models include full set of year dummies. All
covariates are lagged one year. Standard errors, in parentheses, are robust to clustering
by state. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level. Column 1 is without state
fixed effects; column 2 is with state fixed effects.
SOURCE: ACS.
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cally examines whether these factors matter in determining the type of
care preschool children are enrolled in. A relationship between regulation and enrollment could indicate that state regulations are influencing
the price or the availability of certain types of care. Unfortunately, reliable price data do not exist in the data that are examined. The process
could be that as regulation raises the price of care and reduces its availability, one would expect to find fewer children attending regulated
center care in states where regulation is stronger. However, if regulation increases the quality of care, then demand for formal care arrangements may increase. Specifically, this section of the chapter examines
whether increased state regulation of center-based and family-based
care increases or reduces a child’s probability of enrollment in each
care type.
Estimating this relationship involves the use of child care enrollment data from the ECLS-K, the ECLS-B, and the NLSY. Table 4.6
displays a tabulation for the various types of child care enrollment for
children in the NLSY and the ECLS-K and ECLS-B in 2007. The tabulations from the three data sets show somewhat different measures of
enrollment. In the ECLS-K and ECLS-B, overall enrollment of preschool children is provided in the year before kindergarten, when the
children are either age four or five. In the NLSY database, the children
are age three. As shown in Table 4.6, the most popular care arrangement in the ECLS-K and ECLS-B data set is center-based care, with 46
percent of children attending some form of center care. The next most
popular forms of day care are parental care (19 percent), relative care
(15 percent), family-based care (10 percent), Head Start (10 percent),
and nonrelative care (1 percent). These values are different from those
in the NLSY because the proportion attending center-based care in the
NLSY is much lower and the proportion attending parental care is much
higher. In the NLSY, only 17 percent of children attend center-based
care, and 55 percent receive parental care. This disparity is due in part
to the sampling differences used in each of the databases.
Table 4.7 goes beyond the descriptive statistics in Table 4.6 and
shows the influence of regulation on preschool children’s attendance.
The table shows the influence of regulation when other characteristics are accounted for in the empirical analysis. More specifically, the
estimates in the table attempt to show whether government regulation,
controlling for individual characteristics, influences child care enroll-
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Table 4.6 Proportion of Enrollment in Various Types of Child Care,
Using ECLS-K and ECLS-B Data, NLSY Data, 2007
Panel A: Primary child care arrangement in the
year before kindergarten, ECLS-K and ECLS-B
%
n
Center care
6,268
45.7
Parental care
2,541
18.5
Relative care
2,049
15.0
Family-based care
1,420
10.4
Head Start
1,315
9.6
Nonrelative care
109
0.8
Total
13,702
100.0
Panel B: Primary child care arrangement at age 3, NLSY
%
n
Center care
1,581
17.3
Parental care
5,037
55.1
Relative care
1,396
15.3
Family-based care
931
10.2
Nonrelative care
197
2.2
Total
9,142
100.1
NOTE: Total in Panel B does not sum to 100.0 because of rounding.
SOURCE: ECLS-K, ECLS-B, National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY).

ment. The results show the influence of regulation for center-based and
family-based day care, using both the ECLS-K and ECLS-B in Panel A
and the NLSY in Panel B. The estimates are a series of marginal effects
from a multinomial logit model of the type of care for child enrollment
that relates to state regulation and individual characteristics. Overall,
the results show no consistent or conclusive results. Nevertheless, for
the ECLS data used in the table, the results in Panel A show that greater
state regulation is negatively associated with enrollment in center-based
preschool programs (given in column one)—programs are calculated
to be about 7 percent less at the mean value of the distribution used in
Table 4.7. Since different age groups are in the two data sets, the estimates on enrollment are consistent with the anticipated results. None
of the other major categories of preschool enrollment show significant
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Table 4.7 Effect of Regulation on Preschool Attendance for Center-Based
and Family-Based Day Care, Using ECLS-K and ECLS-B Data
and NLSY Data
Variables
overall center
overall family
Observations

Panel A: ECLS-K and ECLS-B—2005
Center
Family
Head Start
−0.03***
0.0068
−0.0005
(0.01)
(0.0058)
(0.0040)
0.0053
−0.0046
−0.0051
(0.0126)
(0.0056)
(0.0041)
16,363
16,363
16,363

Other
0.0235**
(0.0106)
0.0044
(0.0117)
16,363

Panel B: NLSY Overall Regulation Enrollment Effects
Variables
Center
Family
Other
−0.0032
0.0024
0.0009
overall center
(0.0033)
(0.0027)
(0.0041)
−0.0051**
−0.0001
0.0052
overall family
(0.0026)
(0.0020)
(0.0032)
Observations
3,481
3,481
3,481
NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. Model includes a full set of year and state dummies and includes a full set of individual and family controls. Estimates are marginal
effects at the mean (MEM) from the multinomial logit model. Overall regulation indices are lagged one year in Panels A and B (1996 or 2004). * significant at the 0.10
level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level.
SOURCE: ECLS-K, ECLS-B, NLSY.

results for the role of regulation. Furthermore, the estimates using data
from the NLSY in Panel B also show no influence of regulation on preschool enrollment for center-based care, but these results are for only
three-year-olds. The estimates in Panel B show only a modest negative
influence for family-based care. Looking at both national data sources,
it is difficult to find a clear pattern for the role of regulation in affecting
enrollment in preschool programs over the period for the data analysis
shown in Table 4.7, but to the extent the estimates are informative they
suggest a negative influence of regulation on center-based enrollment.
Finally, the rest of the chapter focuses on the potential effect of regulation in influencing test scores as a proxy for academic achievement.
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The Influence of Regulation on Preschool Children’s
Academic Skills
If regulation accomplishes its goals of improving quality, a measure
of that goal would be an enhancement of test scores for children in
regulated preschool environments. The outcomes would occur because
regulation would produce more highly qualified teachers and staff or
because the regulations would result in more attention being devoted to
students through lower staff-to-student ratios (Kleiner 2011). Based on
the results examined earlier in the chapter, it appears that occupational
regulation does not influence either wage determination or the selection
of the type of day care facility. However, other regulatory provisions
may affect the quality of student achievement, which then shows up in
enhanced student performance. This section of the chapter focuses on
this issue.
Estimates of student achievement from the ECLS-K
Table 4.8 shows the effect of each summated regulation index on
math and reading scores for children sampled in either the ECLS-K or
the ECLS-B data. The dependent variable is the child’s item response
theory math or reading score in the fall of his or her kindergarten year
(measured in 1998), which provides a measure of academic aptitude
prior to kindergarten. The samples used for the estimates include children whose primary care arrangement was center-based (including
preschool, day care, and prekindergarten, but excluding Head Start) or
family-based care (nonrelative care provided outside the child’s home)
in the year prior to kindergarten (1997–1998).
The table matches each child in the ECLS-K and ECLS-B samples
with the appropriate state regulation indices (family-based or centerbased, depending on which type of care the child received) for the year
1997–1998. The match occurs for each child, with the regulation index
using information from the child’s home state in the year 1997. The
sample sizes vary based on the regulation data that was available for
each state. They match with the state regulation indices for that individual, which measure an overall value along with ones for development,
health, staff, environment, ratio, oversight, and education. The coefficients on these variables measure the relationship between a child’s
test score and the strength of state regulation in each area, given that
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the child was exposed to the measured regulation. The estimates are
an approximation of the effect of the strength of government regulation on early childhood academic achievement. This interpretation,
however, depends heavily on controlling for factors that influence average test scores within a state, and the factors are correlated with the
number of regulations within the state. To reduce the risk of potential
bias, the estimates include several covariates in these models, which
control for individual-, family-, and state-level characteristics that may
be related to test scores. The individual-level variables include race,
gender, and birth weight. In addition, family-level covariates include
family income, father’s and mother’s education and employment status,
family type, and residence type. Finally, these estimates include state
controls, such as state per capita income and spending on welfare, and
regional dummy variables to control for a wide range of differentials in
children’s test scores by state and region of the country.3
The results show that state regulation of center-based providers
in terms of environmental and educational requirements is positively
related to math and reading scores among children who attended centerbased care. The coefficients suggest that additional state regulation in
either of these areas is associated with an increase in math and reading
scores by roughly a tenth of a standard deviation. To put this in perspective, a tenth of a standard deviation increase in test scores is roughly
equivalent to the black-versus-white test score gap (0.13 of a standard
deviation) and is more than three times larger than the gender gap (0.03
of a standard deviation), which is estimated as part of the same model
that is shown in Table 4.8. While the results suggest that educational
and environmental requirements carry an important impact, there is no
evidence in the ECLS that stronger regulation of other aspects of the
provider’s operation has an effect on child test scores.
Estimates of student achievement from the NLSY
To test for robustness and consistency of the estimates in the
ECLS-K and ECLS-B samples, the NLSY is examined. This is another
database that contains information on preschool academic achievement.
Using data on student achievement, Table 4.9 shows results of the estimates of the influence of regulation. Again, the sample sizes vary based
on the regulation data that was available for each state. The NLSY estimates find a similar result for the role of educational requirements on
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Table 4.8 Regulation’s Influence on Student Academic Outcomes, Using
the Combined ECLS-K and ECLS-B Data
Panel A: Influence of center-based regulations on math scores
(1)
Variables
Math
overall center −0.02
(0.02)
development
center
health center

(2)
Math

(3)
Math

(4)
Math

(6)
Math

(7)
Math

−0.02
(0.02)
0.02
(0.05)
0.00
(0.02)

staff center

0.10***
(0.01)

environment
center
ratio center
education
center
Observations
R2

(5)
Math

−0.02
(0.05)

4,810
0.265

5,806
0.266

8,918
0.281

5,852
0.269

8,802
0.283

9,537
0.282

0.11***
(0.03)
8,712
0.283

NOTE: Columns show the influence of regulation on math scores, according to the type
of preschool program the child attended. The ECLS-K and ECLS-B provide detailed
information by type of preschool program. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Estimates include set of year and state dummies and individual and family controls.
Sample includes only children attending center care in the year prior to kindergarten.
Standard errors are robust to clustering at the state level. * significant at the 0.01 level;
** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level.
SOURCE: ECLS-K, ECLS-B.

reading scores. However, the result for math scores is insignificant. The
NLSY estimates also fail to reveal an effect of regulations related to
the environment, as was found in the ECLS. The NLSY results reveal a
positive relationship between health- or safety-related regulations and
test scores. The estimates in Table 4.9 show the effect of each summated
regulation index on math and reading scores for children sampled in the
NLSY. The method of presentation in Table 4.9 is similar to that for the
combined ECLS estimates. The dependent variables in Panel A are the
PIAT (Peabody Individual Achievement Test) math scores measured at
age six, on average. The dependent variables in Panel B are the PIAT
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Table 4.8 (continued)
Panel B: Influence of center-based regulations on reading scores
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
Variables
Reading Reading Reading Reading Reading Reading Reading
overall center −0.03
(0.02)
−0.02
development
(0.02)
center
−0.06*
health center
(0.04)
−0.02
staff center
(0.02)
0.13***
environment
(0.02)
center
−0.00
ratio center
(0.04)
0.16***
education
(0.05)
center
Observations
4,768
5,762
8,749
5,808
8,633
9,368
8,542
0.245
0.248
0.242
0.251
0.240
0.240
0.244
R2
NOTE: Columns show the influence of regulation on reading scores, according to the
type of preschool program the child attended. The ECLS-K and ECLS-B provide
detailed information by type of preschool program. Standard errors in parentheses.
Estimates include set of year and state dummies and individual and family controls.
Sample includes only children attending center care in the year prior to kindergarten.
Standard errors are robust to clustering at the state level. * significant at the 0.01 level;
** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level.
SOURCE: ECLS-K, ECLS-B.

reading scores using the same test. Unlike many other standardized
tests, the ages at which children were tested in math and reading varies
significantly. For example, children were tested anywhere between the
ages of two and 11. Consequently, there is a control for the age at which
the children took the test.4
In the NLSY, specifications used controls that were similar to those
used in the other analysis in the chapter. These approaches include a
full set of year and state dummies to estimate state fixed effects and
year effects. Some of the individual controls include the child’s age,
race, and gender. The family controls include the mother’s and father’s
education levels, mother’s aptitude as measured by the Armed Forces
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Table 4.9 Influence of Center-Based Regulation on Math Scores,
Using the NLSY
Panel A
Variables
overall center

(1)
Math
0.18
(0.23)

(2)
Math

(3)
Math

(4)
Math

(6)
Math

(7)
Math

0.21
(0.29)

development
center
health center

1.54***
(0.53)
0.00
(0.26)

staff center

0.48
(1.09)

environment
center
ratio center
education
center
Observations
R2

(5)
Math

0.89
(1.29)

604
0.237

625
0.238

670
0.251

632
0.242

669
0.246

671
0.247

1.37
(1.98)
659
0.251

NOTE: Columns show the influence of regulation on math scores, according to the type
of preschool program the child attended. The ECLS-K and ECLS-B provide detailed
information by type of preschool program. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Regressions include year and state dummies and individual and family controls.
Sample includes only children attending center care at age three. Standard errors are
robust to clustering at the state level. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at
the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level.
SOURCE: NLSY.

Qualifying Test (AFQT), and family arrangement. When all of these
factors are accounted for, it is evident that regulation has no effect for
the overall measure of regulation, but that some of the individual factors, such as regulating the environment of center-based preschool education and regulating health and safety, matter for some of the measures
of student achievement.
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Table 4.9 (continued)
Panel B
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
Variables
Reading Reading Reading Reading Reading Reading Reading
overall center −0.02
(0.19)
−0.08
development
(0.22)
center
1.24***
health center
(0.31)
−0.07
staff center
(0.22)
0.25
environment
(0.85)
center
−0.59
ratio center
(1.02)
2.20**
education
(0.82)
center
Observations
595
616
660
622
659
661
649
2
0.331
0.319
0.328
0.320
0.324
0.325
0.332
R
NOTE: Columns show the influence of regulation on reading scores, according to the
type of preschool program the child attended. The ECLS-K and ECLS-B provide
detailed information by type of preschool program. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions include year and state dummies and individual and family controls. Sample includes only children attending center care at age 3. Standard errors are
robust to clustering at the state level. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at
the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level.
SOURCE: NLSY.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter attempted to measure many of the key elements of
the costs and benefits of government regulation of child care, with a
focus on occupational licensing. The regulation of child care is at an
early stage of development, in terms of both the number of states that
require it and the standards to be licensed. The estimates fail to find any
evidence that the wages of preschool teachers or child care workers
are affected by government regulation. This finding is not surprising,
since the requirements are both relatively new and at low levels. How-
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ever, there is some evidence, albeit not conclusive, that government
regulation appears to affect child care enrollment in center-based care
by making it more difficult to find teachers and support staff, thereby
reducing enrollment. Unfortunately, no reliable price data are available
to examine this issue in more detail. One potential benefit of increased
regulation is an increase in the quality of child care. This effect could
be measured by improved child development and early childhood academic achievement scores. The results for the overall index variable
fail to show evidence of benefits related to increased early childhood
academic achievement in math and reading scores across two major
government databases—the ECLS-K and the NLSY—but several individual factors such as environment, health, and education-based regulations are significant in some of the estimates for both reading and math
scores.
At these levels of regulation and in this industry, the regulation of
child care is unlikely to show much influence. The estimates in this
chapter confirm this prediction. If regulation does little to change costs
through wages or only modestly affects costs through changes in enrollment patterns, there are few reasons to enact the kinds of low levels of
licensing that are considered in this chapter. This is especially true if
these regulations result in governmental monitoring or fees that do not
seem to generate major benefits to either workers or children. Furthermore, the estimates show that occupational regulations have no measurable influence on test scores.
The remainder of the book examines occupations and industries at
much higher levels of regulation, where licensing laws have been in
effect for much longer time periods. The expectation is that regulations
that are more rigorous and have been in force for a longer time are
more likely to have an influence on the compensation of members of the
occupation and on consumers of their services.
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Notes
1. I thank Matthew Hendricks for his contributions to this chapter. He is an assistant
professor of economics at the University of Tulsa.
2. Similar estimates of wage determination for other day care workers and for all day
care workers showed similarly inconclusive results.
3. Estimates were also developed for the role of overall regulation in family-based
care, and the results are similar, in that some individual factors have an influence
on preschool children’s test scores.
4. Additional robustness tests were conducted for family- and center-based care
using various specifications and controls, and none found consistently significant
results. Overall, these regulation indices did not show any influence on children’s
cognitive test scores using the NLSY.
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5
Of Life, Limbs, and Licensing:
Electricians and Plumbers
With Kyoung Won Park
Possession of any of these licenses gives the holder enormous
economic advantage, for he is protected from competition from
nonholders. Indeed, so important has the license become that outsiders wishing to compete for business in an area where they do
not have a license may seek out a license holder who is no longer
actively engaged in the business and arrange to rent his master’s
license.
—Shimberg, Esser, and Kruger (1973, p. 67)
Opposition to statewide licensing had come from plumbers who
feel that such licensing makes it easier for outsiders to compete
with them for local jobs. (Ibid., p. 69)
Every job must be passed and approved by the “city’s electrical
inspectors.” Should the work be unsatisfactory, the contractor must
bear the expense of making all necessary changes. It is this potential monetary penalty, say the proponents of licensing only contractors, that motivates the contractor to hire competent workers and to
provide them with high-quality supervision. (Ibid., p. 70)

INTRODUCTION
Most of this book is devoted to the analysis of regulated white-collar
occupations; however, this chapter examines electricians and plumbers,
two of the most highly skilled blue-collar occupations in the construction industry.1 The chapter goes beyond merely looking at the traditional wage effects of occupational regulation to examine whether the
training and monitoring of the work that is associated with occupational

127
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regulation contributes to the enhanced safety of the workers in the occupation. Although firm-related factors, such as financial leverage, may
influence health and safety, the evaluation of the issue represents a first
attempt to go beyond traditional economic measures to examine some
of the potential benefits of regulation—benefits not only for consumers
but also for workers using measures of nonmonetary outcomes (Cohn
and Wardlaw 2013).
Analysts of government policies in the labor market have long held
that licensing laws that restrict the supply of labor cause an increase in
wages, but there has been little analysis of the influence of regulation
on the conditions of work. We examine the influence of occupational
licensing on the wages and workplace safety of electricians and plumbers, among the most regulated and skilled occupations directly involved
in the construction industry.
A focus of this chapter is on the role of occupational licensing and
other forms of government regulation for electricians, a heavily regulated occupation in the construction industry. The material in the chapter also examines plumbers, but given data constraints and the lack of
variation in the laws governing this occupation, the analysis is in much
less depth. Unlike previous chapters, which examine the role of occupational licensing on wages, prices, access, or quality to consumers, this
chapter extends the analysis of regulation on the likelihood of occupational licensing reducing work-related deaths and serious job-related
injuries, using new methods and data (Shepard 1978; Bond et al. 1980;
Cox and Foster 1990; Kleiner and Todd 2007).
The central findings show that certain occupational licensing
requirements, such as minimum age, education, and exam requirements,
raise the wages of electricians by about 6 to 8 percent. These results are
robust for several alternative specifications for electricians. However,
the results for plumbers are murky. Furthermore, the estimates suggest a modest but significant trade-off between wages and work-related
injuries for electricians, a result that agrees with economic theory on
compensating differentials of trade-offs of pay for safety. Local licensing of electricians is associated with approximately a 12 percent wage
premium beyond state regulations. This is consistent with the quotation
at the beginning of the chapter that local licensing of the construction
trades is often seen as a major economic benefit to the members of the
trade. Neither the estimates for electricians nor those for plumbers show
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much evidence of a systematic influence of occupational licensing on
the injury rates, severity of injuries, or death rates. As with the other
chapters in this book, we first describe the institutional environment of
the occupations and then describe the data and analysis used to examine
the labor market and health and safety effects of occupational regulation by government.

PUBLIC POLICY APPROACHES TO OCCUPATIONAL
HEALTH AND SAFETY
Public policies on health and safety have generally taken two
approaches: the regulation and setting of standards, and the implementation of social insurance through worker compensation. Illustrations
of the regulation approach are the passage of the Coal Mine Safety Act
in 1969 and the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) in 1970.
The federal government has played a major role in protecting the
health and safety of the workforce. For example, miners have been at the
forefront of occupational health and safety legislation, largely because
they have the highest rate of injury and death, and also because they
have gathered the most attention through the media. Media attention has
occurred in part because many of the deaths and injuries involve large
groups of miners who are affected in one incident, usually in dramatic
fashion. In contrast, deaths and injuries in construction tend to occur
to a much greater extent in small groups, away from the spotlight of
public attention. The focus on miners develops even though construction workers are likely to have multiple times as many overall deaths
and injuries annually. Recent data provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics show that construction workers have by far the greatest number
of deaths and injuries of any industry, and that they rank high in rates
of injury and death (BLS 2011). The analysis provided in this chapter
adds to the literature on occupational health and safety by examining
whether occupational regulation complements current regulatory policies to promote workplace health and safety by reducing the occurrence
and severity of occupational injuries. If occupational regulation matters
in improving health and safety in this sector, then it could potentially
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influence other sectors of the economy such as agriculture, mining, or
manufacturing, which also have high levels of workplace injuries.
Furthermore, occupational licensing gives a standard method of providing a service to include the health and safety of the workers that are
involved in the industry. For example, in the case of electricians, about
10 percent of their class time is spent in discussions of health and safety,
and numerous teaching units in apprenticeship programs are explicitly
devoted to health and safety (Center for Construction Research and
Training 2009); see Box 5.1 for examples of these requirements. The
expectation is that workers who have this background on safety from
both the classroom and the on-the-job training would incur fewer workplace injuries and deaths. One of the objectives of this chapter is to
examine training requirements in more detail with respect to electricians and plumbers, two regulated occupations in the industry.
Electrician Labor Market
Electricians were chosen to be examined in this section of the book
because they are the most government-regulated craft in construction.
Further reasons to focus the analysis on electricians are because they
form a key element in the construction workforce, they are numerous
in the industry, and they contribute much value to the industry. About
80 percent of all electricians work in the construction industry, and
about 695,000 were employed in the industry in 2008. About 32 percent of all electricians are members of a union, with the largest portion
belonging to the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. In
comparison, about 13.8 percent of all construction workers are represented by a union (BLS 2012c; Hirsch and Macpherson 2011). As with
other prevalent occupations in construction (e.g., plumbers and laborers), electricians’ high level of unionization may raise wages, and the
influence of unions on work rules is expected to be especially important
within this occupation. As a consequence, unions may also contribute to
reductions in occupational injuries. All states that have licensing for the
occupation require electricians to take classes on safety. Michigan, for
example, requires electrician apprentices to present a training course
plan on health and safety in order to become licensed.
Until the Great Recession, the construction industry had been growing over time, and Figure 5.1 shows the increase by billions of dollars
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Box 5.1 Training and Qualifications for Becoming an Electrician
Each year of training includes at least 144 hours of classroom
instruction and 2,000 hours of on-the-job training. In the classroom,
apprentices learn electrical theory, blueprint reading, mathematics,
electrical code requirements, and safety and first aid practices. They
also may receive specialized training in soldering, communications,
fire alarm systems, and cranes and elevators.
On the job, apprentices work under the supervision of experienced
electricians. At first, they drill holes, set anchors, and attach conduits.
Later, they measure, fabricate, and install conduits and install, connect,
and test wiring, outlets, and switches. They also learn to set up and
draw diagrams for entire electrical systems. Eventually, they practice
and master all of an electrician’s main tasks.
Some people start their classroom training before seeking an
apprenticeship. A number of public and private vocational-technical
schools and training academies offer training to become an electrician.
Employers often hire students who complete these programs and usually start them at a more advanced level than those without this training.
A few people become electricians by first working as helpers—assisting electricians by setting up job sites, gathering materials, and doing
other nonelectrical work—before entering an apprenticeship program.
All apprentices need a high school diploma or a general equivalency
diploma (GED). Electricians also may need additional classes in mathematics because they solve mathematical problems on the job.
Education continues throughout an electrician’s career. Electricians may need to take classes to learn about changes to the National
Electrical Code, and they often complete regular safety programs,
manufacturer-specific training, and management training courses.
Classes on such topics as low-voltage voice and data systems, telephone systems, video systems, and alternative energy systems such as
solar energy and wind energy increasingly are being given as these
systems become more prevalent. Other courses teach electricians how
to become contractors.
(continued)
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Box 5.1 (continued)
Licensure. Most states and localities require electricians to be
licensed. Although licensing requirements vary from state to state,
electricians usually must pass an examination that tests their knowledge of electrical theory, the National Electrical Code, and local and
state electrical and building codes.
Electrical contractors who do electrical work for the public, as
opposed to electricians who work for electrical contractors, often need
a special license. In some states, electrical contractors need certification as master electricians. Most states require master electricians to
have at least seven years of experience as an electrician or a bachelor’s
degree in electrical engineering or a related field.
SOURCE: BLS (2012b).

from 1990 to 2010 (BLS 2012a). Although the construction industry is
highly cyclical and suffered a precipitous decline in output starting in
2006 and continuing through 2010, the figure shows the steady growth
in output until the dramatic decline that began just before the recession of 2008. Figure 5.1 includes major sectors such as construction of
buildings, heavy civil engineering construction, and specialty contractors over time (Center for Construction Research and Training 2009).
Since employment grows and then declines based on business activity,
we are careful to adjust for employment in the construction industry
when showing the level of workplace deaths and injuries in subsequent
tables and figures such as Figure 5.2.
The deaths and injuries of electricians rank among the highest in the
construction industry (BLS 2011). However, deaths and injuries at the
workplace have been in decline. Figure 5.2 shows the extent to which
the death and injury rates for electricians have declined. A large decline
took place in 1996, and the period following that steep fall has seen a
steady decline in both deaths and injuries for electricians. According to
the Center for Construction Research and Training, the secular decline
occurred for a number of reasons. From a public policy perspective, in
1993 OSHA set standards that were implemented from 1993 through
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Figure 5.1 Construction Sector Output in Constant 2005 Dollars from
1990 to 2010
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SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Office of Occupational Statistics and Employment Projections.

1996. These changes required electricians to reduce their work with live
circuits, increased the use of aerial lifts as opposed to step ladders, and
introduced underground utility mapping and verification requirements
(Dong, Wang, and Herleikson 2010).
Figure 5.3 shows the growth in the number of states that require
licensing for electricians and the percentage of electricians who are
union members, which has declined in the occupation over time. Similar to national trends, the decline in the number and percentage of union
members is related to the number of workers covered by state licensing (Kleiner and Krueger 2010). Specifically, the number of states that
license electricians grew from 40 to 45 from 2000 to 2007, whereas the
percentage of electricians in unions declined from 39.0 percent to 34.2
percent during the same period.
Not only has the level of licensing increased, but the intensity of the
process of becoming licensed has become more difficult. Key officials
at the Center for Construction Research and Training, as well as focus
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Figure 5.2 Injury and Death Rates for Electricians, 1992–2007
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NOTE: Injury and death rates were computed as follows: Injury Rate = (Sum of the
weight for the national estimate from the SOII / Estimated employment of electricians
from the CPS MORG) × 100; and Death Rate = (Actual number of deaths from the
CFOI / Estimated number of employed electricians from the CPS MORG) × 10,000.
SOURCE: Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI) and Survey of Occupational
Injuries and Illnesses (SOII).

groups comprising practitioners from the construction industry, collectively identified the following five components as important in becoming licensed: 1) a general age/education requirement, 2) an apprenticeship, 3) a written exam, 4) a practical performance exam, and 5) a
continuing education requirement. These elements form the foundation
of an index of the rigor of the licensing process, in addition to the type
of licensing (i.e., state or local). This index makes it possible to trace
the evolution of the intensity of the licensing index from 1992 through
2007. This evolution is shown in Figure 5.4 using a box-and-whisker
graph of the sum of the five key elements of the licensing regulations
for electricians. The results show a modest upward movement in the
mean values, and the variance declines over time as the licensing pro-
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Figure 5.3 Growth of State Occupational Licensing and Decline of
Unions for Electricians, 2000–2007
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SOURCE: Current Population Survey (CPS) Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG) data,
2000–2007, and the authors’ survey of licensing statutes for electricians by state from
1992 to 2007.

visions become more standardized. Occupational licensing is growing
among states, and its provisions for an electrician to enter and maintain
good standing as a licensed professional are becoming more stringent.
The path to becoming a licensed electrician generally involves four
years of training and includes being an apprentice, a journeyman, and
then a master electrician. The path usually includes full-time work plus
attending classes several nights a week. Pass rates vary by region and
often include local licensing beyond state-level regulations for each of
the stages toward becoming a licensed electrician. About 10 percent of
electricians then become contractors and open their own businesses.
For states that license individuals, only licensed electricians can certify the quality of electrical work on a construction project, and only
licensed individuals are allowed to perform wiring procedures on construction sites. Given this institutional background on the labor market
for electricians, related factors might lead workers to earn more, work
under safer conditions, and reduce job-related injuries.
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Figure 5.4 Box-and-Whisker Graph of the Sum of the Five Key
Elements of State Licensing Regulations for Electricians,
1992–2007
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SOURCE: The authors’ survey of licensing statutes for electricians by state, from 1992
to 2007.

Plumber Labor Market
The licensing of plumbers has followed a trajectory similar to that
of electricians. Traditionally, the licensing of plumbers has been a
local issue, since building codes have usually varied by city or county.
Shimberg, Esser, and Kruger (1973) contend that the public health and
safety argument for local licensing is “little more than a smoke-screen
to obscure self-interest” (p. 69). Some states such as California preempt
local licensing, and all regulation is at the state level. Others have state
minimum requirements but have additional regulations based on unique
local characteristics.
Figure 5.5 presents a box-and-whisker graph of the sum of the five
key elements for state licensing regulations for plumbers from 1992
through 2007. There are no major changes in the figure to denote an
increase in the toughness of those regulations or changes in the variance of the regulations. The major changes in the regulations governing
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Figure 5.5 Box-and-Whisker Graph of the Sum of the Five Key Elements
of State Licensing Regulations for Plumbers, 1992–2007
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SOURCE: The authors’ survey of licensing statutes for plumbers by state, from 1992
to 2007.

licensing took place prior to 1992—the year in which the data analysis in this chapter begins. As is the case with electricians, regulations
appear to be getting modestly more stringent for plumbers, according
to measures of education and training.2 The data in Tables 5.4 and 5.5
also show there is a movement toward state licensing and away from
local licensing, which broadens the geographic market for plumbers
at the expense of local regulations. Perhaps unions and their members
prefer a wider geographic market with more potential jobs to a market
with higher wages and fewer job opportunities, which are the likely
outcomes of local licensing.

THEORIES OF THE EFFECTS OF REGULATION
ON WAGES AND SAFETY
This section first focuses on the theory of wage determination and
then examines the role of occupational regulation on reducing work-
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related deaths and injuries. A starting point for the examination of
wages and work injuries can be found in the comments of the eighteenth century economist Adam Smith on compensating differentials
for various types of work. He noted that workers will demand a compensating wage differential for jobs that are perceived as risky or otherwise unpleasant (Smith 1937).
The analysis of wage determination under licensing in construction
builds on work by Perloff (1980) on the influence of licensing laws
on wage changes in the construction industry. The basic model posits
that market forces are largely responsible for wage determination in
construction and that the industry is highly cyclical. Perloff presents
two cases. In the first, there are no costs to shifting across industries, so
the labor supply to the construction industry is completely elastic at the
opportunity wage. In this case, the increase in the demand for construction work would have little effect on wages, since workers would flow
between the construction industry and other industries. (Manufacturing
would be the most likely substitute in the model and would appear to be
a plausible substitute for the skills of construction workers.)
In the other extreme case, a licensing law renders the supply of construction labor inelastic. Here, labor cannot flow between the sectors,
so variations in construction demand would be reflected in the construction wage. In his empirical work, Perloff (1980) shows that for electricians, more so than for either laborers or plumbers, state regulations
make the supply curve highly inelastic. Consequently, the ability of a
state to limit entry or impose major costs on entry through licensing
would enhance the occupation’s ability to raise wages.
The institutional labor market literature has developed one additional issue that has been an important focus in construction: the determination of the geography of markets (Dickens and Lang 1992). These
researchers argue that institutions in the labor market, such as unions
or occupational associations, attempt to capture a geographic area. In
the case of both electricians and plumbers, limiting the geographic area
would result in greater control of the labor market and higher wages.
Therefore, there is an incentive to limit the area to local licensing rather
than expand the market to the state level. To the extent that the market
has been expanded, it has been done to increase employment, but that
may have come at the expense of higher wages.
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The issue of the role of occupational regulation on the reduction of
deaths and injuries is less developed. In general, a model developed by
Viscusi, Harrington, and Vernon (2005) of the risk of injury or death
can be presented as follows:
(5.1)

Riskt = α + β1Occupational Regulationt − 1
+ β2Cyclical Effectst + β3Industry Characteristicst
+ β4Worker Characteristicst + ε ,

where occupational regulation includes the training, selection, and standardization effects of occupational licensing, cyclical effects in construction include the boom of the early 2000s, and industry controls
include whether the person was in the construction industry and the
human capital characteristics of the individuals that are covered in the
sample.
An important issue in the occupational health and safety literature is
whether regulations or standards for work are more effective than litigation such as worker compensation laws in reducing the incidence and
severity of injury and the incidence of death. Most of the analyses on
standards such as OSHA legislation find that occupational regulations
or standards are not more effective (Smith 1976; Viscusi, Harrington,
and Vernon 2005). In contrast, many of the studies on worker compensation and its influence on the incidence and severity of injury and the
incidence of death show much larger influences. For example, Moore
and Viscusi (1990) show that worker compensation laws reduce job
fatality rates by about one-third, and that this legislation is much more
effective than setting standards. Based on these findings, the expectation is that there are modest effects of occupational regulation standards
in reducing injuries, and that the influence of these policies would be
similar to the effects of legislation such as OSHA, where the influence
of the policies appears to have diminished (Gray and Mendeloff 2005).
To the extent that licensing introduces standardization of procedures in electrical work or plumbing that take health and safety concerns into effect, the expectation is that regulation would reduce injuries and deaths. Specific programs such as apprenticeships, required
classes on health and safety, and continuing education would all serve
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to reduce the likelihood of injuries at the workplace. Furthermore,
licensing eliminates the lower part of the quality distribution within the
occupation through time-intensive classes and the costs of occupationspecific education, and consequently would diminish the likelihood of
death and injury by keeping more careless individuals from working
in the occupation. Only those individuals who are willing to take on
the time and money costs of continuing education, are committed to
the occupation, and are willing to pay annual fees and attend seminars
to stay in the occupation would be likely to know the appropriate procedures to stay safe at the workplace. Practitioners could also benefit
from technological innovations learned in the workplace or at construction sites. Although these innovations could reduce injuries or deaths,
they may be overlooked in assessments because they do not fit into the
standard method of doing things. In addition, attempts at implementing
unorthodox methods in response to technological change may result in
the loss of a license.3
One final issue that helps define the role of occupational regulation
in construction is the state or local political jurisdiction in place. In
most jurisdictions, licensing for electricians and plumbers is done at the
state level. However, some states have local licensing for electricians,
and these local licensing regulations are sometimes more difficult for
workers to complete than state-level regulations. Cook County, which
includes the city of Chicago, is often given as an example of a jurisdiction having more and tougher requirements than the ones at the state
level. Given the pervasiveness of local licenses that may, in some cases,
be more rigorous than the ones at the state level, the analysis will examine the influence of local licenses to regulate electricians. Consequently,
the issue of whether the regulation of occupations matters in raising
wages or reducing the injuries and deaths of electricians is an empirical
issue. The chapter now turns to that empirical issue. The data to estimate the models described above are detailed in the following section.
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DATA ON LICENSING STATUTES, WAGE DETERMINATION,
AND HEALTH AND SAFETY
Regulation Data
A group of researchers working with funding from the Department of Labor were among the first to examine the role of occupational
regulation in construction. In a study that was commissioned by the
department’s Office of Research and mentioned at the beginning of this
chapter, Shimberg, Esser, and Kruger (1973) discussed the role of occupational regulation in construction and also mentioned the difficulties
of health and safety issues in the industry. The researchers also focused
on the variations in occupational licensing in the industry for several
occupations. The key elements of their findings were on the process of
licensing and not on the outcomes. Their work focused on who is on the
licensing boards for the occupation and whether state and local boards
are or should be regulating the occupation. Their study also examined
whether the boards were composed of political appointees, whether the
pay was low, whether the boards were dominated by members of the
occupation, and whether they had public members. Other analysis, also
funded by the Department of Labor, focused on the quality of work
under occupational licensing (Carroll and Gaston 1981).
In order to examine which of these occupational issues dominates
the determination of health and safety for electricians, a regulatory
index was developed based on the focus group responses that capture
the major elements of the statutes across states. Table 5.1 displays the
key elements (and their operational definition) of the licensing provisions in the statutes and administrative regulations that were examined
for each of the states in the sample for electricians. Table 5.2 presents
information on the changes in the various licensing statutes regulating
the occupation by states over time.4 It tabulates only the changes in
occupational regulations in state statutes. For example, electricians in
Alaska were licensed at the state level, and the five key elements of the
licensing provisions did not change between 1992 and 2007.
Table 5.2 presents these values over the period from 1992 through
2007. The details of the provisions and the states and years in which
they were passed are presented in Appendix Table B.1. The results indi-

Kleiner2013.indb 141

9/18/2013 10:11:05 AM

142 Kleiner and Park
Table 5.1 Key Elements and Definitions of Regulatory Variables
Variable
license
state license
local license
Five major components
general requirements
apprentice codes

written exam
performance exam
continuing education

Definition
1 if either license is required by state statute or local statute;
otherwise 0.
1 if license is required by state statute; otherwise 0.
1 if license is required by statute of local municipality;
otherwise 0.
1 if either a minimum level of education or of age is
required to be licensed; otherwise 0.
1 if occupation-specific experience as apprentice (or
equivalent years of education) is required to be licensed;
otherwise 0.
1 if a written exam is required to be licensed; otherwise 0.
1 if a performance exam is required to be licensed;
otherwise 0.
1 if state has any requirement for license renewal;
otherwise 0.

SOURCE: The authors’ survey of licensing statutes for electricians and plumbers by
state, from 1992 to 2007.

cate that the occupation experienced growth in regulations governing
the entry and training requirements. The level of the index, or the number of items included in the measure, grew from 2.11 in 1992 to 2.38 in
2007, or almost 13 percent. This reflects the intensity of the growth of
requirements to enter the occupation of electrician and maintain membership in that occupation.
In order to fully implement the empirical estimation strategy, we
show in Panel A of Table 5.3 the states that changed licensing policies. For example, Iowa switched to state licensing from local regulations, and Louisiana changed from no licensing to state regulation of
the occupation. A number of states allow electricians to be regulated at
the local level, including populous states such as Illinois and New York.
In Panel B of the table, we list the states that ranked highest and lowest
using our index of regulation.
Table 5.4 gives the changes in the statutes for the period 1992
through 2007 for plumbers, the other occupation that is the subject of
the analysis. The results show that a number of states had local regulation of the construction occupation. However, both South Dakota and
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Table 5.2 Changes in the Index of State Licensing Regulation for
Electricians, 1992–2007
Year
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Total

No. of changes in occupational
regulations in state statutes
38
38
38
38
38
38
38
38
40
41
41
42
43
43
43
45
642

Mean
2.11
2.11
2.18
2.24
2.24
2.24
2.29
2.34
2.33
2.29
2.32
2.38
2.35
2.35
2.35
2.38
2.28

sd
0.98
0.98
1.04
1.02
1.02
1.02
1.01
0.94
0.94
0.96
0.96
0.88
0.90
0.90
0.90
0.91
0.95

SOURCE: The authors’ survey of licensing statutes for electricians by state from 1992
to 2007.

Virginia moved to state licensing from local regulations, and Idaho
moved to state certification from local regulations. Nebraska remained
as the only state with no regulations for the occupation; Alaska, North
Dakota, and Tennessee all moved from not having any regulation to
state licensing during the period that was examined.
Table 5.5 shows the growth in the level of licensing for plumbers
using the index developed earlier. For example, from 1992 until 2007,
the mean of the index grew by 17 percent, and the standard deviation
declined over the same time period. Over the period there was a standardization of state licensing beyond the clear growth shown in the
table. Nevertheless, the changes in the index of statutes for plumbers
were much smaller than those for electricians.
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Table 5.3 States Staying with or Switching Their Level of Licensing, and
State Rankings of Occupational Regulation of Electricians,
1992–2007
Panel A: Stayers and switchers of occupational regulation of electricians, 1992–2007
State licensing
Stayers

All other states

Switchers

Local licensing
Illinois, Kansas,
Missouri, New York,
Pennsylvania
Delaware (to state
licensing in 2000), Iowa
(to state licensing in
2007), Kentucky (to
state licensing in 2001),
Texas (to state licensing
in 2003)

No licensing
Indiana

Louisiana (to state
licensing in 2004),
Massachusetts (to state
licensing in 2007),
Tennessee (to state
licensing in 2000)

Panel B: Regulation rankings of the top and bottom groupings
of states for electricians, 2007
Top States
Arizona
Massachusetts
Wyoming
Alabama and 17 other
states

Sum of the five
requirements
5
4
4
3

Bottom states
Alaska
Kentucky
Louisiana
Mississippi

Sum of the five
requirements
1
1
1
1

SOURCE: Authors’ survey of licensing statutes for electricians by state, 1992 to 2007.

Workplace Safety Data
The analysis of information comes from two sources of confidential
data: the Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses (SOII) and the
Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI), with Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) supervision over the handling of the data for public dissemination (for detailed information, see BLS [2013a]). To examine the
role of occupational licensing in potentially reducing serious nonfatal
injuries, we use the SOII, which is a confidential establishment-level
survey for nonfatal injury data administered by the BLS and stored at
its Washington, D.C., offices. The SOII lists nonfatal injuries reported
by establishments in the private sector for 39 states between 1992 and
2007. Although the injuries are divided into three categories,5 the focus
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Table 5.4 Stayers and Switchers in Occupational Regulation of
Plumbers, 1992–2007
State
licensing

Local
licensing

Certification

Stayers

All other states Iowa, Kansas,
Massachusetts,
Mississippi, New
York, Pennsylvania,
Wyoming
Switchers
South Dakota (to state Idaho (to state
licensing in 1999),
licensing in
Virginia (to state
1996)
licensing in 1995)

No
licensing
Nebraska,
West Virginia

Alaska (to state
licensing in
2005), North
Dakota (to state
licensing in
1993), Tennessee
(to state licensing
in 2006)

SOURCE: Authors’ survey of licensing statutes for plumbers by state, 1992 to 2007.

Table 5.5 Changes in the Index of State Licensing Regulation for
Plumbers, 1992–2007
Year
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Total

No. of changes in occupational
regulations in state statutes
42
42
42
43
43
43
43
44
44
44
44
44
44
44
44
44
694

Mean
2.24
2.33
2.33
2.35
2.42
2.42
2.42
2.36
2.39
2.41
2.43
2.50
2.50
2.55
2.61
2.61
2.43

sd
1.21
1.18
1.18
1.17
1.18
1.18
1.18
1.22
1.20
1.23
1.23
1.17
1.17
1.11
1.06
1.06
1.16

SOURCE: Authors’ survey of licensing statutes for plumbers by state, 1992 to 2007.

Kleiner2013.indb 145

9/18/2013 10:11:06 AM

146 Kleiner and Park

is on cases involving injuries of workers from the age of 16 to 64 that
resulted in an absence from work, as measured by “days away from
work.”6
Table 5.6 shows the main events resulting in workplace nonfatal
injuries for electricians and plumbers from 1992 through 2007. The
industry rate for both occupations is about the same—namely 15 percent for electricians and 13 percent for plumbers. For both regulated
occupations, overexertion in lifting resulted in the highest number of
nonfatal injuries. For electricians, injuries such as falling and bending
were also important types of injuries. Similarly, bending and falls were
major forms of nonfatal injuries for plumbers.
To maintain consistency in the analysis, much of the data is restricted
to fatal injuries among workers ages 16 to 64 in the private sector, but
including 50 states and the District of Columbia. The data are from the
CFOI, another confidential fatal injury data source that is administered
and stored at the BLS offices in Washington, D.C.
Because the SOII and CFOI do not have the employment information, one important issue in building an uninterrupted time series for
the empirical analysis is to estimate the denominator (i.e., the employment within states in a given year) for computing both the injury rates
and death rates at the workplace. Using the Current Population Survey
(CPS) Merged Outgoing Rotation Group (MORG) data from 1992 to
2007 (downloaded from http://www.nber.org/morg/annual/), an estimate was developed for employment of electricians in a state in a given
year, and then the injury rates and death rates by state and year were
computed.7 Finally, the sample selection rules for this study (e.g., persons from the age of 16 to 64 and in the private sector) would necessarily produce death and injury rates that are different from those publicly
available through the BLS.
Table 5.7 summarizes the five most frequent events that led to fatal
injuries for electricians. Not surprisingly, the results show that four of
the frequent events were related to electrocutions and explained about
55 percent of electrician deaths. Figure 5.6 compares the days away
from work (a measure of the severity of the injury) for electricians,
a regulated occupation, and for laborers, an unregulated construction
occupation. The figure highlights two findings. First, there are relatively
small differences in the days away from work for the two occupations,
which do very different tasks, but both are involved in difficult con-
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Table 5.6 Five Main Events Causing Workplace Non-Fatal Injuries, 1992–2007
Electricians
Estimated
Events (code)
occurrences
Overexertion in lifting (221)
12,400
Fall from ladder (113)
11,625
Bending, climbing, crawling,
reaching, twisting (211)
Struck against stationary object
(012)
Struck by slipping handheld
object (0232)
Others
Total

% of estimated
occurrences
9.05
8.48

8,608

6.28

7,405

5.40

7,267

5.30

89,788
137,093

65.49
15

Plumbers
Estimated
Events (code)
occurrences
Overexertion in lifting (221)
17,100
Bending, climbing, crawling,
7,742
reaching, twisting (211)
Struck by falling object (021)
6,406
Fall to floor, walkway, or other
surface (131)
Fall from ladder (113)
Others
Total

% of estimated
occurrences
14.05
6.36
5.26

6,858

5.63

6,061

4.98

77,552
121,719

63.71
13

SOURCE: The SOII and CFOI from 1992 to 2007.
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Table 5.7 Five Main Events Causing Workplace Deaths for Electricians,
1992–2007
% of actual
Events (code)
occurrences
Contact with wiring, transformers, or other electrical
26.0
components (3120)
Contact with overhead power lines (3130)
18.2
Fall from ladder (1130)
5.8
Contact with electric current of machine, tool, appliance,
5.0
or light fixture (3110)
Contact with electric current, unspecified (3100)
4.5
Others
40.4
Total
99.9
NOTE: Column does not sum to 100.0 because of rounding.
SOURCE: The CFOI from 1992 to 2007.

Figure 5.6 Severity of Injuries Due to Nonfatal Injuries for Electricians
and Laborers, by the Percentage Who Lost Days of Work
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SOURCE: The SOII from 1992 to 2007.
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struction tasks at work. Second, most of the injuries were relatively
minor: 47.7 percent of injured electricians returned to work within five
days, and 77 percent returned to work within a month. Injuries causing
absence from work for more than 180 days made up only 1.6 percent
of the total.
Economic Data
As a key part of the examination of the influence of regulation on
the labor market, the analysis uses data from the CPS MORG. Table
5.8 presents the basic information that was used for the analysis. The
standard variables from the MORG include human capital variables
for electricians such as gender, age, experience, education, race, parttime employment, union membership, and sector. The estimates for the
wage models, using information from the American Community Survey (ACS) from 2000 through 2007, show that the results are similar to
those in the CPS. Since the ACS has no information on unionization—
an important element for occupational licensing in wage and safety
determination—the results only present estimates from the CPS.
The empirical strategy was to initially estimate the role of regulation on wage determination for workers in construction, with an emphasis on electricians.8 These models will update and refine the work by
Perloff (1980). Next, estimates were developed of the influence of occupational licensing on the incidence, severity, and death of construction
workers, with a focus on electricians. The estimates provide several
tests of the robustness of the estimates with various specifications and
across databases and occupations.
Wage Determination
Initially, there is an examination and estimate of an earnings model
with licensing regulations. The basic model is specified as follows:
(5.2)

ln(Earningsist) = α + βRst + γXist + δs + θt + εist ,

where Earningsist represents the hourly earnings of electricians i in
state s in year t; Rst stands for the licensing occupational regulations
and components of the regulation in person i’s state s in year t; Xist is
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Table 5.8 Basic Statistics from the CPS MORG, 1992–2007, for
Electricians
Variable

Hourly earnings
Gender (1: male; 0: female)
Age (years)
Experience (age − years of school − 6)
Experience squared (÷ 1,000)
High school graduate
Some college experience
College diploma or more
Marriage
White
Hispanic origin
Part-time
Government
Union member

n
9,747
11,050
11,050
11,050
11,050
11,050
11,050
11,050
11,050
11,050
11,050
11,050
11,050
9,748

Mean
21.13
0.98
37.09
18.46
4.61
0.46
0.24
0.23
0.63
0.92
0.83
0.02
0.02
0.37

sd
9.85
0.13
10.91
10.95
4.68
0.50
0.43
0.42
0.48
0.27
0.28
0.15
0.14
0.48

SOURCE: The Current Population Survey’s Merged Outgoing Rotation Group (MORG)
files, from 1992 to 2007.

the vector that includes covariates measuring the characteristics of each
person; δ and θ are state and year fixed effects, respectively; and εist is
the error term in the panel data.
Table 5.9 shows the estimates from the above model of the influence of licensing on wages for electricians. The model also includes
estimates of the influence of unions on wage determination, since it is
also an important labor market institution in the construction industry.
The results show no statistically significant impact of the measure of
the overall index of licensing on earnings. However, the additional estimates suggest that licensing matters in most of the specifications in the
model. For example, the summated rating scale of licensing at the statelevel variable is statistically significant, but the magnitude of the coefficient is small. In contrast to the overall effects of licensing in the economy, the value for local licensing is significant and positive for almost
all the specifications (Kleiner and Krueger 2013). The range of significant coefficients is from 8 to 13 percent. Several of the specific entry
requirements are significant. Local licensing regulations, such as ones
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that are quite difficult (e.g., those that exist in Cook County, Illinois),
can serve to raise the wages of electricians. In addition, the coefficients
for the general requirements of age and education are significant, as are
the provisions for taking an exam and having an apprenticeship. This
is also consistent with the institutional industrial-relations approach
that holds that occupations can gain economic advantages by limiting
the geographic market (Perlman 1928). Further analysis of licensing at
the local level and for other construction-related occupations could add
more detailed geographical data to the basic results for electricians.
In order to probe the basic wage estimate further, Table 5.10 presents
the role of potential compensating wage differentials within the context
of occupational licensing, injury rates, and worker compensation insurance controls. The estimates suggest a small influence of approximately
1 percent on the logarithm of hourly wages for a 1-percentage-point
increase in the injury rate. Most of the other licensing variables maintain similar magnitudes and significance, with the inclusion of both a
measure of workers’ compensation insurance premiums and the rate of
injury. These findings are consistent with other estimates, dating to the
original work by Adam Smith (see the 1937 edition of the original 1776
volume) on the trade-off of higher wages for more risk, and appear to
hold for the model and the use of the CPS data (Smith 1937).
In contrast to the estimates for electricians, the wage effects for
plumbers were not nearly as robust or as clear, and consequently are not
shown in a separate table, since the estimates are not stable or significant.9 As with electricians, the influence of the overall index for licensing is not statistically significant. Moreover, there is no clear pattern
of regulation having an influence at the state or local level or having
an impact on wage determination. Unlike the influence of apprenticeships, exam requirements, and continuing education requirements for
electricians, there was, if anything, a small, negative influence of these
required policies on the wage determination for plumbers. In other
words, low-quality plumbers may be substituted for those who do have
these requirements, and they are the ones who are getting more work in
the construction industry. Moreover, given the lack of variation in the
data for plumbers, there may be more noise in the wage data for this
occupation. Nevertheless, these results can serve as a starting point for
further research into the puzzle as to why regulations matter so little for
this highly skilled and regulated occupation.
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Table 5.9 The Influence of Occupational Licensing on Hourly Earnings for Electricians, 1992–2007
Hourly earnings
(1)

(2)

(3)

Union
0.270***
membership
(0.013)
State license
−0.056** −0.045* −0.007
(0.025)
(0.024) (0.045)
Local license
0.069
(0.052)
Summated
measures
General
requirements
Apprenticeship
code
Written exam
Performance
exam
Continuing
education
Constant
Basic controlsa
State controlsb
Year fixed
State fixed

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.270***
0.270***
(0.013)
(0.013)
0.013
(0.041)
0.083*
0.124*** 0.128***
(0.048)
(0.032)
(0.029)
0.028*** 0.033***
(0.009)
(0.008)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

0.270*** 0.270*** 0.270*** 0.270*** 0.270*** 0.270***
(0.013)
(0.013)
(0.013)
(0.013)
(0.013)
(0.013)

0.065**
(0.029)

0.087***
(0.021)

0.130*** 0.125*** 0.070**
(0.038)
(0.030)
(0.029)

0.072**
(0.030)

0.086*
(0.043)

0.077**
(0.036)
0.064**
−0.018
(0.029)
(0.028)
0.070**
0.044
(0.027)
(0.028)
0.004
−0.055
(0.009)
(0.038)
0.054
0.035
(0.037)
(0.023)
1.745*** 1.743*** 1.696*** 1.683*** 1.597*** 1.588*** 1.691*** 1.631*** 1.619*** 1.694*** 1.695*** 1.715***
(0.106)
(0.098)
(0.111)
(0.107)
(0.099)
(0.099)
(0.110)
(0.121)
(0.106) (0.129)
(0.116)
(0.124)
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
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N
R-squared

9,724
0.29

9,724
0.35

9,724
0.29

9,724
0.35

9,724
0.29

9,724
0.36

9,724
0.36

9,724
0.36

9,724
0.36

9,724
0.36

9,724
0.36

9,724
0.36

NOTE: Columns show the influence of each measure of regulation on hourly earnings of electricians with the control variables listed below. *significant
at the 0.10 level; **significant at the 0.05 level; ***significant at the 0.01 level. Standard errors, shown in parentheses, are clustered by state. Y = yes.
a
“Basic controls” include gender; age; experience and experience squared; dummy variables indicating high school graduates, some college experience,
and college graduates and more levels of education; marital status; white, Hispanic origin; part-time; and governmental workers.
b
“State controls” include employment growth rate, unemployment rate, and rate of union coverage in the construction industry.
SOURCE: CPS data.
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Table 5.10 Compensating Differentials for Injuries with Licensing Effects on Hourly Earnings for Electricians,
1992–2007
Hourly earnings
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
Wc premium ratea −0.010
−0.010
−0.011
−0.011
−0.011
−0.010
−0.010
−0.010
−0.011
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.007)
Injury rate
0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 0.008**
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.003)
Union
0.261*** 0.261*** 0.261*** 0.261*** 0.261*** 0.261*** 0.261*** 0.261*** 0.261***
membership
(0.017)
(0.017)
(0.017)
(0.017)
(0.017)
(0.017)
(0.017)
(0.017)
(0.017)
State license
−0.056** 0.021
(0.024)
(0.040)
Local license
0.107** 0.140*** 0.083*** 0.152*** 0.136*** 0.087*** 0.088*** 0.074**
(0.041)
(0.021)
(0.019)
(0.043)
(0.027)
(0.019)
(0.020)
(0.032)
Summated
0.031***
measures
(0.009)
General
0.111***
0.016
requirements
(0.030)
(0.037)
Apprenticeship
0.069***
−0.030*
code
(0.041)
(0.016)
Written exam
0.063**
0.026
(0.030)
(0.030)
Performance
−0.012
−0.014
exam
(0.016)
(0.016)
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Continuing
education
Constant
Basic controlsb
State controlsc
Year fixed
State fixed
R-squared
N

0.024
(0.071)
1.752*** 1.679*** 1.605*** 1.702*** 1.634*** 1.631*** 1.712*** 1.698***
(0.099)
(0.108)
(0.102)
(0.096)
(0.110)
(0.106)
(0.096)
(0.095)
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
0.33
0.33
0.33
0.33
0.33
0.33
0.33
0.33
5,975
5,975
5,975
5,975
5,975
5,975
5,975
5,975

−0.000
(0.049)
1.716
(0.105)
Y
Y
Y
Y
0.033
5,975

NOTE: *significant at the 0.10 level; **significant at the 0.05 level; ***significant at the 0.01 level. Standard errors, shown in parentheses,
are clustered by state. Y = yes.
a
“Wc premium rate” is the compensating differential—how much extra workers get paid for doing more dangerous work.
b
“Basic controls” include gender; age; experience and experience squared; dummy variables indicating high school graduates, some college experience, and college graduates and more levels of education; marital status; white, Hispanic origin; part-time; and governmental
workers.
c
“State controls” include employment growth rate, unemployment rate, and rate of union coverage in the construction industry.
SOURCE: CPS data.
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IMPLEMENTING THE HEALTH AND SAFETY MODELS
WITH LICENSING REGULATIONS
The main part of the analysis focuses on the incidence of injuries at
the state level. This approach is then expanded by including two more
stringent measures of safety outcomes in the model. The methods of
developing the data for our analysis are shown in Appendix Table B.2.
These measures include the severity of injuries, as measured by days
away from work due to injury or illness and by the death incidence
rates at the state level. The basic model for the injury incidence rate
can be stated as follows:
(5.3)

Injury Ratesst = α + βRst + γXst + δs + ηt + εst ,

where Injury Ratesst stands for the injury incidence rates of electricians
in state s in year t; Rst represents the licensing occupational regulations
and components of the regulation in state s in year t; Xst is the vector
that includes covariates measuring characteristics of each state s; δ and
η are state and year fixed effects, respectively; and εst is the error term.10
Table 5.11 shows the influence of licensing on the reporting of injuries for electricians. The overall summated rating scale shows a positive
influence, and several of the elements of the index, such as general age
and education requirements, apprenticeships, and continuing education, are all positively related to the incidence or reporting of workplace
injuries. However, the existence of a performance exam, which provides direct evidence of the skills an electrician must exhibit in order
to become licensed, is negatively related to the reporting of workplace
injuries. One reason for the increase in the reporting and documentation
of injuries may be that licensing requires more incidence reporting and
documentation of any type of work-related injury. The implementation
of a licensing regime requires the more technical types of regulatory
requirements, but they are not necessarily related to serious types of
injuries.11
Table 5.12 provides information on the role of state licensing on
the state injury rate for plumbers. The results show that the regulations
have no influence on the injury rates. The injury rate for plumbers is
low, and there is little variation in the injury rates for the members of
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the occupation across states. Similar to the licensing of electricians,
licensing of plumbers does not seem to improve the injury rate in the
occupation.
The next section of the analysis of injuries and occupational regulation examines the severity of injuries at the individual level using information on the duration of time away from work because of injuries,
as recorded in the SOII. The severity of injury model can be stated as
follows:
(5.4)

Severity of Injuryist = α + βRst + γXist + δs + ηt + εist ,

where Severity of Injuryist is measured by the days away from work
because of injury/illness of individual electricians i in state s in year t;
Rst is the licensing measure of occupational regulation and its components in person i’s state s in year t; Xist is the vector that includes covariates measuring the characteristics of each injured/ill person as well as of
the state where the person was injured; δ and η are state and year fixed
effects, respectively; and εist is the error term.
Specifically, we estimate Equation (5.4) using a Weibull survival
model, a commonly used estimation method in the unemployment and
workers’ compensation literature (e.g., Butler and Worrall 1983). This
statistical model estimates the time it takes to return to work based on
the characteristics of occupational licensing and state and year of the
injury. It should be noted that some of the information on these individuals from the SOII that was needed to create the control variables is
different from those in the wage equations. From the survival analysis,
the estimates for the severity of injuries based on the time needed to
return to work for electricians are presented in Table 5.13. In contrast
to the positive estimates presented in the previous table, in Table 5.13
the estimates show that licensing has no significant impact on the time
it takes to return to work following an injury. The coefficient for a performance exam reduces the duration of being away from work, which
is consistent with the results in Table 5.11. In Table 5.13, the only other
licensing provision that increases the duration of the days to return to
work from an injury for electricians is the continuing education variable. The estimates show no general influence of the role for licensing
on the days away from work in the fixed-effects models.
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State license

(1)
−0.443
(0.952)

Local license

(2)
−0.182
(0.943)
0.420
(1.754)

Summated
measures
General
requirements
Apprenticeship
code
Written exam
Performance
exam
Continuing
education
Constant

9/18/2013 10:11:10 AM

Basic controlsa
State controlsb
Year fixed
State fixed

(3)

2.625
(1.579)
1.105**
(0.478)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.420
(1.451)

3.121
(1.853)

1.359
(1.598)

(7)

0.592
(1.456)

(8)

(9)

1.171
(1.516)

1.982
(2.076)

1.629*
(0.885)
2.157
(4.104)
Y
Y
Y
Y

2.045
(1.445)
1.123*
(0.641)
0.124
(1.245)
0.241
(2.371)
1.086
(0.848)
−0.205
(4.523)
Y
Y
Y
Y

3.329**
(1.305)
2.749**
(1.077)
1.244
(1.227)
−4.579***
(0.948)

3.743
(4.373)
Y
Y
Y
Y

2.240
(4.671)
Y
Y
Y
Y

−2.080
(4.793)
Y
Y
Y
Y

1.415
(4.177)
Y
Y
Y
Y

−1.789
(4.560)
Y
Y
Y
Y

0.483
(4.854)
Y
Y
Y
Y

6.593
(4.427)
Y
Y
Y
Y
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Table 5.11 Influence of Occupational Licensing on Workplace Injury Rates for Electricians, 1992–2007
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N
R

620
0.41

620
0.41

620
0.42

620
0.41

620
0.41

620
0.41

620
0.41

620
0.41

620
0.42

NOTE: *significant at the 0.10 level; **significant at the 0.05 level; ***significant at the 0.01 level. Standard errors, shown in parentheses,
are clustered by state. Y = yes.
a
“Basic controls” include proportions of the population ages 20–24, 25–34, 35–44, 45–54, and 55–64; proportion of married; white and
other nonwhite; and proportions of high school graduates, some college experience, and college graduates and more levels of education.
b
“State controls” include laborers’ injury rate, employment growth rate, unemployment rate, and rate of union coverage in the construction
industry.
SOURCE: CPS, SOII, and CFOI.
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Table 5.12 The Effects of Occupational Licensing on the State
Workplace Injury Rates for Plumbers, 1992–2007

Licensed

(1)
(2)
0.073 0.481
(0.304) (1.213)

State license

Workplace injury rates
(3)
(4)
(5)

(7)

0.090 0.492
(0.324) (1.220)
−0.042 −2.113
(0.561) (1.386)

Local license
Apprenticeship
Exam
requirement
Continuing
education
Year fixed
Other state
controls
State fixed
Observations
R-squared

(6)

0.237
(0.564)
0.274
(0.846)

Y
N

Y
Y

Y
N

Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

0.088
(0.645)
Y
Y

N
578
0.16

Y
578
0.28

N
578
0.16

Y
578
0.28

Y
514
0.27

Y
514
0.27

Y
514
0.27

NOTE: Standard errors, shown in parentheses, are clustered by state. Other state controls include the percentages of the following variables: the six age groups 20–24,
25–34, 35–44, 45–54, 55–64, and 65 and greater (age group 16–19 is used as a reference); marriage status; white and nonwhite (the portion of African American is used
as a reference); Hispanic origin; high school diploma, some college, college diploma
and more (high school dropouts used as a reference); part-time; unemployment rate,
employment growth, and union coverage in the construction industry. Y = yes; N = no.
SOURCE: CPS, SOII, and CFOI.

The final model that is estimated tests for the role of occupational
regulation in the incidence of death rates for electricians. The basic
specification follows the earlier models and is presented as follows:
(5.5)

Death RatesstE = α + βRst + γXst + δs + θt + εst ,

where Death Ratesst represents the death incidence rates of Electricians
(E) in state s in year t; Rst stands for the licensing occupational regula-
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tions and components of the regulation in state s in year t; Xst is the vector that includes covariates measuring the characteristics of each state s;
δ and θ are state and year fixed effects, respectively; and εst is the error
term.
Table 5.14 shows that measures of occupational regulation have
little influence on the death rates of electricians in construction. The
overall measure of regulation is negative but does not rise to the level
of statistical significance. Although the coefficient on the performance
exam is statistically significant and positive only at the 0.10 level, in
contrast to the previous findings in the other tables, the other components of the government regulations are not significant in reducing the
death rates of electricians. The performance exam result for workplace
deaths may be due to the small number of these events relative to the
larger number of injuries that are more frequent and can be evaluated
more carefully. We found that the results for regulations were similar to
those of OSHA, which also found that regulations seem to have small
effects on outcomes for safety and health (Weil 2001).
In order to be consistent with reporting the earlier estimates for electricians, we include Table 5.15, which shows similar results for plumbers. The model is the same basic one that was used for electricians. The
results suggest that local licensing is associated with somewhat reduced
death rates, but that state regulations do not have much statistical influence on the death rates for plumbers for the period 1992 through 2007.
Regulations at the state level do not appear to influence either wage
determination or death and injury rates for plumbers.
A final set of estimates, presented in Table 5.16, illustrates the
potential effect of endogeneity, which may present an issue to the extent
that high levels of deaths and injuries in a previous period may have
influenced the passage of state or locally based occupational licensing laws for electricians. Table 5.16 shows the hazard ratios from a
Weibull survival model. The estimates on prior deaths and injuries or
prior workers’ compensation rates are not statistically significant, indicating an absence of this form of simultaneity bias.12 Although there
may be unobservables that are not accounted for in the model, such
as unique political factors in a state that contributed to the passage of
licensing laws, there are no variables in standard data sets that show that
these factors are obviously associated with the passage of laws regulating electricians.
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Days to return to work
State license
Local license

(1)

(2)

−0.018
(0.075)

−0.229
(0.184)
−0.149
(0.188)

Summated measures
General requirements

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

0.106
(0.081)
0.020
(0.030)

0.070
(0.055)

0.210*
(0.116)

−0.019
(0.110)

0.072
(0.054)

0.083
(0.053)

0.028
(0.062)

Apprenticeship code

0.137
(0.112)

Written exam

−0.118
(0.125)

Performance exam

−0.139*
(0.094)

Continuing education
Constant

9/18/2013 10:11:12 AM

Basic controlsa
State controlsb
Year fixed

−0.748*** −0.637*
(0.272)
(0.310)
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

−0.916*** −0.857*** −0.991*** −0.735**
(0.316)
(0.271)
(0.313)
(0.307)
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

−0.716**
(0.306)
Y
Y
Y

(9)

0.411***
(0.116)

−0.366***
(0.136)
0.469***
(0.050)
−0.171
(0.124)
−0.135
(0.091)
0.158*** 0.168***
(0.045)
(0.056)
−0.863*** −0.991***
(0.273)
(0.318)
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
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Table 5.13 Hazard Model Estimates of the Influence of Occupational Licensing on Duration of the Days to Return
to Work for Electricians (using a Weibull distribution of duration), 1992–2007
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State fixed
Log Likelihood
N

Y
−266,510
20,745

Y
−266,502
20,745

Y
−266,526
20,745

Y
−266,528
20,745

Y
−266,509
20,745

Y
−266,514
20,745

Y
−266,529
20,745

Y
−266,510
20,745

Y
−266,426
20,745

NOTE: *significant at the 0.10 level; **significant at the 0.05 level; ***significant at the 0.01 level. Unstandardized coefficients are
shown; standard errors, shown in parentheses, are clustered by state. Y = yes.
a
“Basic controls” include age, age squared, gender, and dummy variables, indicating four different groupings of length of services and
four different groupings of races.
b
“State controls” include laborers’ injury rate, employment growth rate, unemployment rate, and rate of union coverage in the construction
industry.
SOURCE: CPS, SOII, and CFOI.
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Table 5.14 Influence of Occupational Licensing on Workplace Death Rates for Electricians, 1992–2007
Workplace death rates
State license

(1)

(2)

−0.848
(0.882)

0.045
(0.533)
1.478
(1.495)

Local license
Summated measures

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

1.333
(1.704)
−0.056
(0.312)

1.408
(1.348)

0.578
(1.685)

1.524
(1.671)

1.435
(1.348)

1.377
(1.531)

−0.267
(2.031)

−0.170
(0.830)
−0.614
(4.057)
Y
Y
Y
Y

1.519
(1.567)
−2.025*
(1.094)
0.687
(1.005)
1.918
(2.318)
−0.521
(1.093)
−0.814
(4.012)
Y
Y
Y
Y

General requirements

0.482
(1.024)

Apprenticeship code

−0.931
(0.812)

Written exam

0.144
(0.997)

Performance exam

5.806*
(3.160)

Continuing education
Constant
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Basic controlsa
State controlsb
Year fixed
State fixed

0.354
(4.431)
Y
Y
Y
Y

−0.662
(4.442)
Y
Y
Y
Y

−0.388
(4.145)
Y
Y
Y
Y

−0.716
(4.002)
Y
Y
Y
Y

0.753
(4.198)
Y
Y
Y
Y

−0.796
(4.446)
Y
Y
Y
Y

−6.414
5.372)
Y
Y
Y
Y
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R-squared
N

0.21
809

0.21
809

0.21
809

0.21
809

0.21
809

0.21
809

0.21
809

0.21
809

0.21
809

NOTE: *significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level. Standard errors, shown in parentheses, are clustered by state. Y = yes.
a
“Basic controls” include proportions of the population ages 20–24, 25–34, 35–44, 45–54, and 55–64; proportion of married; white and
other nonwhite; and proportions of high school graduates, some college experience, and college graduates and more levels of education.
b
“State controls” include laborers’ injury rate, employment growth rate, unemployment rate, and rate of union coverage in the construction
industry.
SOURCE: CPS, SOII, and CFOI.
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Table 5.15 The Effects of Occupational Licensing on the State Death
Rates for Plumbers, 1992–2007
Death rates
(1)
Licensed

(2)

(3)

(4)

−0.003
(0.002)
−0.007***
(0.002)

0.004
(0.006)
−0.016***
(0.007)

(6)

(7)

−0.002 0.003
(0.003) (0.009)

State license
Local license
Apprenticeship
Exam
requirement
Continuing
education
Year fixed
Other state
controls
State fixed
Observations
R-squared

(5)

0.005*
(0.003)
−0.001
(0.005)

Y
N

Y
Y

Y
N

Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

−0.003
(0.004)
Y
Y

N
787
0.11

Y
787
0.21

N
787
0.11

Y
787
0.21

Y
666
0.24

Y
666
0.24

Y
666
0.24

NOTE: *significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; ***significant at
the 0.01 level. Standard errors, shown in parentheses, are clustered by state. Other
state controls include the percentages of the following variables: the six age groups
20–24, 25–34, 35–44, 45–54, 55–64, and 65 and greater (using the age group 16–19
as a reference); marriage status; white and nonwhite (using the portion of African
American as a reference); Hispanic origin; high school diploma, some college, college diploma and more levels of education (using high school dropouts as a reference); part-time; and the unemployment rate, employment growth, and union coverage in the construction industry. Y = yes; N = no.
SOURCE: CPS, SOII, and CFOI.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The general issue of occupational regulation has particular relevance to the potential health and safety of electricians and plumbers,
whose rates of occupational injuries and deaths are among the high-
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est of any blue-collar occupation. The main focus of this chapter has
been the development of the first analysis in a modeling framework
of how licensing influences both wage determination and health and
safety in the workplace. The chapter provides multivariate estimates
linking various levels of state or local occupational regulation to levels
of and changes in occupational injuries and deaths of electricians and
plumbers.
There has been significant growth of licensing for both occupations at the state level from 1992 to 2007. First, the chapter documents
the growth of regulation by states in the occupations. Next, the results
show estimates of the impact of occupational regulation on wages. The
results suggest that the influence of occupational regulation has generally been significant for wage determination at both the state and local
levels. Furthermore, estimates find that there is a small but statistically
significant wage premium for the incidence of work-related injuries,
which is consistent with much of the literature on compensating wage
differentials for dangerous or unpleasant work. A potentially more
effective policy seems to be the use of a social insurance such as workers’ compensation to reduce the most severe occupational injuries and
deaths at the workplace.
Finally, the results for the incidence and severity of injury and death
rates show that the impact of occupational regulation on deaths and
injuries is statistically insignificant or murky in the multivariate analysis for both electricians and plumbers. The estimates presented in this
chapter provide a first approximation and new data for the relationship between occupational licensing, wages, and deaths and injuries for
important occupations in the construction industry. Although regulation
may have an influence through the monopoly effect on wage determination for electricians, licensing does not appear to be influential in
reducing either life-threatening injuries or the risk of injuring limbs—
two hazards that workers in these two essential occupations face in the
construction industry.
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Variables
injury rate t
injury rate t − 1
work comp premium rate t
work comp premium rate t − 1
union coverage rate t
union coverage rate t − 1
χ2
prob > χ2
log pseudo—likelihood
N

No licensing to state licensing
(1)
(2)
(3)
1.315
1.250
(0.240)
(0.227)
1.047
0.941
(0.309)
(0.241)
1.049
1.930
(0.316)
(3.704)
1.015
0.551
(0.274)
(1.077)
0.851*
0.778
(0.833)
(0.213)
0.899*
1.098
(0.538)
(0.246)
4.22
19.72
–
0.23
0.00
–
19.01
17.77
19.33
67
60
60

Local licensing to state licensing
(1)
(2)
(3)
0.846
0.816
(0.100)
(0.102)
1.129
1.084
(0.268)
(0.141)
0.874
1.930
(0.246)
(3.704)
0.910
0.551
(0.198)
(1.077)
0.807*
0.778
(0.100)
(0.213)
0.883***
1.098
(0.039)
(0.246)
6.82
10.66
249.23
0.08
0.01
0.00
18.49
17.32
18.89
91
82
82

9/18/2013 10:11:13 AM

NOTE: *significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; ***significant at the 0.01 level. Hazard ratios are shown. Standard
errors, shown in parentheses, are clustered by state. χ2 and its p-value in column 3 with no licensing to state licensing are not shown,
because these estimates were regarded as not reliable under the parameters set by StataCorp Data Analysis and Statistical Software.
SOURCE: CPS, SOII, and CFOI.
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Table 5.16 Hazard Model Estimates of Time to Adoption of a State Occupational Licensing Statute for Electricians
(using a Weibull distribution of duration), 2009
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Notes
1. The research in the chapter was partially funded by the Center for Construction
Research and Training through a grant from the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services. I thank Kyoung Won Park for his assistance with this chapter.
Park is an assistant professor in the School of Economics and Business Administration at Hanyang University in the Republic of Korea.
2. Table 5.5 shows the changes in the index of regulation from 1992 through 2007.
3. One example of such an innovation is plastic wiring, which may demand a different safety protocol than copper wiring, but the licensing authority may still require
the older procedures. The delays in implementation of official protocol may lead
to workplace injuries for electricians.
4. Although there is an ability to track the changes in the licensing provisions in the
statutes and administrative regulations when these occupations are licensed at the
state level, the ability to track local statutes is limited by both data availability and
costs, and there is a lessened ability to obtain those changes when these occupations are licensed at the local level, such as with city and county regulations. As a
consequence, the data contain only information on whether these occupations are
licensed at the state or local level, and have only partial information on specific
provisions of some key elements of the occupational regulations for plumbers and
electricians at the substate level.
5. The three categories are 1) injuries that cause an absence from work, 2) injuries
that cause a restriction of work or job transfer, and 3) injuries that do not affect
working capacity (BLS 2013a).
6. Starting with the 2002 data, the SOII does not report injuries separate from illnesses. We expect that the change in the measure should not have affected our
analysis because illnesses account for less than 2 percent of nonfatal injuries and
illness in BLS reports (Center for Construction Research and Training 2009).
7. Specifically, we computed the injury rate and death rate as follows: Injury rate =
(Sum of the weight for the national estimate from the SOII / Estimated employment of electricians from the CPS MORG) × 100; and Death rate = (Actual number of deaths from the CFOI / Estimated number of employed electricians from the
CPS MORG) × 10,000.
8. The estimates for plumbers showed murky results both for the issue of wage determination and for health and safety. The results for health and safety show that
there was a decline in deaths and injuries, but that decline stopped in the early
2000s and held steady following that period.
9. Wage estimates for plumbers using state and year fixed effects can be found in
Kleiner and Park (2010b).
10. The state-level control variables were aggregated using the individual variables
from the CPS MORG data. The same state-level control variables are also included in
empirical analyses for the state death rates.
11. Another rationale for these findings is that the use of state fixed effects may serve
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to inflate the coefficient values. When we estimate the models without state fixed
effects, none of the licensing coefficients are significant.
12. Estimates were also developed using the same models for death rates and injury
rates for plumbers, and the results were qualitatively similar.
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6
Battles among Universally
Licensed Occupations
with Kyoung Won Park
Whether or not a dental hygiene clinic can be a successful business model is none of a dentist’s business. The free market system
will determine that, not a dentist. Most dentists are notoriously
very poor businessmen/women.
—Reader comment made to a blog post about a California law
allowing hygienists to open independent clinics (Frey 2008)
The American Dental Association has taken a strong stance against
dental therapists in Minnesota and nationally, arguing that only a
dentist has the skills to pull teeth or engage in other permanent or
invasive procedures.
—Jackie Crosby (2012), Minneapolis Star Tribune writer

What are the policy issues among universally licensed occupations?
This chapter focuses on occupations that are licensed in all states and
focuses on one of the policy issues that may arise when two related
occupations are not only complementary to each other but also able to
be substituted for one another.1 The broad growth of occupational regulations over the past 60 years has resulted in some situations in which
licensing regulations create overlap between occupational groups, and
in these situations occupations may compete for the same type of work.
Unlike the previous chapters, which examine occupations that are not
universally licensed, this chapter looks at occupations that are regulated
in all 50 states and at some of the unintended consequences resulting
from the policy of universal licensure. The issue of who gets to do the
work and whether government should decide on these jurisdictional
disputes is growing as the number of occupations that are licensed continues to expand. Furthermore, occupational subfields such as dental
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hygienists have developed to the point where they are now licensed in
all states. Examples of occupations that are both complementary and
competitive are doctors and nurses, physical therapists and occupational therapists, dentists and hygienists, architects and interior designers, engineers and architects, and electricians and electrical engineers.
The public policy consequences can be substantial. In health care, for
example, in states where licensing laws allow only doctors to provide
certain common procedures related to well-baby exams, these procedures cost as much as 8 to 10 percent more than in states where nurse
practitioners can perform the same procedures (Kleiner et al. 2012).
This chapter focuses on two occupations—dentists and dental
hygienists—that are universally licensed and provide complementary
services to patients, but that also, as service providers, can act as substitutes for certain tasks. However, for key services the states determine
who can do the work, the market structure, and what is required for the
patient. The chapter examines the labor market implications of these
governmental requirements. With the growth in the number of individuals who are regulated or are seeking regulation by the states, this case
study is able to illuminate the potential economic issues of the increased
regulation of occupations in the U.S. labor market, especially where the
work of the regulated occupations overlaps. It also gives an illustration
of the kinds of issues that arise as more occupations become regulated
and turf battles arise over who is legally allowed to do work for pay.
In order to examine the relationships between dentists and hygienists, the chapter initially explores the evolution of state regulation for
both occupations, and what battle lines have evolved for the occupations. Next, it shows the anatomy of state regulations for dental hygienists over time. The chapter further develops an approach that describes
the basic production function in dentistry, with dentists fulfilling an
essential role and hygienists providing additional key elements. The
results show how a potential monopsony relationship between dentists
and hygienists can develop—i.e., a relationship where there is only one
feasible employer, where there are frictions in the market and employers have the ability to collude to set wages, and which then influences
the earnings and employment of hygienists and dentists. In an empirical
section, the influence on hygienists’ earnings of state regulations that
grant hygienists the ability to be self-employed is shown to be associated with an earnings increase of approximately 10 percent. Further-
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more, when hygienists are able to work without the supervision of a
dentist, there is an associated increase in the state-level employment
growth of hygienists, but a decrease in the employment growth and
earnings for dentists. This suggests that for some tasks they are substitutes for one another. These results are robust to sensitivity tests for
similar partially licensed occupations and other health-related occupations that are regulated. To the extent that these results suggest inefficiencies due to licensing and monopsonistic deadweight loss, the chapter provides estimates of these losses.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE
REGULATION OF DENTISTS AND DENTAL HYGIENISTS
This part of the chapter presents the evolution of state licensing of
dentists and hygienists and shows how state policies have changed from
fostering a situation in which dentists had almost exclusive control of
the hygienist labor market activities to creating a situation that favors
greater autonomy for dental hygienists (Adams 2004).
The state licensing of dentists initially started in South Carolina in
1876; Pennsylvania followed suit the next year. The last state to fully
license dentists was North Carolina in 1935. As of 2011, most members of licensing boards are appointed by the governor through a list
provided by the state dental association. Generally, dentists dominate
membership on the state licensing boards. However, other licensed professionals such as hygienists or dental assistants may also be on licensing boards in states where they are regulated, and they generally have a
minor role in the process. In 2010, 17 states had separate hygienist committees that provided recommendations to the board and, in some cases,
to the legislature (Wanchek 2010). As recently as 1994, nine states forbid the employment of more than two hygienists per dentist in a dental
office, fixing the ratio for these two occupations (ADHA 1994). One of
the functions of the licensing board is to deal with disciplinary issues
involving dentists, which vary from sexual harassment of patients to
incompetent delivery of dental services. However, the licensing board
function that deals with the allocation of work among various service
providers and that gives services to clients is of direct interest for the
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analysis. For example, the licensing board makes recommendations to
the legislature on regulations governing which occupation provides certain dental services. Furthermore, it provides legal services to defend
regulatory practices in state courts. In addition, the board can issue
statements on appropriate regulations for continuing education, such as
which classes count toward the completion of the requirement. Finally,
the licensing board usually has the ability to determine which procedures, such as dental sealants, are appropriate for each occupational
category, from dentist to dental assistant.
The Regulation of Hygienists
The state licensing of dental hygienists began with the regulation
of hygienists by New York in 1868. Over 50 years passed before other
state governments followed suit, when five additional states licensed
this occupation between 1919 and 1921. By 1952, 29 states had full
licensing of dental hygienists, and by the early 1950s all of the other
states started to license dental hygienists (Council of State Governments
1952). A relatively unique part of the regulation of dental hygienists is
that hygienists are regulated by dentists, rather than self-regulated, in
most states (Wanchek 2010)—exceptions are Washington, Connecticut,
and New Mexico. In Washington, dental hygienists are regulated by the
director of the state health department in consultation with a committee of three dental hygienists and a consumer. In Connecticut, dental
hygienists are regulated directly by the health department. In New Mexico, hygienists are regulated by a committee of five dental hygienists,
one dentist, and a consumer. In all the other states, dentists dominate the
decision-making process of who gets to do the work.
Initially, dental hygiene programs lasted for one year, but they have
since been expanded. In 2010, depending on the state, it took between
two and four years to complete the education requirements. A particularly illustrative example of regulatory oversight of the occupation
occurred when military dental hygienists who returned to the civilian
workforce requested permission to sit for the hygienist’s exam. The
civilian hygienists protested, saying that the military hygienists needed
the same number of years of dental hygiene training as the civilian
hygienists in order to take the licensing exam.
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One of the key issues for the licensing boards of dental services was
the work that dentists could do relative to hygienists and the supervision
of dental hygienists by dentists (Helm 1993). Traditionally, dentists are
required to be physically present when hygienists are doing their work.
The licensing board would determine the precise meaning of the requirement, but it would generally mean that dentists had to be physically
present somewhere in the building. Since dentists can either engage in
leisure or see other patients while hygienists are seeing patients, this
practice could be perceived as a form of featherbedding, where services
are paid for without any clearly defined work being provided.
As early as 1932, the issue of determining the proper tasks of
hygienists relative to dentists was raised at national meetings of hygienists, with a view that hygienists should have greater autonomy. Specifically, this meant the ability to work independently of dentists and to
conduct more sophisticated dental procedures. A key part of the history
of the profession has focused on the importance of hygienists playing
a more important role in the policy process, particularly with respect to
legislative issues. Until 1988, when Colorado first allowed hygienists to
practice without the direct supervision of a dentist, hygienists had been
required to work for or be under the direction of a dentist. Since that
time, seven states have allowed hygienists to be self-employed without
the direct oversight of a dentist. Hygienists also have attempted to limit
the supply of practitioners. For example, as of 2007, no state permitted reciprocity, or the movement of dental hygienists from other states.
Dental hygienists must meet the requirements of the state they are moving to in order to be granted a license.
As of 2007, seven states (California, Colorado, Montana, Nebraska,
New Mexico, Oregon, and Washington) allowed hygienists to be selfemployed other than as independent contractors to dentists, and only
three states (California, Colorado, and New Mexico) permitted a dental
hygienist to own a dental hygiene practice (Beach et. al. 2007). Montana and Nebraska adopted the provision allowing hygienists to be
self-employed other than as independent contractors in 2003 and 2007,
respectively. The work by dental hygienists who are self-employed is
restricted to specific dental practices that vary across these states. For
example, in Colorado hygienists are allowed to clean teeth and do simple restorative work, independently of dentists.
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In the late 1970s, the American Dental Hygienists’ Association
(ADHA) supported alternative practice methods that would allow the
dental hygienist to become the primary provider of initial services, in
accordance with state dental and dental hygiene practice acts (Motley
1988). In response to these policy changes, the American Dental Association (ADA) passed a resolution stating that dental hygienists are
auxiliaries who must work under the supervision of a dentist, who also
would retain ownership and managerial authority (Beach et al. 2007).
Over time, hygienists have been able to gain greater authority in certain
states (as granted by the legislatures) as their numbers have increased
in overall dental practice and consequently their influence in crafting
licensing laws has grown. As of 2008 there were more than 174,000
dental hygienists in the United States (BLS 2012a). These policy provisions by the two dental service organizations set the battleground for
conflicts in state legislatures, licensing boards, and the courts.
State-Level Examination of Dental Hygienists’ Legally Permitted
Job Characteristics
As noted earlier, the number of tasks that dental hygienists have
been permitted to do over the past several years has grown. Table 6.1
provides a full listing of the provisions that are graphed in Figure 6.1;
some of the key components of the tasks include prophylaxis (cleaning), fluoride treatment, sealant application, x-rays, amalgam restorations, local anesthesia, nitrous oxide, initial screening, and patient referral (National Center for Health Workforce Analysis 2004). In order to
show the growth in hygienists’ autonomy over time, Figure 6.1 uses
a box-and-whisker graphic analysis of state regulation, which gives
the mean and spread of the regulation of hygienists over the period
2001–2007. Panel A shows the overall ranking of the dental hygienists’
professional practice environment that is allowed by statute or legal
rulings. Panel B shows the number of dental tasks that hygienists are
permitted to do, independently of dentists, by state law or administrative or court rulings in the state.
A report funded by the Kellogg Foundation, the Rasmuson Foundation, and the Bethel Community Services Foundation showed that dental
hygienists did as well as dentists in performing routine tasks such as the
ones listed here (Wetterhall et al. 2010). The results in Panels A and B
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of Figure 6.1 show a movement toward greater autonomy for hygienists
in dental practice from 2001 to 2007. The mean value of the summated
rating scale for all states was 43.67 (sd = 19.84) in 2001 and increased
to 49.10 (sd = 20.54) by 2007 (out of 100 possible points). Most of the
changes in state regulations occurred between 2002 and 2007, a period
during which more states allowed hygienists to perform additional procedures. Panel A shows the overall results, which suggest that in spite of
generally greater control of the regulatory process by dentists, hygienists have been able to gain more autonomy over the delivery of dental
services, including the ability to control their own offices without the
supervision of a dentist. Moreover, even within states that have full
control over the delivery of dental services, there has been growth in the
independence of hygienists from monitoring by dentists with respect to
Figure 6.1 Box-and-Whisker Graph Showing the Growth and Spread of
State Regulations on the Professional Practice Environment
of Dental Hygienists, by State over Time
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Figure 6.1 (continued)
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NOTE: The box-and-whisker plot shows annual values, by year, of the median, interquartile range, and outliers of the summated rating scale based on the National Center
for Health Workforce Analysis’s (2004) Dental Hygiene Professional Practice Index
(DHPPI). The line in the middle of the box represents the median. The bottom and top
edges of the box are the first and third quartiles, respectively. The whiskers extending from the box represent the most extreme point within the range of one-and-a-half
times the interquartile range (the difference between the third and first quartiles). The
remaining points represent outliers that do not fall within the range of the whiskers;
for the definition of each of the variables, see Table 6.1, and for detailed sample statistics, see Panel B in Table 6.3.
SOURCE: National Center for Health Workforce Analysis (2004).

specific dental procedures, and likely an increase in the skills and education of hygienists, as provided to clients of dental services.
The next section of the chapter verbally models the role of dentists
and hygienists in the production of dental services and shows how the
market for hygienists’ services may resemble a monopsony in certain
elements of the market for dentists and hygienists.
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Table 6.1 Definitions of Regulatory Variables
Variables
DHPPI

Definitions
A simple sum of all the components of the DHPPI, ranging
from 0 to 100.

tasks permitted
(summated)

A simple sum of whether hygienists are permitted to perform
the following practices: prophylaxis, fluoride treatment, sealant
application, x-rays, amalgam restorations, local anesthesia,
nitrous oxide, initial screening/assessment, refer patients,
and other expanded functions. We coded each practice as 1 if
hygienists are allowed to perform; otherwise coded as 0.

tasks permitted
(Rasch)

A Rasch scale of tasks permitted that is used to form the
summated measure of tasks permitted.

independence
from dentists
(summated)

A simple sum of whether hygienists are able to perform
dental hygiene practices without supervision of dentists at the
following locations: dentist’s office, long-term care facilities,
schools, public health agencies, correctional facilities,
mental health facilities, hospitals/rehabilitation hospitals or
convalescent settings, and personal residences. We coded each
location as 1 if hygienists are able to perform dental hygiene
practices without supervision of dentists; otherwise 0.

independence from
dentists (Rasch)

A Rasch scale of independence from dentists that is used to
form the summated measure of independence from dentists.

self-employment
allowed

We coded 1 when the provision allows hygienist to be selfemployed other than as independent contractor; otherwise 0.

SOURCE: National Center for Health Workforce Analysis (2004).

A MODEL OF DENTAL SERVICES PRODUCTION
This section initially develops the basic production function for
dental services and then expands it to include government regulation
of work practices, where dentists are required to supervise hygienists.
The model serves as a basis to inform the empirical work, rather than as
a fully specified general equilibrium model of dental production under
regulation. The unit of analysis for the model is the office-based dental
practice. Following Reinhardt (1972), this entity can be treated as a firm
of which the dentist is the owner/manager who faces a profit maximization decision. Within this context, the dentist makes decisions regarding
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her own effort to maximize income, subject to constraints including the
technical production relationship between her labor and other inputs.
These inputs include capital and the use of hygienists and other somewhat less knowledgeable workers, such as dental technicians, aides,
and clerical and administrative assistants.
As was noted earlier in this book, Shapiro (1986) provides a guide
for analyzing occupations that are universally licensed. In his model
of licensing he envisions a labor market where service output has two
types of workers: high-skilled and lower-skilled. In order to adapt the
model to a production function and the market for dentists and hygienists, one can think of a stylized version of production and output. If
labor services can be provided only by a dentist and hygienists can
work only for a dentist, then dental services can be provided only when
a dentist is present. Hygienists’ income and work are therefore tied to
the success of a dentist.
Within this profit relationship for the dentists, the hygienist’s wage
is determined by the decisions of the dentist as to the use of the hygienist’s labor input and technology mix by the high-skilled provider, the
dentist. Assuming profits are constant, as the hygienist’s wage goes
down, the dentist’s wage will go up. Also implied is that the hygienist’s
employment will go up and the dentist’s employment will go down.
These conditions, which are a modified production function, can therefore lead to conditions that are consistent with elements of a monopsony market for hygienists who are controlled by dentists.

CAN REGULATION RESULT IN CONDITIONS CONSISTENT
WITH MONOPSONY IN THE LABOR MARKET?
Milton Friedman noted that under occupational licensing, all regulated occupations are often assumed to attempt to capture the rents
of licensing and reallocate resources from the consumer to the regulated practitioners (Friedman 1962). The application to this case study
assumes that the relatively low-skilled (hygienist) workers can by law
do only low-skilled work and are allowed to work only under the supervision of relatively high-skilled workers. With favorable regulation for
dentists, the high-skilled workers that control low-skilled workers’ tasks
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and their ability to do work only for certain types of employers have
the monopsonistic characteristics of employing lower-skilled workers
and capturing rents. When regulation of employment by high-skilled
workers of low-skilled workers ceases, low-skilled workers can open
their own establishments and capture the licensing rents for themselves
(Groshen 1991). For monopsony to exist, the labor market must generally have two key assumptions (Manning 2003). First, important frictions are assumed to be present. In the case of two universally licensed
occupations, with one dominant, this requires the supervision of the
other, and the assumption of frictions in the labor market is established.
In this case, state law requires that hygienists work under the supervision of a dentist; they are not allowed to work on their own or open an
office in competition with a dentist.
Second, employers have some ability to set wages. Since dental
hygienists have no major options for employment other than working
for or under the supervision of a dentist, dentists can have significant
market power to collude to set wages in a local market. This is consistent with one of the elements of monopsony (Lipscomb and Douglass
1982). Even if there are many dentists bidding for their services, the
market for hygienists is less than it would be without either the legal
constraints established through law or the administrative rules established by the dental board. Although not an ideal case of monopsony,
such as the textbook cases of mine operators in a small town or a large
manufacturer in a small isolated town, the general conditions established by Manning are present in the case of dentists and hygienists.
A simple model of monopsony in the context of occupational licensing is shown in Figure 6.2, where a monopsonist employer maximizes
profits with employment L, which equates demand (given by the marginal revenue product of labor [MRPL] curve) to marginal cost MC at
point A. With licensing, both occupations are able to restrict the supply
of labor and raise wages within their occupation. The model informs the
empirical work in the next section of the study.
In the case where dentists are making positive profits on the marginal
hygienists, there is no incentive to increase employment because doing
so would require increasing the wage to attract the extra worker, and
this higher wage must be paid to all existing workers. The gap between
the wage and the marginal revenue product in Figure 6.2 is referred to
as the rate of exploitation (Manning 2003). In the case of hygienists,
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Figure 6.2 A Graphical Representation on Monopsony and Licensing
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NOTE: A monopsonist employer maximizes profits with employment LM, which
equates demand, given by the marginal revenue product of labor (MRPL) curve, to
marginal cost MC at point A. Supply curve S L is the result of licensing. The wage is
then determined on the supply curve of licensed workers S L, at point M, and is equal
to w M. By contrast, a competitive labor market would reach equilibrium at point C,
where supply S* equals demand. This would lead to employment L* and wage w*.
Triangle AMC is deadweight loss, the part that has been lost by society as a result of
the monopsonistic restriction of employment; and rectangle w Lw MMM’ is the part that
the monopsonist licensed employer has exploited from the other licensed workers.
Triangle LL”C is deadweight loss, the part of the competitive social surplus that has
been lost by society because of the licensing of workers.
SOURCE: Developed by the authors.

the model predicts that laws that require hygienists to work for or be
supervised by dentists would result in lower wages and employment for
hygienists. In addition, if the laws were relaxed, there would likely be
lower earnings and employment for dentists, since the level of exploita-
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tion would be reduced. Furthermore, the lower employment and wage
caused by the monopsony power has two distinct effects on the economic welfare of the occupations. First, the law favors dentists’ control
over the market structure and, as a consequence, it redistributes welfare
away from workers (hygienists) to their employers (dentists). Second,
the market structure established by these two occupations reduces the
aggregate (or social) welfare enjoyed by both groups taken together,
since the employers’ net gain is smaller than the loss inflicted on workers. It is a net social loss or deadweight loss. As such, it is a measure of
the market failure caused by monopsony power, through a misallocation of resources to employer dentists and away from worker hygienists.
Figure 6.2 also shows that a monopsonist employer in the face of
licensing maximizes profits with employment LM in a way that equates
demand (given by the marginal revenue product of labor [MRPL]
curve) to marginal cost MC at point A. The supply curve S L is the result
of licensing. The wage (w) is then determined on the supply curve of
licensed workers S L, at point M, and is equal to w M. By contrast, a competitive labor market would reach equilibrium at point C, where supply
S* equals demand. This would lead to employment L* and wage w*.
Triangle AMC is deadweight loss, the part that has been lost by society as a result of the monopsonistic restriction of employment by both
occupations; and rectangle w Lw MMM’ is the part that the monopsonist
licensed employer has exploited from the other licensed workers. Triangle LL”C is deadweight loss, the part of the competitive social surplus
that has been lost by society because of the licensing of workers.
The estimates of the empirical influence of monopsony without
licensing have been mixed. For example, the results for specific industries range from major league baseball, where the impact has been large
(100 to 600 percent), to teachers, nurses, and nursing assistants, where
the influence has been 5 percent or less (Scully 1974; Zimbalist 1992;
Kahn 2000; Matsudaira 2010). For the overall labor market, the impact
of monopsony has been estimated at less than 3 percent (Brown and
Medoff 1989). This analysis is the first attempt to estimate monopsony
for both workers and their primary occupational employer as a result
of variations in occupational licensing statutes, specifically related to
the ability of hygienists to open their own dental-practice offices or do
work independently of dentists, which is a weak form of monopsony
(Boal and Ransom 1997).

Kleiner2013.indb 183

9/18/2013 10:11:18 AM

184 Kleiner and Park

HOW TO MEASURE DENTAL HYGIENE
PROFESSIONAL PRACTICES
The Dental Hygiene Professional Practice Index (DHPPI) is used to
assess state government regulations on the professional practice environments of dental hygienists. The National Center for Health Workforce Analysis (2004) originally compiled this index, which consists of
state government regulations in the 50 states and the District of Columbia for 2001, and the index is extended and updated to 2007 (Table 6.1
gives the main regulatory components that have changed since 2001).
These major professional regulatory components include the following:
• Legal and regulatory environment. This includes governance
of the profession through the state regulatory board of dental
hygiene or through a dental hygiene committee empowered by a
dental board with a mandate to regulate the profession, licensure
by credential/endorsement with no new clinical exam required,
scope of practice defined in law or regulations, and restriction to
patient of record of the primary employing dentist.
• Supervision in different practice settings. This includes dental
supervision requirements across a variety of health settings including private dental offices, long-term care facilities, schools,
public health agencies, correctional facilities, and similar institutional facilities. The supervision requirements vary from direct
supervision to general and collaborator supervision, to complete
autonomy.
• Tasks permitted under varying levels of supervision. This includes tasks allowed for dental hygienists to provide basic services such as prophylaxis (dental cleaning), sealants, fluoride
treatments, x-rays, and hygiene screening and assessment, as
well as expanded functions such as placing amalgam restorations (tooth fillings), administration of local anesthesia, and administration of nitrous oxide.2
• Reimbursement. Direct Medicaid reimbursement and direct
payment to hygienists by other third-party insurers or patients.
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The raw score of the DHPPI is a 100-point scale with different
weights attached to subitems under the four major components, indicating that a higher score means a less restrictive practice environment for
dental hygienists.
For empirical analysis, a DHPPI index is an overall index to capture
the spread in each state’s regulatory system for the professional practice environment, as coded by the National Center for Health Workforce Analysis (2004). Because certain regulatory components are more
important to wage determination and employment outcomes than other
components, we also examine each individual component in two ways.
In particular, we focus on two major components: 1) tasks permitted
and 2) supervision requirements. Because the weights to the subitems
of these components of the DHPPI are assigned in somewhat arbitrary
fashion, we develop both the summated rating scale and the statistically weighted index (Rasch index) for each component. Therefore, we
examine how each state’s regulatory system for the professional practice environments affects the market outcomes of the professions by
using both linear (summated rating scale) and nonlinear (Rasch index)
measures of the regulatory system. Finally, we analyze whether the provision that permits hygienists to be self-employed other than as independent contractors affects the market outcomes. Table 6.1 gives the
key values of the indices.3
Table 6.2 shows the top and bottom five states ranked by their
summated DHPPI. Although the rankings of the top five states have
remained the same, with only a minor change in the DHPPI for the years
2001–2007, the rankings of the bottom five states have changed, with
a relatively larger growth in the DHPPI. In particular, Kentucky, the
second-lowest state in the DHPPI, went through a substantial change
during the period. The state with the largest growth was Montana, with
an increase of 43 points. Not only has the DHPPI been increasing, but
there also has been considerable variation across states and over time.
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Table 6.2 Rankings of the Top and Bottom Five Regulated States
and Changes in Their Dental Hygiene Professional Practice
Index (DHPPI)
Year
2001

2007

Top five states
State
DHPPI
Colorado
97
Washington
94
Oregon
88
California
86
New Mexico
86

Bottom five states
State
DHPPI
Mississippi
15
Alabama
18
Kentucky
18
West Virginia
20
Virginia
21

Colorado
Washington
Oregon
California
New Mexico

Mississippi
Alabama
Georgia
West Virginia
Arkansas

Montana
Oklahoma
Nebraska
Kentucky
Arizona

97
94
90
88
87

15
20
23
26
28

Top five states by change in DHPPI 2001–2007
2001
2007
Change
43
86
43
28
52
24
44
68
24
18
40
22
42
62
20

SOURCE: Author survey of occupational regulation among states, tabulated using DHPPI.

LABOR MARKET ANALYSIS FOR DENTISTS AND
HYGIENISTS WITH OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING
REGULATIONS
Table 6.3 provides descriptive statistics from the American Community Survey (ACS) for key labor market variables as well as other
market and regulatory variables used in our analysis.4 The values show
that the average age of dentists is about six years higher than that of
hygienists, and that dentists have six more years of schooling. Furthermore, the dentistry profession tends to be male-dominated, whereas
97 percent of hygienists are females. The average hourly earnings of
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dentists are more than three times higher than those of hygienists. One
important distinction gleaned from the data is that 71 percent of dentists are self-employed, but only 2 percent of hygienists work for themselves. Part of this difference may be due to state laws that require dentists to directly supervise the work of hygienists. The data for dentists
were derived from the ACS, and the methods are shown in Appendix C,
with the sample selection criteria in Appendix Table C.1.
The estimates in Tables 6.4 and 6.5 demonstrate the association
between DHPPI and hourly earnings for dental hygienists and dentists, using individual-level data in the ACS. The basic general earnings
equation can be stated as follows:
(6.1)

D

lnቆEarningsistH ቇ = α + ßRst + γXist + θZst + δs + ηt + μist ,

where Earningsist is the hourly earnings of the dentist (D) or dental
hygienist (H) i in state s in time period t; Rst represents the DHPPI
and its components in person i’s state s in time period t; the vector Xist
includes covariates measuring the characteristics of each person; the
vector Zst includes time-varying state-level controls such as the state
median household income and the percentage of uninsured in the state;
δs and ηt are state and year fixed effects, respectively; and μist is the error
term.5
Table 6.4 shows the influence of the overall DHPPI index on the
logarithm of hourly earnings of hygienists, using all the controls for
individual characteristics shown in Table 6.3, which were extracted
from the ACS. These estimates show that the DHPPI level is not a
significant factor in determining hourly earnings. However, the legal
ability either to be self-employed or to have tasks unsupervised is a
key factor influencing wage determination. For example, having the
legal ability to be self-employed raises hygienists’ hourly earnings by
approximately a statistically significant 10 percent. Similarly, working
unsupervised, measured by the summated score and the Rasch score, is
associated with a 1.2 and 0.7 percent increase in earnings for hygienists,
respectively. These additional measures of legal restrictions are used to
provide additional sensitivity analysis for the measures of legal restrictions on the practice of dentistry. The issue of whether hygienists were
directly reimbursed under the state government regulations with the
same specifications was also examined. Although we do not report the
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Table 6.3 Summary Statistics for the Labor Market Variables Using the ACS, 2001–2007
Panel A: Individual sample statistics
Dental hygienists
(n = 5,886)
Mean
sd
Age
40.55
10.11
Schooling (in years)
14.65
1.25
Experience (in years)
19.90
10.07
Gender (male: 1; female: 0)
0.03
0.17
Married (married: 1; not married: 0)
0.74
0.44
Experience squared (/1,000)
0.50
0.42
White (white: 1; others: 0)
0.92
0.26
Black (black: 1; others: 0)
0.02
0.14
Others (others: 1; otherwise: 0)
0.05
0.23
Citizen (U.S. citizen: 1; others: 0)
0.98
0.13
Work for for-profit (yes: 1; no: 0)
0.94
0.24
Work for not-for-profit (yes: 1; no: 0)
0.02
0.13
Work for government (yes: 1; no: 0)
0.02
0.15
Self-employment (yes: 1; no: 0)
0.02
0.14
Hourly earnings (in 2007 dollars)
28.81
11.93

Dentists
(n = 7,220)
Mean
sd
46.98
10.02
20.30
1.05
20.67
10.09
0.80
0.40
0.84
0.37
0.53
0.41
0.84
0.36
0.02
0.15
0.13
0.34
0.96
0.19
0.22
0.41
0.02
0.14
0.05
0.22
0.71
0.45
95.46
67.66
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Panel B: State sample statistics
Mean
sd
Source
n
DHPPI
357
46.80
20.02 Nat. Ctr. for Health Workforce Analysis (2004)
Tasks permitted (summated)
357
7.19
2.55 “
”
Tasks permitted (Rasch)
357
1.44
1.76 “
”
Independence from dentists (summated)
357
1.12
2.56 “
”
Independence from dentists (Rasch)
357
−8.19
4.27 “
”
Self-employment allowed
357
0.11
0.32 “
”
Growth in the number of dental hygienists
298
0.04
0.15
Occupational Employment Survey
Growth in the number of dentists
272
0.02
0.21
“
”
State median household income ($)
357 44,984.93 7,597.42
Current Population Survey
Percentage of uninsured
357
13.67
3.76
“
”
State median price of amalgam restoration ($) 336
112.66
19.73
Survey of Dental Fees (American Dental
State median price of prophylaxis ($)
343
49.47
8.54
Association 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007)
SOURCE: American Community Survey (ACS) and Dental Hygiene Professional Practice Index (DHPPI).
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Experience
Experience squared (/1,000)
Schooling (in years)
Gender
Marital status

(6)

9/18/2013 10:11:20 AM

0.100**
(0.041)
0.017**** 0.017**** 0.017**** 0.017**** 0.017**** 0.017****
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.003)
−0.345**** −0.345**** −0.345**** −0.344**** −0.344**** −0.344****
(0.061)
(0.061)
(0.061)
(0.061)
(0.061)
(0.061)
0.043**** 0.043**** 0.043**** 0.043**** 0.043**** 0.043****
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.007)
−0.065*
−0.064*
−0.064*
−0.064*
−0.065*
−0.064*
(0.034)
(0.034)
(0.034)
(0.034)
(0.034)
(0.034)
0.008
0.008
0.008
0.008
0.008
0.008
(0.014)
(0.014)
(0.014)
(0.014)
(0.014)
(0.014)
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Table 6.4 Pooled OLS Model of Log Hourly Earnings for Dental Hygienists Using the ACS, 2001–2007
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
DHPPI
0.000
(0.002)
Tasks permitted (summated)
0.005
(0.007)
Tasks permitted (Rasch)
0.005
(0.010)
Independence from dentists
0.012**
(summated)
(0.006)
Independence from dentists (Rasch)
0.007*
(0.004)
Self-employment allowed
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White
Black
Citizen
Work for for-profit
Work for not-for-profit
Self-employment
Constant
State controls with state fixed effects
Year fixed effects
R-squared
N

0.002
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.002
(0.032)
(0.032)
(0.032)
(0.032)
(0.032)
(0.032)
−0.080
−0.080
−0.080
−0.080
−0.080
−0.080
(0.048)
(0.048)
(0.048)
(0.048)
(0.048)
(0.048)
0.142***
0.142***
0.142***
0.143***
0.143***
0.143***
(0.044)
(0.044)
(0.044)
(0.044)
(0.044)
(0.044)
0.168**** 0.168**** 0.168**** 0.167**** 0.167**** 0.167****
(0.034)
(0.033)
(0.033)
(0.033)
(0.033)
(0.033)
0.093*
0.093*
0.093*
0.093*
0.093*
0.093*
(0.048)
(0.048)
(0.048)
(0.048)
(0.048)
(0.048)
0.137*
0.137*
0.137*
0.137*
0.137*
0.137*
(0.069)
(0.069)
(0.069)
(0.069)
(0.069)
(0.069)
−3.087
−3.106
−3.256
−2.793
−2.981
−3.036
(3.048)
(2.998)
(2.963)
(3.078)
(2.980)
(2.968)
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
0.171
0.171
0.171
0.172
0.172
0.172
5,886
5,886
5,886
5,886
5,886
5,886
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NOTE: Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are reported in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the
0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level; **** significant at the 0.001 level. State controls include state median household income and
the percentage of uninsured in the state. For this and the following tables, the six columns show different specifications—i.e., different
independent variables used or different control variables to show how the alternative specifications influenced wage determination. These
varying estimates provide a guide for the sensitivity of the model to alternative specifications. Y = yes.
SOURCE: Developed by the authors using ACS data.

DHPPI
Tasks permitted (summated)
Tasks permitted (Rasch)
Independence from dentists
(summated)
Independence from dentists (Rasch)

(1)
−0.002
(0.003)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

−0.005
(0.020)
−0.014
(0.023)
−0.005
(0.017)
−0.014*

Self-employment allowed
Experience
Experience squared (/1,000)
Schooling (in years)
Gender
Marital status

(6)

9/18/2013 10:11:21 AM

0.031**** 0.031**** 0.031**** 0.031**** 0.031****
(0.005)
(0.005)
(0.005)
(0.005)
(0.005)
−0.610**** −0.609**** −0.609**** −0.610**** −0.610****
(0.112)
(0.112)
(0.112)
(0.112)
(0.112)
−0.015
−0.015
−0.015
−0.015
−0.015
(0.011)
(0.011)
(0.011)
(0.011)
(0.011)
0.244**** 0.244**** 0.244**** 0.244**** 0.244****
(0.018)
(0.018)
(0.018)
(0.018)
(0.018)
0.115**** 0.115**** 0.114**** 0.115**** 0.115****
(0.020)
(0.020)
(0.020)
(0.020)
(0.020)

(0.008)
−0.162**
(0.077)
0.031****
(0.005)
−0.611****
(0.112)
−0.015
(0.011)
0.244****
(0.018)
0.115****
(0.020)
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Table 6.5 Pooled OLS Model of Log Hourly Earnings for Dentists Using the ACS, 2001–2007
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White
Black
Citizen
Work for for-profit
Work for not-for-profit
Self-employment
Constant
State controls with state fixed effects
Year fixed effects
R-squared
N

0.097**** 0.097**** 0.097**** 0.097**** 0.097**** 0.097****
(0.017)
(0.017)
(0.017)
(0.017)
(0.017)
(0.017)
−0.036
−0.036
−0.036
−0.037
−0.037
−0.037
(0.058)
(0.059)
(0.059)
(0.058)
(0.058)
(0.058)
0.067
0.067
0.067
0.067
0.067
0.067
(0.041)
(0.041)
(0.041)
(0.041)
(0.041)
(0.041)
0.387**** 0.387**** 0.387**** 0.387**** 0.387**** 0.387****
(0.032)
(0.032)
(0.032)
(0.032)
(0.032)
(0.032)
0.111*
0.111*
0.111*
0.111*
0.110*
0.110*
(0.057)
(0.057)
(0.057)
(0.057)
(0.057)
(0.057)
0.500**** 0.500**** 0.501**** 0.500**** 0.500**** 0.500****
(0.037)
(0.037)
(0.037)
(0.037)
(0.037)
(0.037)
11.574*
11.848*
12.090*
11.727*
11.365*
11.511*
(6.138)
(6.065)
(6.144)
(6.095)
(6.142)
(6.046)
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
0.122
0.122
0.122
0.122
0.122
0.122
7,220
7,220
7,220
7,220
7,220
7,220

NOTE: Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are reported in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the
0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level; **** significant at the 0.001 level. State controls include state median household income and
the percentage of uninsured in the state. Y = yes.
SOURCE: Developed by the authors using ACS data.
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results in the table, we find that the direct reimbursement was associated with approximately 5.1 percent higher earnings for hygienists and
8.4 percent lower earnings for dentists, and that it was statistically significant at the 0.01 level only for hygienists. However, the direct reimbursement was not statistically significant in the employment growth
models in Tables 6.6 and 6.7. In order to test for the robustness of the
results, a further analysis also examined whether state provisions that
allow for hygienists to be self-employed are associated with earnings
dispersions for the two occupations. These further tests were estimated
in Appendix Table C.2 and were consistent with the results presented in
Tables 6.4 and 6.5.
In contrast, for dentists in Table 6.5, the estimates from the model
using the same set of controls from the ACS as in Table 6.4 indicate that
having state provisions that allow for hygienists to be self-employed is
associated with approximately 16 percent lower hourly earnings for the
dentists in that state. It appears that dentists lose more, perhaps because
they are no longer able to require hygienists to work only for them
in order to provide dental services. The consequence of the legal provision may result in higher costs due to higher wages for hygienists.
In addition, there may be lost income because hygienists may be taking patients away from full-service dentists and recommending fewer
costly dental procedures. For example, the assumption is that independent dental hygienists are more likely to recommend lower-cost dental
sealants, but that a hygienist who works in a full-service office may
have incentives to recommend a higher-cost dental filling because of
bonuses or promotion opportunities. To further illustrate, there are
strong incentive effects for dentists to recommend more costly procedures. On average, sealants cost $37, but most fillings cost more than
$100 and also need to be replaced periodically (Simonsen 1991). Once
fillings are installed, there is a greater likelihood for both crowns and
root canal procedures, both of which cost more than $1,000 each. Since
hygienists can only work with sealants, having independent hygienists
can have a major impact on dental incomes by changing the service and
product mix. There is some evidence that sealants provide protection
from further tooth decay that is as good as or better than the protection
from fillings (Gooch et al. 2009). Furthermore, the signs of the coefficients for the ability of hygienists to engage in broader work assign-
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ments are negative in the remainder of the specifications for dentists’
wage determinations.
The analysis also examined whether state provisions that allow for
hygienists to be self-employed are associated with earnings dispersions
for the two occupations. The employment effects of variations in state
statutes for dental hygienists and dentists are given in Tables 6.6 and
6.7, respectively.6 The general employment equation can be stated as
follows:
(6.2)

D

EmploymentstH = α + ßRst + γXst + δs + ηt + μst ,

where Employmentst is the employment growth of dentists (D) or
hygienists (H) in state s in time period t; Rst is the DHPPI and its components in state s in time period t; the vector Xst includes covariates
measuring economic and dental characteristics within each state; δs and
ηt are state and year fixed effects, respectively; and μst is the error term.
The estimates from the reduced form model in Tables 6.6 and 6.7
use the Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS 2013b). One advantage of the data is that it is
collected at the state level and gives information on an aggregate state
level, as opposed to the individual-level information provided in the
ACS. Since almost all hygienists are required to work for a dentist, the
estimates from the database have few errors in the values for employment change that might be present if hygienists worked independently.
Although the ACS has individual-level data, the estimates for small
states may have large errors. The estimates show that the overall index
is not significantly associated with the employment growth of hygienists in equations that include state-level controls, such as the growth in
the number of dentists in the state, the state median household income,
the percentage of uninsured in the state, and the state median prices
of amalgam restoration and prophylaxis in each specification in the
table. However, as shown in Table 6.6, whether hygienists can be selfemployed is positively and statistically significant at the 0.10 level in
its association with employment growth of hygienists by about 6 percent. Furthermore, enhancing the ability of hygienists to do various
tasks without the supervision of dentists is also associated with positive
employment growth for their occupation.
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DHPPI

(1)
0.004
(0.003)

Tasks permitted (summated)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

−0.020
(0.034)

Tasks permitted (Rasch)

−0.037
(0.045)

Independence from dentists (summated)

0.009*
(0.005)
0.006**

Independence from dentists (Rasch)
Self-employment allowed
Dental hygienist’s employment growth rate
State median household
Income (/1,000)
Rate of uninsured
State median price of prophylaxis
State median price of amalgam restoration

(6)

9/18/2013 10:11:22 AM

−0.146**
(0.064)
−0.015
(0.012)
−0.004
(0.008)
0.008
(0.009)
0.000
(0.004)

−0.155**
(0.061)
−0.013
(0.013)
−0.001
(0.009)
0.009
(0.010)
0.000
(0.004)

−0.151**
(0.063)
−0.014
(0.013)
−0.002
(0.008)
0.010
(0.010)
0.000
(0.004)

−0.150**
(0.064)
−0.014
(0.012)
−0.004
(0.008)
0.008
(0.009)
0.000
(0.004)

−0.150**
(0.064)
−0.014
(0.012)
−0.004
(0.008)
0.008
(0.009)
0.001
(0.004)

(0.003)
0.061*
(0.034)
−0.151**
(0.064)
−0.014
(0.012)
−0.003
(0.008)
0.008
(0.009)
0.001
(0.004)
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Table 6.6 Models of Employment Growth for Dental Hygienists by State, Using the OES Data, 2001–2007
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Constant
State fixed effects
Year fixed effects
R-squared
N

1.399
(1.102)
Y
Y
0.221
250

1.381
(1.108)
Y
Y
0.216
250

1.245
(1.140)
Y
Y
0.219
250

1.421
(1.111)
Y
Y
0.215
250

1.472
(1.104)
Y
Y
0.215
250

1.409
(1.112)
Y
Y
0.215
250

NOTE: Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are reported in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the
0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level; **** significant at the 0.001 level. Y = yes.
SOURCE: Developed by the authors using ACS data.
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Self-employment allowed
Dentists’ employment growth rate
State median household
Income (/1,000)
Rate of uninsured
State median price of prophylaxis

9/18/2013 10:11:22 AM

State median price of amalgam
restoration

−0.282
(0.192)
−0.002
(0.013)
−0.002
(0.010)
0.007
(0.015)
0.002
(0.003)

−0.300
(0.189)
−0.004
(0.013)
−0.003
(0.010)
0.010
(0.013)
0.001
(0.003)

−0.293
(0.189)
−0.004
(0.013)
−0.005
(0.011)
0.006
(0.013)
0.002
(0.002)

−0.287
(0.189)
−0.003
(0.013)
0.000
(0.010)
0.006
(0.014)
0.002
(0.003)

−0.287
(0.189)
−0.003
(0.013)
−0.001
(0.010)
0.006
(0.014)
0.001
(0.003)

(6)

(0.003)
−0.255****
(0.039)
−0.288
(0.189)
−0.003
(0.013)
−0.001
(0.010)
0.006
(0.014)
0.001
(0.003)
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Table 6.7 Models of Employment Growth for Dentists by State, Using the OES Data, 2001–2007
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
DHPPI
−0.005
(0.003)
Tasks permitted (summated)
−0.022
(0.042)
Tasks permitted (Rasch)
0.022
(0.050)
Independence from dentists
−0.036****
(summated)
(0.005)
Independence from dentists (Rasch)
−0.024****
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Constant
State fixed effects
Year fixed effects
R-squared
N

0.817
(1.774)
Y
Y
0.243
250

0.772
(1.762)
Y
Y
0.239
250

0.911
(1.688)
Y
Y
0.238
250

0.792
(1.738)
Y
Y
0.247
250

0.607
(1.736)
Y
Y
0.246
250

0.847
(1.748)
Y
Y
0.246
250

NOTE: Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are reported in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the
0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level; **** significant at the 0.001 level. Y = yes.
SOURCE: Developed by the authors using ACS data.

199

9/18/2013 10:11:23 AM

200 Kleiner and Park

Table 6.7 shows the relationship between the statutes and the
growth of employment for dentists in the state. The estimates show that
giving greater autonomy to hygienists is associated with a significantly
negative 26 percent employment growth of dentists. Since the average growth rate of dentists’ employment is 2 percent, having a law that
allows hygienists to have an independent business would reduce dentists’ growth rate to about 1.5 percent. This is a small absolute amount.
Since hygienists and dentists are often substitutes for each other in the
production of dental services, the state provisions favoring hygienists may reduce the need for dentists in the state. In order to test for
the robustness and sensitivity of the results, estimates show two cases
involving the role of the DHPPI in the earnings of dental assistants who
are not universally licensed and have different requirements from dental hygienists, and they found no influence on their earnings in the ACS
of the index to include market structure. In another test case, estimates
were performed for another robustness check using data from the ACS
for registered nurses, who have another set of statutes influencing the
market structure for their occupation. The estimates showed that the
DHPPI had no influence on the earnings of registered nurses. These
results suggest that the estimates were not a consequence of other factors that were not captured by the state fixed effects.
Since the results suggest elements of monopsony as shown in the
theory, there are also potential redistribution effects and economic
losses within the context of both occupations being licensed. If there is
no reduction in the quality of services that are provided to patients with
fewer regulations in dentistry, then an application of a deadweight loss
analysis can give the basic parameters to estimate potential losses to
society from monopsony in the market (Kleiner and Kudrle 2000). Using
the parameters developed from the results in the earlier tables, Box 6.1
shows that the reallocation from hygienists to dentists is approximately
$1.34 billion per year. The output loss due to the monopsonistic restriction of employment is approximately $0.08 billion per year. The output
loss due to licensing is between $0.54 and $0.68 billion per year. Therefore, the total losses associated with overall occupational licensing and
within-occupation regulation are between $0.62 and $0.76 billion annually. This results in approximately a 1 percent annual reduction in the
output of dental services for those states that required dentists’ supervision of dental hygienists, using a basic deadweight loss analysis (Car-
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Box 6.1 A Static Simulation of the Effects of State Regulations on
U.S. Dental Service Costs
Estimates of U.S. dental service expenditures:
• U.S. dental service expenditures are approximately $96.36 billion
(Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 2008).
• Labor costs account for 60 percent of health care spending
(Schwieters and Harper 2007).
• Dental hygienists account for approximately 23.2 percent of the
total labor costs (from the ratio of the average hourly earnings of
dentists and hygienists in Table 6.3).
• Therefore, labor costs for hygienists are approximately $13.40
billion (= $96.36 billion × 0.60 × 0.232), which is rectangle
wMOLMM (= wM × LM ) in Figure 6.2.
Analysis of monopsonistic exploitation and deadweight loss using
basic demand analysis:
• Monopsonistic exploitation (rectangle wLwMMM’ in Figure 6.2).
° We substitute the estimates of 0.100 for (WL − WM)/WM and 0.061
for (LL − LM )/LM (from Tables 6.4 and 6.6).
° Then, we are able to compute the reallocation from hygienists to
dentists (rectangle wMwLM’M) as follows:
(wL − wM) × LM = 0.100 wM × LM = 0.100 × $13.40 billion = $1.34
billion.
° Although we cannot compute a deadweight loss because of the
restrictions (i.e., triangle AML as a whole), we can approximate it
with triangle M’ML by multiplying by two. Then, the deadweight
loss due to the monopsonistic employment restriction is
(wL − wM) × (LL − LM) = 0.100 wM × 0.061 LM = 0.100 × 0.061 ×
$13.40 billion = $0.08 billion.
• Licensing effect
° To compute the licensing effect, we compute hygienists’ total revenue (rectangle wLOLLL in Figure 6.2). For this, we only need to
compute rectangle MLMLLL’ as follows:
(LL − LM) × wM = 0.061 LM × wM = 0.061 × $13.40 billion = $0.82
billion.
° Then, hygienists’ total revenue is $15.64 billion (= $13.40 billion +
$1.34 billion + $0.08 billion + $0.82 billion).
(continued)
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Box 6.1 (continued)
°
°

•

Given that the licensing premium is 15 percent economy-wide
(Kleiner and Krueger 2010), then the reallocation from consumers
to hygienists’ services is $2.35 billion (= 0.15 × $15.64 billion).
Also, given that the mean value of demand elasticity of labor is 0.3
(Hamermesh 1993), the deadweight loss due to licensing (i.e., triangle LL”C in Figure 6.2) should be about $0.70 billion. If only 80
percent is deadweight (Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil 2009), then
it would be more like $0.56 billion.
The total output losses would be $0.56 to $0.70 billion because of
licensing plus the monopsony effect of $0.08 billion, which equals
$0.64 to $0.78 billion.

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

neiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil 2009). This analysis does not include the
misallocation of resources within production or the losses to consumers
who allocated their resources toward dentistry and away from other
purchases (Schmidt 2012).

REVIEW AND SUMMARY
The licensing of occupations is most pervasive among health care
occupations. This chapter has examined two occupations—dentists and
dental hygienists—that are universally licensed in all 50 states in the
United States. Initially the chapter explored the evolution of licensing
for these two occupations, as well as the legal conditions governing permissible tasks for hygienists that affect both occupations. Conflict has
arisen over the allocation of work and the supervision of tasks. Next the
chapter developed the anatomy and timing, by state, of the implementation of regulations that guide the work that each of the occupations
can legally do according to state statutes and administrative decisions.
Given this institutional background, we developed a basic model of
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dental production that has elements of occupational licensing favoring
dentists in the production of services for patients. The results from the
model show that regulations requiring dentists to supervise hygienists
result in higher earnings for dentists and lower earnings and employment for dental hygienists. The model is extended to show that it has
elements of monopsony that can result in potential deadweight losses to
society if licensing and these monopsony rents are pervasive.
The estimates from the empirical models show the influence of regulations that favor tasks that hygienists can perform on the wages and
employment of dentists and hygienists for the period 2001–2007. During
this time period, hygienists were allowed to do more tasks, and in seven
states they were allowed to work without the supervision of a dentist.
The time and state fixed-effects models for both dentists and hygienists
show that fostering greater autonomy by legally allowing hygienists to
work independently of dentists is associated with an approximately 10
percent higher wage and a 6 percent increase in the employment growth
of dental hygienists. Conversely, these state provisions are associated
with approximately a 16 percent reduction in dentists’ hourly earnings
and a 26 percent reduction in dentists’ employment growth in the states
that have adopted them. In part, this larger loss by dentists is a result of
the change in the service and product mix that is delivered by hygienists
as compared to full-service dental offices. In a simple deadweight loss
analysis consistent with a monopsony model, the typical state would
lose approximately 1 percent of dental expenditures because of licensing and by not allowing hygienists to practice on their own. These estimates are lower-bound estimates, and the loss to society is likely higher.
Overall, the results suggest that state laws on permissible tasks
matter in wage and employment determination for both dentists and
hygienists. With occupational licensing, the final arbiter of who gets
to do the work is the responsibility of the state legislature and the
courts. The decisions by these policymakers appear to influence wage
and employment outcomes for practitioners in the occupations. One
could also examine, in the manner outlined in this chapter, additional
potential conflicts for licensed occupations, such as architects and interior designers or doctors and nurses, arising from the issue of who can
legally do certain tasks.
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Notes
1. I thank Kyoung Won Park for his assistance with this chapter, which is based on
and uses material from Kleiner and Park (2010a).
2. We note that this component also includes other provisions, such as whether a
hygienist may be self-employed other than as an independent contractor. We separated this provision from the other components and treat it as a qualitatively different variable in our empirical analysis.
3. The correlations among the major components of the original DHPPI range from
0.56 to 0.96, and their intercorrelation (i.e., Cronbach’s alpha) is 0.77. Although
the correlations among the two summated ratings of task permitted and selfemployment range from 0.50 to 0.75 and their intercorrelation is 0.67, the correlations among the two Rasch indices and self-employment range from 0.41 to 0.73,
and their intercorrelation is 0.51.
4. We choose to analyze the ACS as our main data set over alternative data sets
such as the CPS, because the use of the ACS over time allows us to have enough
observations by state to fully implement the empirical model, which requires state
and year controls. For a detailed sampling framework of the ACS, see U.S. Census
Bureau (2013).
5. Although an alternative specification might be a difference-in-difference
approach, the data available do not track the same individuals over time by state.
However, our ability to control for time and state fixed effects suggests that our
policy variables influence wages for each occupation beyond state- or timevarying characteristics.
6. As a further test of the reliability of our employment data, we correlated the data
from the Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) with membership data from
the ADHA by state for 2002–2006 and with the number of active dentists in 2006
from the ADA. Their correlation was 0.92 and 0.96, respectively. This suggests
that the OES is an appropriate measure of dentists’ and hygienists’ employment
by state and year.
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7
Lessons from Studies on the
Stages of Occupational Regulation
The essential task of democratic society is to establish a proper
balance between freedom and order. A danger in modern democracy is the threat of overthrowing the equilibrium either by excessive emphasis on governmental regulation on the one hand or by
the irresponsibility and inequalities of completely unregulated
freedom on the other hand.
Flowing directly from this major concern of democratic government and more immediately pertinent to the problems involved in
state licensing of occupations is the role of government in reconciling public and special interests. Ours is a society in which
organized special groups are in conflict with each other not only
in serving their own private interests but over the very definition of
what constitutes the public interest. Much of the business of state
administration therefore consists in reconciling the demands of
special groups upon government. These interest groups compete
with one another in attempting to bring public policy into conformity with their own particular objectives.
—Council of State Governments (1952, p. 1)

INTRODUCTION
The purpose of the book has been to examine several occupations
that are at different stages of government regulation and determine to
what extent licensing has influenced the individuals in the occupation,
consumers, or other closely related occupational practitioners. Since
governments at the local, state, and national levels are confronted with
the interests of the members of the occupations and, in rare cases, consumers of the services seeking more regulation, the goal of this book is
to provide new analysis and evidence on how these labor markets work
in the face of government regulations. With the decline of union mem-
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bership and the growth of employment in the service sector, workers
and their agents (unions or professional associations) have attempted to
establish a “web of rules” to regularize work and reduce competition in
the field (Dunlop 1958). The book has provided a number of case studies that examine how licensing has affected interior designers, mortgage
brokers, preschool teachers, electricians and plumbers, and dentists and
hygienists. Along a continuum moving from less to more regulation,
the book has traced the regulatory development of interior designers,
the least-regulated occupation, and that of dentists and hygienists, both
universally licensed occupations.
As stated in Chapter 1 as part of the introduction to this volume, the
stages of regulation are an arbitrary and, in some ways, a limited way of
looking at the sequence of regulation. The approach utilizes not merely
the uniformities in the sequence of regulation but also the uniqueness of
each occupation’s experience with regulation (Rostow 1960). The volume also examined the tension that exists between the occupations over
the “span of control” of job tasks that are regulated by the state. Occupations that have been regulated for a relatively short period of time
and have minimal requirements for entry are usually unable to achieve
their economic goals of better compensation and less competition. For
the other selected occupations, the more heavily regulated occupations
have been licensed for a longer time and have attained more rigorous
entry requirements, which have led to higher earnings and more voice
in the economic conditions of the tasks.
A common thread throughout the volume included showing the
growth of regulation and its variations over time across a wide variety of occupations. Each chapter depicted the influence of increased
regulation on the wages of the occupations and, where the data were
available, its employment effects. The research also showed several
unique aspects, including outcomes for consumers in the case of regulation of mortgage brokers and outcomes for children whose preschool
teachers and their assistants were licensed. Another unique aspect of
the analysis is the examination of occupations such as those of dentists and hygienists, who battle with regulators over who gets to do the
regulated work. A further innovation is the examination of how regulations may influence the number of injuries and deaths of plumbers and
electricians, two occupations that have among the highest work-related
injuries. Overall, there is a common theme throughout the volume, yet
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each chapter delves into the unique aspects of a particular occupation,
how it is regulated, and the economic consequences of the corresponding regulations.

OVERARCHING FINDINGS
This section summarizes the key findings for each of the occupations studied in this volume, starting with the least regulated and progressing to the most regulated ones. Initially, this section examines the
role of regulation in influencing the wages and employment for interior
designers (the subject of Chapter 2), who are licensed in three states and
the District of Columbia. For occupations at this initial stage of regulation, where certification rather than licensing dominates, there is conflicting evidence as to whether regulation raises wages or does much to
improve quality. National data from the American Community Survey
(ACS) from 2000 to 2009 show that regulation and the licensing of interior designers had a small and insignificant influence on overall wage
determination. An examination of the employment growth of interior
designers during the same time period shows that regulation had a small
influence on employment growth, once state economic characteristics
were taken into account. Furthermore, the economic factors available
for our analysis were not important in determining whether a law was
passed. Perhaps the organizational or political skills of the leaders of
the profession were the more important factors in determining whether
interior designers were licensed.
In Chapter 3, the occupation of mortgage broker was examined. The
evaluation of the occupation introduces and summarizes a compilation
of mortgage broker licensing requirements from the 50 states and the
District of Columbia for the period 1996–2006. The data are used to
analyze whether mortgage broker licensing or any of its components
have significant relationships with labor or service market outcomes.
Investigation of the index constructed to measure the difficulty of entering the profession shows that regulations in general do not significantly
affect labor market or consumer market outcomes.
One regulation common in many states—that mortgage brokers
maintain a surety bond or a minimum net worth—has a significant and
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fairly consistent statistical association with higher wages, fewer brokers, fewer subprime mortgages, higher foreclosure rates on subprime
mortgages, and a higher percentage of mortgages carrying high interest rates. This result is often viewed as a counterintuitive finding by
those who suggest that occupational regulation either does not matter
or can have positive influences on labor markets and consumer financial
well-being.
The analysis of preschool education regulation takes on an industry
that is in both the public and private sectors. The regulation of child
care services is at an early stage of development in terms of both the
number of states that require it and the standards to be licensed. In addition, enforcement is lax. The estimates presented in Chapter 4 fail to
find any evidence that the wages of child care workers are affected by
government regulation. This finding is not surprising, since the requirements are both relatively new and at low levels. However, there is some,
albeit not conclusive, evidence of the cost effects of regulation on child
care enrollment. Unfortunately, no reliable price data were available in
the surveys examined to evaluate this issue in more detail. One potential benefit of increased regulation is an increase in the educational
attainment quality of child care, which was measured by child development and early childhood academic achievement scores. Data from the
Early Childhood Longitudinal Study–Birth and Kindergarten cohorts
(ECLS-B and ECLS-K) as well as the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth (NLSY), three major government databases, show some effect of
center-based regulation, but no effect of occupational regulation on any
improvement in early childhood academic achievement scores—that
is, math and reading scores—due to occupational regulations. At these
levels of regulation and in this industry, the regulation of child care is
unlikely to show much influence. If regulation does little to change costs
through wages or change enrollment patterns or educational attainment,
there are few reasons to enact the low levels of licensing that were measured and used in this segment of the book. This is especially the case
if these regulations result in governmental monitoring or in fees that
do not seem to generate many benefits to either workers or children.
Furthermore, the estimates show that occupational regulations have no
measurable influence on national test scores. The additional costs may
be more regulatory agencies, with few observable benefits.
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Chapter 5 presented an analysis and a discussion of the role of regulation for two blue-collar occupations in the construction industry—
namely, plumbers and electricians. The central findings of the chapter
show that certain occupational licensing requirements, such as minimum age, education, and exam requirements, raise the wages of electricians by about 6 to 8 percent. However, the results for plumbers are
murky and not consistent. Beyond that, the estimates suggest a modest
trade-off between wages and work-related injuries for electricians, a
result that is consistent with economic theory that dates back to Adam
Smith’s work from the late 1700s, which states that employers needed
to compensate workers for unpleasant or dangerous tasks (Smith 1937).
Local licensing of electricians is associated with approximately a 12
percent wage premium beyond state regulations, suggesting a further
influence of local regulations on the occupation. Neither the estimates
for electricians nor those for plumbers show much evidence of a systematic influence of occupational licensing on the injury rates, severity
of injuries, or death rates. Overall, regulation is shown to have a significant impact on wages for electricians but no discernible effect on
increasing safety in this occupation.
Chapter 6 examined the potential conflict between two universally
licensed occupations—namely, dental hygienists and dentists. The discussion and analysis initially explored the evolution of state regulation
for both occupations and the battle lines that have evolved between the
two fields. Next, the chapter showed the anatomy of state regulations
for dental hygienists over time. The empirical section examined the
influence of state regulations on hygienists’ earnings and specifically on
the ability of hygienists to be self-employed. This change in regulations
is shown to be associated with an earnings increase of approximately
10 percent. Furthermore, when hygienists are able to work without the
supervision of a dentist, there is an associated increase in the statelevel employment growth of hygienists, but a decrease in the employment growth and earnings for dentists. Estimated economic costs were
developed that showed the potential overall losses to society of these
legislative and internal administrative battles for control of regulatory
decisions on markets.
In order to succinctly summarize the findings presented in this
book, Table 7.1 gives the level of occupational regulation of each of the
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occupations examined. Next, the table shows the results for the labor
market, and if applicable the effects for consumers or other outcome
measures. The overarching results show that as an occupation increases
its coverage and the time it has been regulated, it enhances its ability
to raise wages and reduce employment growth. This is because occupational licensing boards, which are usually controlled by members of
the occupation, can limit supply and capture jobs for the licensed occupation. Also, as with previous studies of the influence of occupational
regulation, there appears to be little to no influence on outcomes as
measured by consumer welfare or the safety of workers on the job.
Regulation of Other Occupations
Since the publication of my previous book, Licensing Occupations:
Ensuring Quality or Restricting Competition? (Kleiner 2006), other
researchers have implemented studies for a number of occupations.
This section will report on many of them. With the growth of licensing
to almost 30 percent of the U.S. workforce, the number of occupations
that have become licensed and the requirements for both initial entry
and migration from other states have increased (Kleiner and Krueger
2010; U.S. Department of the Treasury and U.S. Department of Defense
2012; Bielick et al. 2013). For the most part, the examination of these
occupations has been limited to those that are universally licensed. For
example, studies of the labor market effects have been implemented on
engineers, barbers, lawyers, real estate agents, nurses and doctors, and
teachers. The results suggest that the impact on training and labor supply of occupational licensing may be fairly small (Klee 2010). Consequently, any workforce development benefits of occupational licensing
may be small in comparison to the overall costs in other areas. Fewer
studies have examined occupations that are licensed in some states and
not in others. For example, massage therapists and radiologic technologists are licensed in some states and show variations in regulations on
a state-by-state basis.
The policy issue of the restriction of geographic mobility because
of licensing has been a long-standing topic of interest to academics
and policymakers, because it raises wages and also can influence labor
supply in states (Kleiner, Gay, and Greene 1982). More recently, top
policymakers have noted that restrictions of geographic mobility can
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Table 7.1 Summary of Key Findings in the Volume
Level of occupational
Occupation
regulation
Labor market effects
Interior designers
Low
None to modest wage and
employment effects
Mortgage brokers
Low to moderate
Modest wage and
employment effects
Preschool instructors and Moderate
related assistants
Electricians and plumbers High

Dentists and dental
hygienists

Universal

Other
Efforts at the state level to become
universally licensed
Recent moves to gain universal licensing;
more regulation has murky effects on
consumers
Modest to no wage effects Movement to universal licensing; little
evidence of major influence on academic
performance
Moderate wage effects
Movement to make regulations more
stringent; little evidence of any influence
on worker safety
Moderate to high wage
Relaxed regulations result in gains for
effects
hygienists at the expense of dentists
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have a particularly severe impact on military families (U.S. Department
of the Treasury and U.S. Department of Defense 2012). The same set of
restrictions can also limit individuals from moving to accept jobs and
can contribute to higher structural unemployment levels. To the extent
that mobility is restricted across states through occupational licensing,
access is reduced and labor market outcomes are potentially affected.
Furthermore, as the stages of regulation advance, the ability of regulators to limit geographic mobility is likely to grow.
Universally Licensed Occupations
Included in the list of universally licensed occupations that have
been analyzed in some detail are lawyers, teachers, and nurses. These
occupations are at the highest stage of occupational regulation. A body
of evidence is developing on the impact of occupational licensing similar to the work on the influence of unions on relative wages that was
pioneered by H. Gregg Lewis at the University of Chicago over several
decades (Lewis 1986). For example, the influence of tougher licensing statutes on lawyers—an occupation that is among the most visible
universally licensed occupations—occurs upon entry. Mario Pagliero
shows that the difficulty of the law exam or the passage rate significantly affects the number of new lawyers that enter a state. Furthermore, the ability for state bar exams to set tougher standards (and hence
affect outcomes) influences the number of potential new entrants into
the legal profession. As was found in earlier analysis by Maurizi, attorneys respond to labor market fluctuations by varying the bar exam pass
rate (Maurizi 1974; Kleiner 1990; Pagliero 2010).
Another universally licensed occupation that has recently received
attention is that of public school teachers. Some studies on the licensing
of teachers have examined the influence of licensing on wages, whereas
others have focused on the educational attainment of students (Kleiner
and Petree 1988; Angrist and Guryan 2003; Kleiner 2011; Larsen 2012).
Overall, in the public sector, licensing generally shows modest effects
on the wages of teachers and no influence on average student achievement (Goldhaber and Brewer 2000). Larsen examines the distributional
effects across wealthy and lower-income school districts. He finds no
influence of tougher licensing for lower-income school districts, but
some positive effects of tougher regulation from higher test scores for
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higher-income school districts. At least for public school teachers, the
influence of more rigorous licensing results in somewhat higher wages
and little effect on quality, both of which tend to favor more wealthy
districts.
Nurses make up a universally licensed occupation that has had to
work under the supervision of physicians. Nurses became regulated
much later than physicians. By 1923, all 48 states had certification legislation that required practitioners to meet certain qualifications in order
to use the title of nurse (Comer 2007). New York enacted the first mandatory licensure legislation for nurses in 1947. Marks and Law (2012)
ask whether, during the transition from certification, which the last state
had adopted in 1923, to licensing, which occurred largely after 1950,
there were any wage and employment effects for the occupation. To
examine the issue, they use individual-level census data on registered
and practical nurses in the United States from 1950 to 1970. As part of
their analysis, they take advantage of a quasi experiment made possible
by the fact that, by the beginning of the sample period, all states already
had certification in place and some states already required a license.
During the subsequent decade, several states switched from certification to a mandatory licensing regime, while others did not. Accordingly, Marks and Law infer the effect of licensure in a difference-indifferences framework that uses states that did not change their regulatory regime as a control. They find that the shift from certification to
mandatory licensing had no effect on the wages or the participation rate
of practical and registered nurses. Since they only examine the period
immediately after the switch, it may be that it takes some time for the
full effect of the transition to take place. Moreover, the grandfathering in of the incumbent practitioners may also have played a role in
the lack of a finding of wage effects in the transition to more rigorous
regulations.
A within-state analysis of a universally licensed occupation was
implemented by Powell and Vorotnikov (2012). In their study within
Massachusetts, they examined the effects of a continuing education requirement that was added to real estate licensing laws in 1999.
According to the authors, the Massachusetts Association of Realtors
lobbied for the change, stating that it would enhance the quality of service for the public. Powell and Vorotnikov’s estimates do not find any
improvement in the quality of service as measured by complaints to
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the real estate licensing board. However, the adoption of continuing
education requirements reduced the number of licensed active agents
by between 39 and 58 percent and increased the incomes of those who
remained by between 11 and 17 percent. These estimates are in line
with other results of the influence of tougher licensing laws in other
occupations (Kleiner and Todd 2007).
Among the longest-standing generally licensed occupations in all
states is that of barbers (only the state of Alabama does not fund its
licensing board, though the legislation to repeal licensing did not pass).
Licensing of barbers began in the late 1800s, starting with the state of
Minnesota in 1897 and then spreading to other states with the assistance of the barbers union. Although estimates of the positive impact of
licensing on barbers’ wages vary, the most current estimates suggest an
impact on wages of between 11 and 22 percent (Kleiner 2006; Timmons
and Thornton 2010).
Finally, a unique case is the regulated and universally licensed occupation of engineers. The regulation of the occupation is unique because
only a small percentage, usually estimated at less than 20 percent, of
the members of the occupation are licensed by states. Hur, Kleiner, and
Wang (2013) present a comprehensive analysis of the role of occupational licensing on the labor market for civil, electrical, and industrial
engineers. These three branches of engineering account for the largest number of engineers covered by occupational licensing statutes in
the United States. The empirical section shows that licensing for these
occupations grew more rigorous from 1995 to 2009. The estimates from
the statistical models of the engineering labor market find that the more
regulated engineers earn slightly higher wages but have modestly lower
employment growth.
Although the regulation of engineers may provide a consistent set
of guidelines for entering the occupation and potential economic rents
for engineers, it may also reduce the variation in their numbers within
and across states. Although the standards are clear, regulation may
reduce innovation coming from engineers with new and different kinds
of training that do not fit easily into the traditional ways that licensing
requires tasks to be completed. In addition, it has the potential to result
in higher wages for engineers and slower employment growth in the
occupation. A possible consequence of the growth of regulation of the
occupation may be to reduce access to engineers by their customers, as
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well as to slow down the ability of builders and manufacturers to use
their vital services in the U.S. economy.
The influence of universally licensed occupations serves to drive up
wages and reduce the new entrants into the occupation. Their effect is
similar to the closed shop provisions that were outlawed under the TaftHartley Act (1947), which amended the National Labor Relations Act;
these provisions had allowed only union members to apply for jobs. In
other words, licensing limits employment opportunities. As has been
shown in the union wage literature, the impact of “monopoly unions”
is to raise wages and reduce employment (Lewis 1986). In the case of
unions, these outcomes can be a direct influence of natural monopolies in the product market or private sector negotiation strategies that
lead to market advantages for unions. On the other hand, occupational
licensing can create government-sanctioned monopolies that may be
granted for health and safety reasons, and that can also result in control
over the labor market by the occupation. A goal of the policy planner is to maximize the health and safety component and minimize the
monopoly aspect of regulation (Freeman and Medoff 1985). Whereas
unions can restrict the supply of labor for a specific firm, licensing in
the long run can limit the number of practitioners in an economy and
thereby reduce the supply of practitioners, especially as the stages of
regulation advance.
Partially Licensed Occupations
More recently, occupations that are licensed in some states and not
in others have been analyzed. As an example, the economic effects of
the regulation of massage therapists have been examined (Thornton
and Timmons 2013). Governmental regulation of massage therapists
has grown, but regulation also varies across states. As of 2010, of the 48
contiguous states—the states for which the authors could obtain data—
36 require massage therapists to be licensed, five require certification,
and only seven still have no form of state regulation of the profession.
In some of these seven states, however, regulation exists at the local
government level. States that license massage therapists mandate certain education requirements such as passing an examination, fulfilling
a minimum number of continuing education credits, and the payment
of licensing fees. Thornton and Timmons find that licensing massage
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therapists raises their hourly earnings by almost 16 percent and reduces
the ratio of massage therapists per capita by state.
Timmons and Thornton (2008) also examine the occupation of
radiologic technologists, another occupation that is licensed in some
states. They evaluate the influence that state licensing has on radiologic
technologists’ wages with a unique data set that allows them to control
for place of work and job specialization. The authors’ estimates find that
radiologic technologists working in states with licensing statutes earn
from 3.3 to 6.9 percent more than radiologic technologists working in
states without licensing. Their estimates provide further support for the
effects of occupational licensing on the wages of practitioners.
Although the evidence is more limited as to the influence of licensing where only some states regulate the occupation, the evidence cited
in this book suggests that licensing laws in a state raise the wages of
the regulated practitioners relative to those in unregulated states. Not
surprisingly, the estimates vary depending on the service market conditions for the occupations. Although the empirical evidence is not nearly
as strong as in the case of universal licensing, the effects for occupations
that are partially licensed suggest that conditions in the service market
are critical in determination of any monopoly effects, and that there are
occupation-specific conditions that largely dominate the economic outcomes. As occupations are able to cross the threshold to higher stages
of regulation, they are more likely to be able to gain economic benefits.

INFLUENCE ON THE QUALITY OF THE SERVICE
Several recent studies have focused on the quality effects of occupational licensing. The subjects of these studies cover everything from
floral arrangements to educational attainment to well-baby exams. In
the first example, Carpenter (2011) conducted a field experiment on
the influence of the licensing of florists on the quality of floral arrangements. “Floral experts” in Louisiana assessed the quality of floral
arrangements and found that licensed florists in that state did not produce better-quality floral arrangements than their counterparts in Texas,
where florists are not licensed. However, the flower arrangements in
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Louisiana, regulated by the state, cost more for the same product and
service than in Texas.
A study by Larsen (2012), discussed earlier in this chapter, obtains
empirical results for public education that support the basic theoretical analysis of the Shapiro model, which says that licensing assists
those who prefer higher-quality services and who usually have higher
incomes, more than those who prefer lower-quality services and who
on average have lower incomes. That is, students in lower-income but
highly licensed school districts do not do better on test scores, but students in wealthier districts that are regulated obtain higher scores on the
standardized tests that are used as outcome measures.
A final study by Kleiner et al. (2012) examines the role of relaxing
occupational licensing requirements on both wage determination and
the price of medical services. The researchers investigate how these
regulations may affect wages and the cost of providing certain types
of medical services using two methods. First, they use data from the
2002–2007 ACS to study how changes in state licensing regulations
have influenced the wages of nurse practitioners and physicians. Second, analyzing a large database of private health insurance claims for
“well-child” exams, they estimate the effect of the regulation changes
on the prices of medical services included in the exam that insurance companies actually pay for. They find that the wages of nurses
are increased by legally allowing nurse practitioners to do more tasks,
and that prices of the service examined can be reduced by relaxing the
licensing requirements. No evidence of a decline in quality of services
was found using mortality or malpractice insurance rates.

WHEN DO REGULATIONS REALLY BITE?
Since many of the results in this book show that for occupations that
are at early stages of regulation, such as interior designers and preschool
teachers, regulation has either no or, at best, modest effects on wage
determination, then at what stage does regulation matter? This section
will show when influences of occupational regulation may affect wage
determination. In my previous book, Licensing Occupations: Ensuring
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Quality or Restricting Competition? (Kleiner 2006), I presented evidence that occupations that have been regulated for long time periods,
such as those of dentists and lawyers, also have significant returns over
occupations that are not regulated. In addition, Timmons and Thornton
(2010) find large economic gains for lesser-educated occupations such
as barbers that have been licensed for decades. The basic case study
evidence in the United States suggests that licensing raises wages over
time. Additional analysis of interior designers, discussed in Chapter 2,
shows that there is a positive and significant effect of duration since
the passage of more restrictive licensing laws on wage determination
(Kleiner and Vorotnikov 2012).
Further economy-wide evidence of the influence of the longevity of
licensure laws on wage determination is provided by a recent report for
the British government that examines the role of occupational licensing
on wage determination in the United Kingdom (Bryson et al. 2012). In
general, the authors find that the overall wage effects of licensing in the
UK are similar to those in the United States, but that for those occupations that were recently regulated, the impacts were minor. However,
as shown in Table 7.2, the longer the occupations were able to reduce
competition and limit the supply of practitioners, the more the influence of regulation increased. For example, the influence of licensing
increased only slightly for those occupations that were licensed in the
1990s relative to ones that were regulated within the past 10 years, by
a statistically insignificant 4 percent. However, occupations that were
licensed prior to 1990, dating back to before 1950, were associated with
wage increases from 17 percent to almost 30 percent relative to ones
that were licensed during the past 10 years. Although it would be interesting to examine whether similar results hold for the United States,
these results for Britain suggest that at initial stages of regulation, wage
effects are minimal. Similarly, a quasi random assignment study in the
Netherlands of those who got into medical school and became doctors,
relative to those who passed the exam for medical school but lost the
state-run lottery for admission and did not become doctors, shows a
lifetime earnings effect of more than 20 percent. The researchers find
that the influence of regulation grows over the lifetime of the physicians
(Ketel et al. 2012). As licensing becomes more established and more
individuals within the occupation are subject to the entry and continuing education aspects of regulations, then the wage effects are more
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Table 7.2 Regression Estimates for Wage Determination among British
Workers in Licensed Occupations, by Length of Time Licensed
in the UK
Occupations with
universal licensing
ln(wage/hour)
Year became licenseda
Before 1950
0.261***
[4.88]
1950–1979
0.297***
[5.24]
1980–1989
0.169***
[2.64]
1990–1999
0.042
[0.83]
0.41
R-squared
Observations
10,466
NOTE: t statistics in brackets. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05
level; *** significant at the 0.01 level. The model includes standard human capital and
other entry requirements.
a
The reference group consists of those occupations that were licensed between 2000
and 2010.
SOURCE: Bryson et al. (2012).

likely to be pronounced. If these results hold when applied to the United
States, then many of the occupations studied in this book will see even
greater wage growth than they have experienced to date, and the costs
of using their services will likely rise the longer they are licensed and
the more the stages of regulation advance.

ARE LICENSING REQUIREMENTS COMPLEMENTS OR
SUBSTITUTES FOR UNIONIZATION?
Recent evidence demonstrates that despite relatively favorable economic and political conditions during the 1990s, trade union membership and influence in the United States continued to remain low (Hirsch
2012). At the same time, different forms of occupational regulation such
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as registration, certification, and licensing are growing dramatically.
Economists have long recognized the economic effects of occupational
regulation and have commonly compared them to those of unionization
(Kleiner and Krueger 2010).
Based on this analysis, the argument has been made that although
both of those labor market institutions can be understood as mechanisms by which supply restrictions can be achieved, their relative
success in rent extraction differs (Koumenta, Humphris, and Kleiner
2011). Although the wage effects of union membership and licensing
attainment are similar in the United States, the market conditions within
which these labor market institutions operate are more favorable for
the growth of licensing than of unions (e.g., low employer dependency,
coverage for the employee’s work life). For example, employers generally are not dependent on a licensed workforce, and are not generally opposed if some members of their workforce have a license. In
addition, once an individual becomes licensed, that employee is more
likely to maintain that status throughout his or her work life. Koumenta,
Humphris, and Kleiner suggest that because of the fall in societal collectivism, registration, certification, and licensing are “products” more
employees want, and that employee membership is associated with
a variety of desirable private goods with little scope for free riding
(Olson 1965). Licensing is organized around “professional identities”
and is often associated with professionalization and up-skilling, which
makes it attractive to low-skilled occupational groups. Finally, state
and employer attitudes toward licensing are much more favorable than
toward unions. For example, the state receives more revenue relative
to the cost of monitoring, and licensing is a potential source of hidden
taxes, since the state can raise the cost of licensing permits with little
public backlash.
For firms, licensing creates the perception of higher-quality services
without the potential constraints that unions impose on the workplace.
Furthermore, licensed engineers or accountants, although they may have
high hourly earnings or costs, still make up a small percentage of the
overall costs of labor to the firm, resulting in much less employer opposition to licensing than to unionization, where employers must pay a
negotiated wage to all employees. For many occupations such as teachers and nurses, licensing and unionization are clearly complements.
Moreover, being both licensed and in a union raises the wage premium
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to 22 percent, from about 15 percent for only being licensed (Kleiner and
Krueger 2010). However, being covered by a collective bargaining agreement results in higher wage gains than being covered by a licensing law
(Gittleman and Kleiner 2013). But here again, being covered by both
collective bargaining and a licensing law, according to Gittleman and
Kleiner, results in the largest wage gains. Nevertheless, against a backdrop of declining union influence and membership, occupational regulation largely serves as a labor market substitute rather than as a complement to unionization in a more service-oriented economy. Certainly,
unions in certain occupations can use licensing to provide elements of
a closed shop, where the individuals who are hired must be licensed in
order to work there. Where these conditions exist, unions have been
shown to raise wages. The same can be said for those who attain occupational licensing.

POLICY PERSPECTIVES
Although occupational licensing has been growing, several proposals have been made to slow the growth of occupational licensing
in favor of certification. For example, in Minnesota, in both 2011 and
2012, the legislature passed a bill out of the Minnesota Senate Commerce and Consumer Protection Committee that explicitly favors certification over licensing. The bill states that “no government shall require
an occupational license, certification, registration, or other occupational
regulation that imposes a substantial burden on the person unless the
government demonstrates that it has a compelling interest in protecting
against present and recognizable harm to the public health and safety,
and [that] the regulation is the least restrictive means to furthering that
compelling government interest.”1 In addition, the proposed bill states
that “an individual who brings an action or asserts a defense under this
section has the initial burden of proof that the statute or administrative
rule or a government practice related to the statute or rule substantially
burdens the individual’s right to engage in an occupation not prohibited
by law. If the individual meets the burden of proof . . . the government
must then demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the government has a compelling interest in protecting against present and rec-
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ognizable harm to the public health and safety, and [that] the regulation
is the least restrictive means for furthering that compelling governmental interest.” Legislation covering similar issues has been introduced in
the Utah Legislature (Goldstein 2012). This proposed Minnesota statute is an example of model legislation on occupational licensing and is
currently being proposed by the Institute for Justice (IJ), a libertarian
public interest law firm that has handled numerous cases for individuals
who have challenged occupational licensing laws in the courts because
they have not been allowed to work as a consequence of such laws.
Appendix D presents the IJ model legislation that the proposed Minnesota statute largely follows.
The proposed Minnesota statute goes a long way toward favoring
a policy of the least possible regulation of occupations by the government, and it allows the courts to determine whether an individual has
been harmed, with the largest burden of proof being on the state to show
that there are compelling health and safety issues for the members of
the occupation to be licensed. In other words, the burden of proof falls
on the state or local government to show that there are actual dangers
to health and safety. One alleged drawback of the proposed licensing
regulation in Minnesota would be the increased litigation costs if individuals who thought that they could do the work, and should be able
to do the work, engaged the state in a significant number of lawsuits.
The legal costs could be balanced by the reduction in economic rents
to the members of the licensed occupations and the increased aggregate
output for the services of the new members of the licensed occupations.
One illustration of the extent to which the research on occupational
licensing has influenced policy comes from Iowa. In 2013, Governor
Terry Branstad vetoed an act that would have licensed four occupations
in the health sector. In his veto message to the Speaker of the Iowa
House of Representatives, he noted the following: “Licenses serve to
increase costs on licensees, increase consumer costs and options, and
reduce opportunities for new workers. One of my goals is to grow jobs
by eliminating impediments to economic growth imposed by burdensome administrative rules and regulations.”2 Further down his message
to the Speaker, Branstad noted the following policy alternative: “Given
that the certification process for substance abuse and addictive disorder
counseling and prevention professionals is well-functioning and serves
the interests of protecting health and public safety, there is no need to
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add an additional mandated layer of regulation and four new licenses.”3
In his view, certification provided a more cost-effective method of
regulation.
Calls to reduce occupational licensing barriers to interstate mobility have come from the executive branch of the federal government,
including the U.S. Department of the Treasury and U.S. Department
of Defense (2012). These policy recommendations have been made
because the families of military personnel have had a difficult time
moving across states and pursuing their careers, because of variations
in state licensing laws. The Department of Defense views this effect
as a hardship on military families. At a minimum, the ability to recognize other states’ licenses, similar to the recognition of driver’s licenses
across states, would serve to help military families as well as greatly
assist the economy in general by reducing structural unemployment
due to state regulation barriers. It would also allow licensed workers
to maximize their incomes and productivity by enabling them to move
across state lines without institutional constraints. These legislative
efforts to reduce regulatory barriers across states may have increasing
support from state or national policymakers.

PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Since the publication of my earlier volume on occupational licensing in 2006, the quality and quantity of research on occupational regulation have significantly increased (Kleiner 2006). Some of that work
has been cited in this chapter. Nevertheless, many key questions remain
unanswered. For example, can we identify whether or when the main
monopoly effects of occupational licensing occur? Are there important
“voice effects” of licensing for the members of the occupation, similar to those identified in the union literature? 4 To what extent are there
estimated benefits of higher quality for consumers? Is innovation in services or products reduced as a consequence of occupational licensing?
To what extent are the personnel policies that apply to the firm
applicable within licensed occupations (Lazear and Shaw 2007)? Are
these benefits mainly for higher-income consumers, and are there distributional aspects of the allocation of the quality effects of occupational

Kleiner2013.indb 223

9/18/2013 10:11:29 AM

224 Kleiner

licensing? Do states raise licensing fees to supplement or substitute
for other forms of taxation? How often do licensing boards revoke the
occupational licenses of incompetent or unscrupulous individuals?
At least two nations in the European Union—Germany and
Poland—are moving in a different direction in comparison to the United
States and Britain. These two nations have entertained proposals to significantly reduce regulation in their occupational labor markets (Miller
2004; Sendrowicz 2012). In other European countries, such as Finland,
Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands, an occupation that is usually
licensed in the United States (e.g., that of attorneys) is instead certified
(Pagliero and Timmons 2012).
In Israel, physicians who came from the former Soviet Union and
faced an easier barrier to becoming licensed had substantially higher
earnings than physicians from the former Soviet Union who faced a
much stiffer barrier. The degree of difficulty in getting licensed was
based on experience. Specifically, those with less than 20 years of
experience had to take a difficult general medical knowledge licensing
exam to become licensed in Israel. This exam had a fairly low pass rate.
Consequently, many of these former Soviet physicians did not become
practicing doctors in Israel and entered entirely different professions
(Kugler and Sauer 2005). Conversely, the physicians with more than
20 years of experience in the Soviet Union were granted an exemption to the exam and issued a temporary general practitioner license for
six months. During this period, they were allowed to practice medicine
under the observation of native physicians. At the end of the six months,
it was nearly certain that the immigrant physicians on the observation
track would receive a permanent license.
Do the stages of regulation patterns outlined in this book apply to
other certified or licensed occupations? Are there alternative methods
that could be applied to the data analyzed in this volume that may result
in different statistical or analytical outcomes? Australia is now reevaluating its occupational licensing policies in the context of workforce
development to examine whether licensing enhances human capital
growth (Cooney 2013). Can licensing influence greater human capital
growth in a nation?
How are wages determined or how is quality assessed in geographic
areas or political jurisdictions that are often free of state and local government licensing, such as on Native American tribal lands (Harrison
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et al. 2012)? Are there lessons to be learned in the United States from
cross-national comparisons? What are the impacts on licensed and
seemingly related unlicensed individuals in the occupation, as well
as on consumers? What are the additional costs to the firm of hiring
licensed workers (e.g., CPAs or engineers) relative to unlicensed workers over the course of their employment with the firm?
This type of analysis has already been implemented in the academic labor management literature (Lee and Mas 2009). In addition,
the dynamics of the organizations involved in the licensing process,
from unions to licensing boards, need more detailed examination. In
less developed nations, such as in Southeast Asia or Africa, would the
effect of occupational licensing for either consumers or licensed practitioners be greater than for consumers or practitioners in more developed nations in North America or Europe?
Although a number of studies examining the price effects of occupational licensing were completed in the 1970s and 1980s, few updates
or further examinations of the influence of regulation on prices have
occurred since that time (Bond et al. 1980; Cox and Foster 1990). Given
the growth of health care costs in particular, what would prices be with
less regulation?
An attempt to answer any of the questions just mentioned requires
that more and better data be developed. Although detailed regulatory
information for occupations is difficult to gather because it involves
a detailed examination of local, state, and federal statutes, this work
is necessary for a proper examination of the influence of licensing on
labor market institutions. Governmental or private nonprofit organizations could serve as depositories of this type of information. Ideally,
this would include administrative hearing information, decisions by
administrative boards, and key state court decisions on the regulation
of occupations. Moreover, data should be maintained by the states and
made available to researchers and policy analysts on the number and
characteristics of licensed individuals. This information should also be
stored and made centrally available for basic research and replication.
The major governmental statistical agencies, such as the Bureau
of Labor Statistics, the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and the Census
Bureau, should keep administrative files of data on occupational regulation from both individuals and the states. Examples of questions for
such data have been developed and tested as part of the Princeton Data
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Improvement Initiative (PDII 2008). For example, Kleiner and Krueger
(2013) would like to have the following questions included in national
government surveys such as the Current Population Survey (CPS), the
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), and the National
Longitudinal Survey (Box 7.1).
Including these questions in national government surveys would
enhance the ability of citizens and their state and national governments
to determine the labor market and service market consequences of various forms of government regulation (Kleiner and Krueger 2013). Recent
efforts toward getting some of the data on federal government surveys
have been successful, because the SIPP plans to ask similar questions
during the 2013 wave of surveys (Boivin 2012). During 2012, states
such as Minnesota, New Hampshire, Utah, and Arizona were actively
considering legislation that would place more of the burden for justifying licensing statutes on governmental entities rather than on the individuals who were seeking employment. If these states are successful in
requiring governmental entities to justify regulations, then more survey

Box 7.1 Sample Questions from the Princeton Data Improvement
Initiative for a National Government Survey on
Occupational Regulation
Do you have a license or certification that is required by a federal, state,
or local government agency to do your job?
YES ....................................................................................................... 1
NO ................................................................................... 2 (Go to Q25)
IN PROCESS/WORKING ON IT..........................................................3
Would someone who does not have a license or certificate be legally
allowed to do your job?
YES ....................................................................................................... 1
NO ......................................................................................................... 2
Is everyone who does your job eventually required to have a license or
certification by a federal, state, or local government agency?
YES ....................................................................................................... 1
NO ..........................................................................................................2
SOURCE: Princeton Data Improvement Initiative (PDII).
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and administrative information will be required on occupational regulation and its effect on consumers. The governmental agencies most able
to supply the information are those statistical agencies at the federal
level.
The chapter opened with a quotation from the 1952 Council of
State Governments report stating that “the essential task of democratic
society is to establish a proper balance between freedom and order.” In
the case of occupational licensing, the evaluation, policymaking, and
implementation of this institution of licensing embodies the tension
between these two laudable goals of order and freedom. Since licensing influences many more individuals in the United States than unions
or the minimum wage, its evaluation should be important for social
science researchers, policymakers, and citizens (Kleiner and Krueger
2013). Furthermore, occupational licensing influences the labor market for both licensed and unlicensed practitioners. It also affects the
ability of consumers to obtain important services. Moreover, it determines the distribution of those services, both among the well-off and
for those in or near poverty. Finally, it helps determine the structure of
markets where service market monopolies are provided by government.
As the politics of occupational licensing ebb and flow with economic
and political trends, it is important to shine the light of data and analysis
on the subject to determine both the equity and the efficiency aspects
through the various stages of the evolution of occupational licensing.
Notes
1. For a detailed explanation of the statute, see Minnesota H.F. No. 2002, as introduced in the 87th Legislative Session (2011–2012), posted on the state Web site
February 1, 2012 (Minnesota State Legislature 2012).
2. Terry E. Branstad to Kraig Paulsen, 26 April 2013, Office of the Governor of Iowa,
Des Moines, Iowa. https://governor.iowa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/4-26
-13-Veto-Message-for-HF-569.pdf.
3. Ibid.
4. The term “collective voice effects,” as described in Freeman and Medoff (1985),
refers to the ability of workers to influence the terms and conditions at work. Similarly, the professions can set standards and pay, as well as determine who can work
within licensed jobs.
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Variable name
ageadcdum
ageddcdum
agetdcdum
cdhrsadcdum
cdhrsddcdum
cdhrstdcdum
edadcdum
edddcdum
edtdcdum
expadcdum
expddcdum
exptdcdum
inftdcdum
ongohadcdum
ongohddcdum
ongohtdcdum
outftdcdum
rat0dcdum
rat1dcdum
rat2dcdum
rat3dcdum
rat4dcdum
rat5dcdum

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

Center-based regulation variable description
Min. age for assistant teacher at center = 1 if > 16; 0 otherwise
Minimum age for director at center = 1 if > 18; 0 otherwise
Minimum age for teacher at center = 1 if > 18; 0 otherwise
Min. hours of child development coursework required for aides in center = 1 if > 0
Min. hrs. of child devel. coursework required for director of center = 1 if ≥ 180
Min. hours of child develop. coursework req. for assis. teacher at center = 1 if > 0
Educ. req. for aide in center in years = 1 if > 8; 0 otherwise
Educ. req. for director of center in years = 1 if ≥ 14
Educ. req. for teacher at center in years = 1 if > 12
Childcare employment experience req. for aide in center in yrs. = 1 if > 0
Childcare employment experience required for dir. of center in years = 1 if ≥ 2
Childcare employment experience req. for teacher at center in years = 1 if > 0
Amount of indoor space req. per child at facil. (sq. ft.) = 1 if ≥ 35
Amt. of annual ongoing training req. for aides in center in hrs. = 1 if > 15
Annual ongoing training required for director of center in hrs. = 1 if > 8
Ongoing annual training req. for asst. teacher at center in hrs. = 1 if > 15
Amt. of outdoor space required per child at facil. (sq. ft.) = 1 if > 75
Max. child/caregiver for children age 0–11 months = 1 if < 4
Max. child/caregiver for children age 12–23 months = 1 if < 5
Max. child/caregiver ratio for children age 24–35 months = 1 if < 8
Max. child/caregiver ratio for children age 36–47 months = 1 if < 12
Max. child/caregiver ratio for children age 48–59 months = 1 if < 12
Max. child/caregiver ratio for children age 60+ months = 1 if < 15

Index (besides overall)
Development, staff
Development, staff
Development, staff
Development, staff
Development, staff
Development, staff
Development, staff, educ
Development, staff, educ
Development, staff, educ
Development, staff
Development, staff
Development, staff
Environment
Development, staff
Development, staff
Development, staff
Environment
Development, ratio
Development, ratio
Development, ratio
Development, ratio
Development, ratio
Development, ratio
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24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Max. group size for age 0–11 months in day care center = 1 if < 12
Max. group size for age 12–23 months in day care center = 1 if < 14
Max. group size for age 24–35 months in day care center = 1 if < 20
Max. group size for age 36–47 months in day care center = 1 if < 30
Max. group size for age 48–59 months in day care center = 1 if < 30
Max. group size for age 60 + months in day care center = 1 if < 32
Is first-aid certif. required for one or more staff members at day care center?
Is a criminal background check required for any employees at day care center?
Do regs. require a developmental program for day care centers?
Do regs. require developmentally appropriate equip. in day care centers?
Are fines imposed on day care centers that defy regs. and requirements?
Is a health evaluation required for any employees at day care center?
Are children who attend day care centers required to be immunized?
Is day care center facility required to carry liability insurance?
Is annual ongoing training required for aides in day care center?
Is annual ongoing training required for director of day care center?
Is annual ongoing training required for teacher in day care center?
Do regs. indicate that centers may release children only to parents?
Is prev. experience or training required of aide at day care center?
Is prev. experience or training required of director at day care center?
Is prev. experience or training required of teacher at day care center?
Is corporal punish. prohibited for all ages of children at day care center?
Do regs. require sick children to be excluded from child care center?
Do regs. allow parents free access to kids and facilities in day care center?
Does agency have authority to revoke day care center license?

SOURCE: Hotz and Xiao (2011).

Development
Development
Development
Development
Development
Development
Health, staff
Health, staff
Development
Environment
Oversight
Health
Health
Health
Development, staff
Development, staff
Development, staff
Health
Development, staff
Development, staff
Development, staff
Health
Health
Oversight
Oversight
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size0dcdum
size1dcdum
size2dcdum
size3dcdum
size4dcdum
size5dcdum
aiddc
crimdc
curricdc
equipdc
finedc
healdc
immundc
insurdc
ongoadc
ongoddc
ongotdc
pickupdc
preadc
preddc
pretdc
punishdc
sickdc
visitdc
revokedc
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Variable name
agedfhdum
cdhrsdfhdum
eddfhdum
inftfhdum
ongohdfhdum
outftfhdum
rat0fhdum
rat1fhdum
rat2fhdum
rat3fhdum
rat4fhdum
rat5fhdum
size0fhdum
size1fhdum
size2fhdum
size3fhdum
size4fhdum
size5fhdum
sizetfhdum
aidfh
crimfh
curricfh

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Family-based regulation variable
Min. age for a family daycare provider = 1 if > 18
Min. hrs. of child devel. training required for family care provider = 1 if > 0
Educ. req. for family day care provider in years = 1 if > 0
Amt. of indoor space req. per child at family facility in (sq. ft.) = 1 if > 25
Amt. of annual ongoing training req. for family provider in hrs. = 1 if > 0
Amt. of outdoor space req. per child at family facility in (sq. ft.) = 1 if > 0
Max. child/caregiver for children age 0–11 months in family based = 1 if < 3
Max. child/caregiver for children age 12–23 months in family based = 1 if < 4
Max. child/caregiver for children age 24–35 months in family based = 1 if < 6
Max. child/caregiver for children age 36–47 months in family based = 1 if < 6
Max. child/caregiver for children age 48–59 months in family based = 1 if < 6
Max. child/caregiver for children age 60 + months in family based = 1 if < 6
Max. number of children age 0–11 months allowed in family home = 1 if < 4
Max. number of children age 12–23 months allowed in family home = 1 if < 4
Max. number of children age 24–35 months allowed in family home = 1 if < 6
Max. number of children age 36–47 months allowed in family home = 1 if < 6
Max. number of children age 48–59 months allowed in family home = 1 if < 6
Max. number of children age 60 + months allowed in family home = 1 if < 6
Max. number of children allowed in family home = 1 if < 6
Is first-aid certif. required for family day care provider?
Is a criminal background check required for a family day care provider?
Do regs. require a developmental program for family homes?

232

Kleiner2013.indb 232

Appendix Table A.2 Family-Based Regulation Variables and Index Composition
Index (besides overall)
Development, staff
Development, staff
Development, staff, educ
Environment
Development, staff
Environment
Development, ratio
Development, ratio
Development, ratio
Development, ratio
Development, ratio
Development, ratio
Development
Development
Development
Development
Development
Development
Development
Health, staff
Health, staff
Development
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equipfh
expdfhdum
fencefh
finefh
firefh
foodfh
healfh
immunfh
insurfh
ongodfh
predfh
punishfh
revokefh
sickfh
tranfh
unannfh
visitfh

23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

Do regs. require developmentally appropriate equip. in family homes?
Childcare employment exper. req. for family day care provider in yrs. = 1 if > 0
Do regs. indicate outdoor play area must be fenced in, family homes?
Are fines imposed on family homes that defy regs. and requirements?
Do regs. require fire-health equip. in family homes?
Do regs. indicate nutritional requirements for meals and snacks, family homes?
Is a health evaluation required for a family day care provider?
Are children who attend family homes required to be immunized?
Is family home facility required to carry liability insurance?
Is annual ongoing training required for family day care provider?
Is training or orientation offered or required for family home providers?
Is corporal punish. prohibited for all ages of children, family homes?
Does agency have authority to revoke family home license?
Do regs. require sick children be excluded from family homes?
Do regs. include spec. instructions for transporting children in family homes?
Is agency authorized to inspect family home without prior notice?
Do regs. allow parents free access to kids and facilities in family homes?

Environment
Development, staff
Health, environment
Oversight
Health
Health
Health
Health
Oversight
Development, staff
Development, staff
Health
Oversight
Health
Health
Oversight
Oversight

SOURCE: Hotz and Xiao (2011).
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Adoption of Occupational
Regulations by State
Statute for Electricians
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State
Alaska
Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of
Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa

9/18/2013 10:11:33 AM

Kansas
Kentucky

Year
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
2000
1992
1999
1992
1992
1992
1992
1999
1992
1992
1992
2007
1992
1992
2001

Type of
licensing
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
L
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
L
N
L
S
L
L
S

General
requirement
0
0
1
0
1
0
1

Apprenticeship
1
1
1
1a
1
1a
1

Written
exam
0
1
1
1
1
1
1

Performance
exam
0
1
1
0
0
0
0

Continuous
education
0
0
1
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
1
1
1
0
1

1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0

1

1

0

0

0

1a

0

0

0
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Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma

N
S
S
S
N
S
S
S
S
L
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
L
S
S
S
S
S
S
L

0
0
1

0
1
1a

1
1
1

0
0
0

0
0
0

1
1
0
0

1
1
1
0

1
1
1
1

0
0
0
0

1
0
0
0

0
0
1
0
0
1
1

1a
1
1
1a
0
1
1

1
0
1
1
0
1
1

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
0
1
1
1
0

1a
1a
1
0
1a
1

0
1
1
1
1
0

0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
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Oregon
Pennsylvania

1992
2004
1992
1992
1992
2007
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
2003
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
2002
1992
1992

State
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Year
1992
1998
1992
1992
1992
2000
1992
2003
1992
2000
1992
1992
1995
1992
1999
1992
1994
1992
1992
1994

Type of
licensing
S
S
S
S
N
S
L
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S

General
requirement
0
1
0
0

Apprenticeship
0
1a
0
1

Written
exam
1
1
1
1

Performance
exam
0
0
0
0

Continuous
education
0
0
0
0

0

0

1

0

0

0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1

1
1
1a
1
0
1a
1
1
1
1a
1
1a
1a

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
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NOTE: S, L, C, and N in the column under heading “Type of licensing” refer to State, Local, Certification, and No license requirement,
respectively; definitions of specific components and their values are shown in Table 5.1.
a
In the “Apprenticeship” column, a indicates that higher occupation-specific experiences than apprenticeship (e.g., journeyman) are required.
SOURCE: Author’s analysis of statutes.
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Appendix Table B.2 Characteristics of the Data in the Analysis

Sampling

Important changes

Panel A: Key descriptions of the SOII and CFOI
Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses (SOII)
Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI)
• 39 states
• 50 states + DC
• Nonfatal injuries and illnesses for private industry
• Includes private and federal, state, and local
only
government agencies
• Excludes the self-employed, farms with fewer than • Data on deaths compiled from death certificates,
OSHA reports, workers’ compensation reports,
11 employees, private households, and federal
government agencies
medical examiner reports, newspaper articles, other
sources
• Includes employees in state and local government
• Change in the standard occupational classification
agencies for national estimates only
(SOC) system and the standard industry codes (SIC)
system in 2003
• Change in the standard occupational classification
(SOC) system and the standard industry codes (SIC)
system in 2003
• No longer reports on injuries separate from illness
starting with the 2002 data

239

9/18/2013 10:11:34 AM

Panel B: Sample selection for electricians: industry and occupation codes
1992–2002
2003–2007
Industry codes
1500~1799 under 1987 SIC
23 (23600~23899) under 2003 NAICS
Occupation codes for 555 Supervisors of electricians and power transmission 47-2111 Electricians;
electricians
installers
47-3013 Helpers of electricians
575 Electricians
576 Electricians’ apprentices
577 Electrical power-line installers and repairers
49-9051 Electrical power-line installers and repairers

This page intentionally left blank.
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Appendix C
Data Developed from the American
Community Survey (ACS)
To generate the sample of dentists and dental hygienists, we started by
dropping individuals who belong to the categories “Working without pay in
family business or farm” and “Unemployed.” Thus, the sample includes individuals who belong to the classes of 1) private wage and salary workers, 2)
government workers (who may work in any local, state, or federal governmental unit), and 3) self-employed, both in their own not-incorporated business and
in their own incorporated business.
Next, individuals whose education is “below associate” for dentists and
individuals whose education is “below 12th grade without diploma” for dental
hygienists were dropped. Also dropped were individuals whose age is greater
than 65 and whose years of experience (= age − years of schooling − 6) are
below zero and individuals whose usual working hours in the past 12 months
were less than 20 hours or more than 60 hours.
Hourly earnings were determined by computing annual hours worked (i.e.,
from the ACS question, the usual working hours times the number of weeks for
the past 12 months). Then we computed annual earnings by adding the wage
and salary income (i.e., wagp) and the income from self-employment (i.e.,
semp), and then dividing the annual earnings by annual hours worked.
In computing the hourly earnings, however, the ACS has two potential
measurement problems: 1) the presence of outliers and 2) the top-coding (or
censoring) of both incomes (i.e., wagp and semp), particularly for dentists.
First, a few individuals report implausibly high earnings relative to their hours
of work, which would affect the estimated mean and variance of hourly earnings. There was a deletion of observations for the professionals whose hourly
earnings were in the top 0.5 percent for each occupation. As a result, the highest hourly earnings were in the range of two times the top-coded hourly earnings. Next, we computed top-coded hourly earnings (we also top-coded hourly
wagp and semp), assuming that the top-coded individuals worked for 40 hours
and 52 weeks in a given year. For individuals who had wagp (semp) only, we
assigned the top-coded hourly wagp (semp) as their hourly earnings. For individuals who had both wagp and semp and for whom the sum of hourly wagp
and hourly semp was greater than the higher of the top-coded hourly wagp and
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the top-coded hourly semp, we assigned the higher of the top-coded hourly
wagp and the top-coded hourly semp as their hourly earnings.
To deal with the top-codings, we followed the method used in much of
the literature: we adjusted the top-coded incomes by a factor (typically, 1.33
or 1.40) that approximates the mean for those above the censoring point (Card
and DiNardo 2002). In this paper, we present empirical results using hourly
earnings adjusted by a factor of 1.40.
For individuals who reported implausibly low earnings, we deleted observations with measured hourly wages below the federal minimum wage of
$5.15 during 2001–2007.
Appendix Table C.1 Sample Selection from the ACS

Initial observations
Selection rule 1: Unemployed or working without pay in
family business or farm
Selection rule 2: Educational attainment
Drop sample: Below associate for dentist;
sample below 12th grade w/o diploma for
dental hygienist
Selection rule 3: Age equal to or over 65
Selection rule 4: Experience = Age − years of schooling − 6
Selection rule 5: Less than 20 hours and more than 60 hours
Selection rule 6: Drop individuals whose hourly earnings
belong to the top 0.5%
Selection rule 7: Hourly earnings less than the federal
minimum of $5.15 during 2001–2007
Total observations

Dental
hygienists
7,510
−20

Dentists
8,942
−11

−48

−28

−142
−8
−1,303
−30

−1,017
−36
−534
−37

−73

−59

5,886

7,220

SOURCE: American Community Survey (ACS).
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Appendix Table C.2 Models of State Median Hourly Earnings Gap between Hygienists and Dentists
DHPPI
Tasks permitted (summated)
Tasks permitted (Rasch)
Independence from dentists (summated)
Independence from dentists (Rasch)

(1)
0.001
(0.008)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

−0.054
(0.043)
−0.053
(0.057)
−0.067****
(0.010)
−0.049****

(0.006)
−0.534****
(0.073)
Employment growth ratio
0.003
0.007
0.005
−0.005
−0.005
−0.005
(0.037)
(0.038)
(0.038)
(0.036)
(0.036)
(0.036)
State median household income (/1,000)
−0.070***
−0.066***
−0.069***
−0.065***
−0.065***
−0.065***
(0.022)
(0.022)
(0.022)
(0.022)
(0.022)
(0.022)
Rate of uninsured
−0.034
−0.029
−0.032
−0.024
−0.024
−0.024
(0.026)
(0.025)
(0.025)
(0.026)
(0.026)
(0.026)
Constant
5.227****
5.301****
5.240****
4.795****
4.346***
4.833****
(1.307)
(1.322)
(1.312)
(1.330)
(1.362)
(1.324)
State fixed effects
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Year fixed effects
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
0.354
0.357
0.356
0.361
0.362
0.362
R−squared
322
322
322
322
322
322
N
NOTE: Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are reported in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the
0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level; **** significant at the 0.001 level.
SOURCE: Author’s compilation of licensing statutes; ACS.
Self-employment allowed
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Appendix D
Statutory Right to an Occupation
Model Legislation
Table of Contents
100.01 Purpose
100.02 Definitions
100.03 Right to engage in a lawful occupation
100.04 Federal law’s use of state occupational regulations

100.01 PURPOSE
This chapter’s purpose is to (a) ensure that an individual may pursue a lawful occupation free from unnecessary regulations and (b) protect against the
misuse of occupational regulations to reduce competition and increase prices
to consumers.
100.02 DEFINITIONS
Subdivision 1. Scope. For the purposes of this chapter, the words defined in
this section have the following meanings.
Subd. 2. Business license. “Business license” means a permit, registration,
certification, franchise, or other approval required by law for a sole proprietorship, partnership, or corporate entity to do business.
Subd. 3. Certification. “Certification” is a voluntary program in which the
government grants nontransferable recognition to an individual who meets
personal qualifications established by a legislative body. Upon approval, the
individual may use “certified” as a designated title. A noncertified individual
may also perform the lawful occupation for compensation but may not use the
title “certified.” “Certification” is not intended to be synonymous with an “occupational license” in this chapter or to prohibit the use of private certification.
Subd. 4. Court. “Court” means any court, administrative tribunal, or other
government agency acting in a judicial or quasijudicial capacity.
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Subd. 5. Government. “Government” means the government of this state or
any of its political subdivisions.
Subd. 6. Lawful occupation. “Lawful occupation” means a course of conduct,
pursuit, or profession that includes the sale of goods or services that are not
themselves illegal to sell, irrespective of whether the individual selling them is
subject to an occupational regulation.
Subd. 7. Least restrictive occupational regulation. “Least restrictive occupational regulation” means, from least to most restrictive, (a) a provision for
private civil action to remedy consumer harm, (b) inspection, (c) bonding or
insurance, (d) registration, (e) certification, or (f) occupational license.
Subd. 8. Occupational license. “Occupational license” is a nontransferable
authorization in law for an individual to perform a lawful occupation for compensation based on meeting personal qualifications established by a legislative body. It is illegal for an individual who does not possess an occupational
license to perform the occupation for compensation. Occupational licensing is
the most restrictive form of occupational regulation.
Subd. 9. Occupational regulation. “Occupational regulation” means a statute,
ordinance, rule, practice, policy, or other law requiring an individual to possess
certain personal qualifications to work in a lawful occupation. It excludes a
business license, facility license, building permit, land use regulation, or other
commercial regulations except to the extent those laws regulate an individual’s
personal qualifications to perform a lawful occupation.
Subd. 10. Personal qualifications. “Personal qualifications” are criteria established by a legislative body related to an individual’s personal background,
including completion of an approved educational program, satisfactory performance on an examination, work experience, moral standing, and completion
of continuing education.
Subd. 11. Registration. “Registration” means a requirement established by
a legislative body in which an individual gives notice to the government that
may include the individual’s name and address, the individual’s agent for service of process, the location of the activity to be performed, and a description
of the service the individual provides. “Registration” does not include personal
qualifications but may require a bond or insurance. Upon approval, the individual may use “registered” as a designated title. A nonregistered individual
may not perform the occupation for compensation or use “registered” as a
designated title. “Registration” is not transferable. It is not intended to be synonymous with an “occupational license” in this chapter or to prohibit the use
of private registration.
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Subd. 12. Substantial burden. “Substantial burden” means a legal or other
regulatory obstacle that imposes significant difficulty or cost on an individual
seeking to enter into or continue in a lawful occupation. A substantial burden
is a burden that is more than incidental.
100.03 RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN A LAWFUL OCCUPATION
Subdivision 1. Statutory right. An individual has a right to engage in a lawful
occupation free from any substantial burden unless the government demonstrates (a) it has a compelling interest in protecting against present and recognizable harm to the public health or safety, and (b) the occupational regulation
is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling interest.
Subd. 2. Defense and relief.
(a) An individual may assert as a defense the right to engage in a lawful
occupation in any judicial or administrative proceeding to enforce an
occupational regulation that violates subdivision 1.
(b) An individual may bring an action for declaratory judgment or injunctive or other equitable relief for a violation of subdivision 1.
(c) An individual may assert as a defense or bring an action against the
enforceability of an occupational regulation, pursuant to subsections (a)
and (b), which is:
(1) in law at the effective date of this chapter; or
(2) enacted, adopted, or amended after the effective date of this chapter
and does not include in the state statute an explicit exemption from
this chapter.
(d) An individual who asserts a defense or brings an action under this section has the initial burden of proof that an occupational regulation substantially burdens the individual’s right to engage in a lawful occupation.
(e) If the individual meets the burden of proof under subsection (d), the
government must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that
the government has a compelling interest in protecting against present
and recognizable harm to the public health or safety, and that the occupational regulation is the least restrictive means for furthering that
compelling interest.
Subd. 3. Judicial determination. A court shall liberally construe this chapter
to protect the right established in subdivision 1. A court shall make its own
findings of fact and conclusions of law. It shall not grant any presumption to
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legislative or administrative determinations of harm to the public health or
safety, or that the regulation is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest.

100.04 FEDERAL LAW’S USE OF STATE OCCUPATIONAL
REGULATIONS
To the extent necessary to meet federal law, the statutory right established in
section 100.03, subdivision 1, does not apply to an individual who is required
by federal law to meet a state occupational regulation.
Note
I thank Lee McGrath, of the Minnesota chapter of the Institute for Justice, for providing
this model legislation (McGrath 2012).
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Appendix E
Data Sources Used in This Volume
The sources of many of the data used in this volume are given, along with the
years of the surveys and their frequency. In addition, units of observation for
the data are presented, along with the sources’ unique characteristics that make
them useful for analyzing the influence of various stages of occupational regulation in the United States.
American Community Survey (ACS)
Conducted by: U.S. Department of Commerce, Census Bureau, as provided
by the Minnesota Population Center (Integrated Public Use Microdata Series),
University of Minnesota.
Survey years: Every year.
Unit surveyed: Individuals, by household.
Number of units in survey: The full implementation of the ACS, which began
in 2005, sampled approximately 2.9 million housing unit addresses annually.
The 2011 ACS sampled approximately 3.3 million housing unit addresses.
This corresponds to a 3.54 million annual level beginning in June 2011.
Unique characteristics: The survey provides broad social, economic, housing,
and demographic profiles. For example, it includes age, gender, race, family
relationships, income and benefits, health insurance, education, veteran status,
disabilities, where you work and how you get there, and where you live and
how much you pay for some essentials.
Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI)
Conducted by: Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). CFOI is a federal-state cooperative program that has been implemented in all 50 states and the District
of Columbia since 1992. To compile counts that are as complete as possible,
the census uses multiple sources to identify, verify, and profile fatal worker
injuries. Information about each workplace fatal injury—occupation and other
worker characteristics, equipment involved, and circumstances of the event—
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is obtained by cross-referencing the source records, such as death certificates,
workers’ compensation reports, and federal and state agency administrative
reports. To ensure that fatal injuries are work-related, cases are substantiated
with two or more independent source documents, or a source document and a
follow-up questionnaire.
Survey years: 1992 through 2010.
Units surveyed: Firms and states. About 200,000 business establishments are
surveyed annually.
Number of units in survey: A work relationship exists if an event or exposure
results in the fatal injury or illness of a person under the following three circumstances: 1) on the employer’s premises and the person was there to work,
2) off the employer’s premises and the person was there to work, or 3) the
event or exposure was related to the person’s work or status as an employee.
The employer’s premises include buildings, grounds, parking lots, and other
facilities and property used in the conduct of business. Work is defined as duties, activities, or tasks that produce a product or result; that are done in exchange for money, goods, services, profit, or benefit; and that are legal activities in the United States.
Unique characteristics: The database has contractor starts and ownership, and
recently it added information by occupation and state. The data also have information on the age of the individual, birthplace, gender, day of the incident,
and what happened during the incident.
Census of the Population
Conducted by: U.S. Department of Commerce, Census Bureau, as provided
by the Minnesota Population Center (Integrated Public Use Microdata Series),
University of Minnesota.
Survey years: Every 10 years, dating to the founding of the United States.
Unit surveyed: Individuals, by household.
Number of units in survey: Between 5 and 100 percent of the population, depending on the question.
Unique characteristics: Provides large samples of individuals’ labor force status (employed, wages, earnings), demographic characteristics, industry and
occupation, national origin, and area of residence.
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Current Population Survey (CPS)
Conducted by: U.S. Department of Commerce, Census Bureau, for the U.S.
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Survey years: Monthly since 1943.
Unit surveyed: Individuals 16 years or older, by household.
Number of units in survey: Currently approximately 120,000 individuals that
make up 60,000 households.
Unique characteristics: Each CPS survey includes data on demographic characteristics, labor force status, industry, region, state, and occupation.
Department of Labor Listing of Licensed Occupations
Conducted by: Department of Labor’s Employment and Training Administration in conjunction with state labor market information agencies.
Survey years: Various years, including 2000.
Units surveyed: State agencies responsible for occupational regulation.
Unique characteristics: Census of state-licensed occupations in the United
States, as provided to the U.S. Department of Labor in 2000 by state agencies
responsible for labor market information and licensing occupations.
Early Childhood Longitudinal Program from Birth, ECLS-B
Conducted by: National Center for Education Statistics. The Early Childhood
Longitudinal Study Birth Cohort (ECLS-B) was designed to supply policymakers, researchers, child care providers, teachers, and parents with detailed
information about children’s early life experiences. Data collected for the
ECLS-B focus on children’s health, development, care, and education during
the formative years from birth through kindergarten entry.
Survey years: Children were followed from birth through kindergarten entry.
Information about these children was collected when they were approximately
nine months old (2001–2002), two years old (2003–2004), and four years old/
preschool age (2005–2006).
Units surveyed: Children and their parents, and another module was gathered
from teachers on the children’s cognitive ability.
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Unique characteristics: A nationally representative sample of approximately
14,000 children born in the United States in 2001. The children participating
in the study came from diverse socioeconomic and racial/ethnic backgrounds,
with oversamples of Chinese children, other Asian and Pacific Islander children, American Indian and Alaska Native children, twins, and children born
with low and very low birth weight.
Early Childhood Longitudinal Program, Kindergarten Class of 1998–1999
(ECLS-K)
Conducted by: National Center for Education Statistics. It focuses on children’s
early school experiences, beginning with kindergarten and following children
through middle school. The ECLS-K data provide descriptive information on
children’s status at entry to school, their transition into school, and their progression through eighth grade. The longitudinal nature of the ECLS-K data
enables researchers to study how a wide variety of family, school, community,
and individual factors are associated with school performance.
Survey years: 1998–1999, 1999–2000, 2002, 2004, and 2007.
Units surveyed: To collect information from children, trained assessors visited the children in their schools. The direct child assessment, which was untimed and conducted one-on-one with each child, collected information about
children’s reading and mathematics skills and knowledge in each round of
data collection, their general knowledge (i.e., science and social studies) in
kindergarten and first grade, and their science knowledge in third, fifth, and
eighth grades. In addition, the assessment included measurements of height
and weight and, in fall kindergarten only, children’s psychomotor skills (e.g.,
ability to hop, skip, jump, manipulate blocks, and draw figures). In the third,
fifth, and eighth grades, children completed questionnaires on various topics
including their perceptions of their social and academic competence and skills,
their school experiences and activities, and their diet.
To collect information from parents, a trained interviewer phoned the parent at
his or her home and conducted a 45–50 minute interview. Computer-assisted
interviewing methods were used to record the parent’s answers. If the child’s
family did not have a telephone, the interview was conducted in person. The
sample now includes 18,300 kindergartners and their families, teachers, school
administrators, and before- and after-school care providers.
Unique characteristics: No large national study that was focused on education
had followed a cohort of children from kindergarten entry to middle school

Kleiner2013.indb 252

9/18/2013 10:11:37 AM

Appendix E 253
until the ECLS-K. The ECLS-K was designed to provide comprehensive and
reliable data that could be used to describe and to better understand children’s
development and experiences in the elementary and middle school grades,
as well as how children’s early experiences relate to their later development,
learning, and experiences in school. The multifaceted data collected across the
years allow researchers and policymakers to study how various child, home,
classroom, school, and community factors at various points in children’s lives
relate to cognitive, social, emotional, and physical development.
National Longitudinal Surveys
Conducted by: The National Longitudinal Surveys (NLS) are a set of two surveys sponsored by the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics and conducted by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) at the
University of Chicago, with assistance from the Center for Human Resource
Research (CHRR) at Ohio State University, and the fieldwork is conducted by
the census.
Survey years: Occasionally since 1965.
Units surveyed: The current survey consists of a nationally representative sample of approximately 9,000 participants and their households.
Unique characteristics: The NLS are a set of surveys designed to gather information at multiple points in time on the labor market activities and other significant life events of several groups of men and women. There are five cohorts
that make up the National Longitudinal Surveys NLSY97 and NLSY79: 1)
children, 2) mature women, 3) young women, 4) older men, and 5) young men.
An extensive two-part questionnaire was administered to each respondent; this
questionnaire listed and gathered demographic information on members of the
household and on the respondent’s immediate family members living elsewhere. Youths are interviewed on an annual basis. Questions are asked about
current and former occupations.
Option One
Conducted by: Data come from Option One, a lending company that obtains
almost all its loans from brokers.
Survey year: 2005.
Units surveyed: Broker-dependent mortgage originators of several million
loans.
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Unique characteristics: Detailed data on mortgage originators in the United
States that includes borrower’s income and racial/ethnic identity, the loan
amount, and several economic and demographic properties of the census tract
where the property is located (the distribution of credit scores, unemployment
rate, median age of applicants, median age of housing stock, percentage of
minority population, median income, and the percentage of owner-occupied
and vacant housing units).
Princeton Data Improvement Initiative (PDII)
Conducted by: Westat conducted a national random-digit-dial (RDD) survey
on behalf of Princeton University.
Survey year: 2008.
Units surveyed: In order to be eligible for the study, persons had to be adults
in the labor force—for this project the labor force was defined as persons who
are either a) currently working at a job for pay or profit or b) currently looking
for work and have worked at a job in the past. Households in which no adults
are currently in the labor force were not eligible for the study. If a household
contained more than one adult in the labor force, one was randomly selected by
the CATI program for participation in the extended interview. When the person
chosen for the extended interview was someone other than the screener respondent, age and workforce status were confirmed with that person before continuing with the extended interview. There were 2,513 completed interviews.
Unique characteristics: Major topics covered in the survey included worker
perceptions of occupational licensing, adult lifetime work experience, and the
potential for their jobs to be offshored. On occupational licensing, there was
a module to assess the accuracy of self-reported occupational licensing and
certification. The key questions were as follows:
Q11. Do you have a license or certification that is required by a federal, state,
or local government agency to do your job?
YES ................................................................................................................. 1
NO .............................................................................................. 2 (Go to Q25)
IN PROCESS/WORKING ON IT.................................................................... 3
Q11a. Would someone who does not have a license or certificate be legally
allowed to do your job?
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YES ................................................................................................................. 1
NO ................................................................................................................... 2
Q12. Is everyone who does your job eventually required to have a license or
certification by a federal, state, or local government agency?
YES ................................................................................................................. 1
NO ................................................................................................................... 2
Those who answered affirmatively to Q11 were asked additional questions
about the agency (federal, state, or local) that required their license or certificate, and about the requirements they needed to satisfy, such as achieving a
high school or college degree, passing a test, demonstrating certain skills, or
completing an internship or apprenticeship.
Survey of Licensing Statutes
Conducted by: Center for Labor Policy, University of Minnesota, Jing Cai,
Yaffa Epstein, Heidi Liu, and Cynthia Pahl.
Survey years: Various years between 1980 and 2010.
Units surveyed: State statutes for interior designers, mortgage brokers, preschool teachers and their assistants, plumbers and electricians, and dentists and
dental hygienists.
Unique characteristics: Statutory data and changes in laws on age, citizenship, residency, good moral character, special education, graduate education
requirements, experience, exam requirements, bachelor’s degree requirement,
and reciprocity requirements with other states or countries.
Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses (SOII)
Conducted by: U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics for establishments with 10 or more workers.
Survey years: Data are provided annually on the rate and number of workrelated injuries, illnesses, and fatal injuries, and how these statistics vary by
incident, industry, geography, occupation, and other characteristics.
Units surveyed: These are surveys of establishments annually. This survey
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is made possible through the cooperation of participating state agencies and
nearly 200,000 business establishments that provide information on workplace
injuries and illnesses to the BLS. State agencies collect and verify most of the
data provided. BLS field offices collect and verify data from nonparticipating
states.
Unique characteristics: The SOII collects data on nonfatal injuries and illnesses for each calendar year from a sample of employers. Just before the start
of the year, the BLS sends notification (and record-keeping information) to the
sampled employers. In the following January, the BLS sends these employers
requests for the injury and illness information for the year just ended, along
with instructions on how to report it to the BLS. These reports form the basis of
the annual estimates published in the following October and November, after
the data are collected.
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About the Institute
The W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research is a nonprofit research
organization devoted to finding and promoting solutions to employmentrelated problems at the national, state, and local levels. It is an activity of the
W.E. Upjohn Unemployment Trustee Corporation, which was established in
1932 to administer a fund set aside by Dr. W.E. Upjohn, founder of The Upjohn
Company, to seek ways to counteract the loss of employment income during
economic downturns.
The Institute is funded largely by income from the W.E. Upjohn Unemployment Trust, supplemented by outside grants, contracts, and sales of publications.
Activities of the Institute comprise the following elements: 1) a research program conducted by a resident staff of professional social scientists; 2) a competitive grant program, which expands and complements the internal research
program by providing financial support to researchers outside the Institute; 3) a
publications program, which provides the major vehicle for disseminating the
research of staff and grantees, as well as other selected works in the field; and
4) an Employment Management Services division, which manages most of the
publicly funded employment and training programs in the local area.
The broad objectives of the Institute’s research, grant, and publication programs are to 1) promote scholarship and experimentation on issues of public
and private employment and unemployment policy, and 2) make knowledge
and scholarship relevant and useful to policymakers in their pursuit of solutions
to employment and unemployment problems.
Current areas of concentration for these programs include causes, consequences, and measures to alleviate unemployment; social insurance and income
maintenance programs; compensation; workforce quality; work arrangements;
family labor issues; labor-management relations; and regional economic development and local labor markets.

291

Kleiner2013.indb 291

9/18/2013 10:11:47 AM

